đź“Ś Static Links
Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:07:29 -0700
[Real Thomas777] Live with RealThomas777
Thu, 24 Sep 2026 12:18:03 -0700
German-Russian relations today appear to have reached a dead end. Germany supports Ukraine, sanctions Russia, and treats Moscow as an enemy. Russia, in turn, sees Germany as part of a hostile Western bloc. It would be easy to look at this situation and assume that the hostility will last for generations. History gives us little reason to make such an assumption. Alliances change. Governments fall. Wars end. Yesterday’s enemy can become tomorrow’s partner.
The older geopolitical argument is simple. Britain spent centuries trying to prevent one power from dominating continental Europe. After 1945, the United States became the main Western power on the continent and built its Cold War strategy around containing the Soviet Union. Germany stood at the center of that division. The western part of Germany emerged from the American, British, and French occupation zones, while the eastern part emerged from the Soviet zone. Germany itself became the frontier between the Atlantic world and the Soviet world.
Some European thinkers imagined another future. Ernst Niekisch, the leading German theorist of National Bolshevism, argued during the interwar years for a German turn towards Russia and against dependence on the Western powers. He later opposed Hitler, was arrested, received a life sentence from the Nazi state, and was liberated by the Red Army. Jean Thiriart, the Belgian theorist of continental Europe, imagined a great Euro-Soviet space running from Dublin to Vladivostok. Guillaume Faye, the French writer associated with the European New Right and Archeofuturism, called his version of this idea Eurosiberia: an autonomous European bloc closely joined to Russia. Alexander Dugin, the Russian philosopher associated with Eurasianism and multipolarity, places German-Russian cooperation within a larger vision of a world divided among several civilizational poles rather than governed from one center.
None of these visions proves what the future will be. That is the point. There is no predestination in international politics. Imagine telling a Frenchman in 1944 that France and Germany would soon form the central partnership of an integrated Europe. German troops still occupied France. Three major wars between the two countries lay within living memory. Yet within a generation Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer were building a partnership that their fathers could scarcely have imagined. What looks permanent often is not.
Germany itself may now be entering another period of change. On September 6, 2026, the AfD (Alternative for Germany) won the state election in Saxony-Anhalt with 43.8 percent, compared with 17.2 percent for the CDU (Christian Democratic Union, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party). Five years earlier, the AfD had received only 20.8 percent there. The party did not win an absolute majority, but the scale of the result was extraordinary. It turned what had once been treated as a protest party into the dominant political force.
This matters for German-Russian relations because the AfD has openly challenged the foreign-policy consensus in Berlin. It has called for the restoration of relations with Moscow, opposed the present policy towards Ukraine, and attacked sanctions on Russia. Merz has attacked the party sharply for precisely this reason, accusing it of serving Russian interests. The rise of the AfD means that Germany’s relationship with Russia is once again becoming an electoral question rather than a closed matter decided by the foreign-policy establishment.
The change is greatest in East Germany. That is no accident, although the reasons are more complicated than nostalgia for the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The GDR was founded in the Soviet occupation zone in 1949 and remained inside the Soviet bloc until 1990, with Soviet troops stationed there throughout the Cold War. Millions of East Germans therefore grew up with Russia and the Soviet Union as facts of everyday political life. For some, the memory is bitter. Soviet power meant political subordination, censorship, and military control. For others, Russia remains less distant and less abstract than it does in West Germany. This difference is still visible in East Germany, where attitudes towards Moscow are notably less hostile than they are in West Germany.
The GDR was a communist state. On some questions, such as women’s employment, it departed sharply from the old German order. But East German society was in many respects more conservative, patriotic, and traditional than its Western counterpart. The Federal Republic became part of NATO, part of the Atlantic economy, and increasingly part of the American cultural sphere. The political map of Germany today still follows the old border in striking ways.
That is why East Germany matters far beyond its population size. Political movements often begin at the edge before moving towards the center. The AfD’s result in Saxony-Anhalt shows that positions once excluded from mainstream German politics can gain mass support. A party that favors tighter borders, greater national sovereignty, a different relationship with the European Union, and renewed relations with Russia has now become mainstream in Germany.
We should also remember something that current political language often obscures: Russia is also a European country, even if we do not regard it as part of the contemporary political West. Russia stretches across Europe and Asia, but its historical core, its two great cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and much of its population and political history belong to the European side of that vast space. More importantly, Russia shares deep cultural and civilizational roots with the rest of Europe. Russian Christianity came from Byzantium and belongs to the Eastern Orthodox branch of the same Christian civilization that shaped Catholic and Protestant Western Europe. Russian literature, classical music, architecture, philosophy, and political thought have been woven into European culture for centuries. Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky, and countless others are impossible to remove from the European story. Russia and Western Europe are not identical. Their histories, churches, and political traditions differ. But difference does not mean civilizational foreignness. Russia can stand outside the political West and still belong to the wider European family of civilizations.
From that starting point, something resembling a Euro-Russian partnership becomes imaginable. Call it Euro-Russia, Eurosiberia, a continental partnership, or simply a European-Russian alliance. The name is less important than the structure. Western Europe and Russia together possess dense infrastructure, advanced technology, immense industrial and scientific capacity, major ports, vast territory, enormous energy and mineral resources, agricultural land, military power, and hundreds of millions of people across the northern Eurasian landmass. Thiriart and Faye saw in this concentration of population, resources, technology, and strategic depth the foundations of a continental arrangement capable of acting as a major power (a hyperpower) in its own right. Their projects were political theories, not forecasts, but the geographical facts behind them remain.
History does not stop at the institutions of one era. The Warsaw Pact once appeared permanent. So did the Soviet Union. So did the division of Germany. Each disappeared or changed faster than most contemporary observers expected.
And this brings us back to the central point.
There is no predestination.
The old continental idea could return in a new form: not Soviet, not American, not the European Union as we know it today, but a sovereign European space in durable partnership with Russia.
From Dublin to Vladivostok.
That future is not promised.
But neither can it be ruled out.
The future has not been written.
If you enjoy my writing, order my new book, Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt.
Jerry B. Marchant of IS IT PROPAGANDA?® asks whether the United Nations still reflects the world it claims to represent.
The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly from September 22-27, 2026, opened under the theme of restoring trust and managing transformation. Its most widely reported image was a room emptying. On 24 September, more than 100 delegates left their seats before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke, the second consecutive year in which he faced a mass walkout. The Palestinian Mission had urged member states to organize the walkout. Although the walkout was a targeted political protest, not a general expression of boredom, its form still matters analytically. A deliberative body whose members leave the chamber to register dissent, while the speaker continues to the cameras, has become an arena for signaling rather than decision.
President Trump’s 2026 address lasted roughly thirty-seven minutes, defended the war against Iran, and criticized the United Nations itself. His 2025 speech ran about an hour and dismissed the institution’s output as empty words that do not solve wars. Even the Assembly’s most powerful critics treat it as a venue for declaration. The Charter explains why: under Article 10, the Assembly may discuss and recommend, but it cannot compel.6 Speeches made there carry no obligation, and their length rises as their consequence falls.
The structural cause of this condition is the Security Council. Article 27(3) requires the concurring votes of the permanent members on substantive matters, and Article 108 gives the same five states a veto over amending the Charter. The result is an institution that cannot correct its own distribution of power. Bosco and Weiss, both sympathetic to the organization, document how the permanent members have used this position to shield their own interests and those of their partners.12
The war between the United States and Iran has now lasted nearly seven months, and the war in Ukraine continues. Neither has been resolved by the body charged with maintaining international peace.
The decline is also material. By the Secretary-General’s own account, only $1.8 billion of the $3.5 billion in regular-budget assessments for 2025 had been received, a shortfall of about half. The revised 2026 budget stands at $3.238 billion, a cut of 15.1 percent, with 2,681 posts eliminated. Analysts note that late payment by the two largest contributors compounds the problem and that accounting rules return unspent funds to members, including those in arrears, which drains cash when it is most needed. An organization that cannot secure its own operating costs from its most powerful members has limited standing to lead them.
Multipolar theorists such as Kenneth Waltz argued that the unipolar moment was inherently unstable and would give way to balancing.3 Mearsheimer holds that the liberal international order was bound to fail because it rested on that temporary distribution of power.4 Acharya and Kupchan extend the argument, contending that authority is dispersing among regional powers and civilizational blocs, so that no single center can write rules for the rest.56
According to this view, consequential diplomacy has moved into bilateral and regional formats, and the General Assembly is consulted, at most, after the fact.
Advocates of multipolarity add that the Charter’s founding principles support their position. Sovereign equality (Article 2(1)) and the limit on intervention in domestic jurisdiction (Article 2(7)) describe a pluralist order more accurately than the hierarchy that has been built on them. The failure lies in the machinery: a Council that reflects 1945, no permanent seat for Africa or Latin America, and none for India despite its population. An institution that cannot represent the world it claims to speak for will be bypassed by it.
The emptying hall is the visible evidence.
Critics of this position raise three points.
The same great powers now blamed for paralysis, including Washington and Beijing, are also implicated in the arrears that constrain the organization. Humanitarian and specialized agencies continue to deliver assistance at scale. And a multipolar system may need a universal forum more than a unipolar one, since regional blocs cannot mediate among themselves.
Whether the United Nations can be reformed or only routed around is the central question of the debate.
Bosco, David L. Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World. Oxford University Press, 2009.
Weiss, Thomas G. What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It. 3rd ed. Polity, 2016.
Waltz, Kenneth N. “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order.” International Security 43, no. 4 (2019): 7–50.
Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Polity, 2014.
Kupchan, Charles A. No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford University Press, 2012.
WSJ POLL: Trump proposed $5K checks if GOP wins the midterms. Good idea or bad?
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 30, 2026
? Good 23%
? Bad 64% https://t.co/dYlDHXsQro pic.twitter.com/LVQgCcZtvN
WSJ: Americans Want Populist Policies That Defy Traditional Political Labels
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 30, 2026
Top 10 policies with highest support among both Democratic and Republican voters https://t.co/dYlDHXsQro pic.twitter.com/HMUYTEk2ii
Abolish the Senate. Congress picks the President.
— House Republicans (@HouseGOP) September 30, 2026
A brand-new constitution.
This is the Left’s official plan.
This is COMMUNISM. pic.twitter.com/e43C6FqvU1
— Dan Scavino Jr.??? (@DanScavino) September 26, 2026
Leaked audio of Ken Paxton:
— Headquarters (@HQNewsNow) September 30, 2026
Q: Do you think Trump is a bit of a drag?
Paxton: To be honest with you, when we did that midterm convention, it dropped our numbers. Everybody’s numbers dropped. Yeah. Not good. pic.twitter.com/ILMI6gN3R8
The GOP was warned for years this was coming.
They stuck their heads in the sand, caved to their donor agenda and cried socialism. Trump won the 2024 election because too many people were becoming desperate. The Iran War and all the downstream economic consequences that stem from it have only made them more desperate.
“Americans in both parties back government-imposed price caps and other market interventions to make life more affordable, suggesting new support for populist ideas that were once largely outside the political mainstream.
That’s the takeaway of a new Wall Street Journal survey that asked respondents what they want from their elected officials and the political system. Voters of all partisan stripes strongly support capping the cost of prescription drugs, child care and credit-card interest rates.
The survey suggests that a coalition reaching beyond the nation’s familiar party labels exists for a range of policies at a time when Americans view Republicans and Democrats negatively. …”
It is worth noting that the Trump Convention in Dallas and the $5,000 promise bombed with voters and seems to have just pissed them off even more. It hurt Republicans all over the map in September.
HI EVERYBODY!
About to begin the LONGEST jaunt of the TOURING SEASON - I’ll be back home in just under 2 WEEKS.
I’ll keep everyone posted from the ROAD on my activities, and drop SITREPS on what I am getting up to w/our FRIENDS out on the WEST COAST - its likely going to be 3 WEEKS rather than 2 WEEKS from time of last MINDPHASER episode upload though; I APOLOGIZE for this! I promise FRESH Podcast content will be available soon as I get home.
When I reach the COAST after leaving PORTLAND, I’m thinking I’m probably going to RECORD some fresh stuff (or even go LIVE, possibly) in the form of dedicated COLLABS, but I’ll announce that when its firmly scheduled.
THURSDAY LIVESTREAMS are gonna be on hiatus next two weeks as well, but WILL RESUME the week of OCTOBER 12.
TYSM, COOL PEOPLES - I got great LOVE for ya.
- T
Stanislav Krapivnik explains how Europe’s willingness to host nuclear weapons is bringing the prospect of Russian nuclear strikes on European soil dangerously close.
Lithuania has become the latest, though certainly not the last, country on the list whose parliament has voted to lift restrictions on the stationing of nuclear weapons. In other words, yet another European state with a death wish has decided to remove the legal barriers to deploying nuclear warheads on its territory. The weapons in question are expected to be primarily American, although French nuclear weapons could also potentially be used. Britain’s nuclear arsenal—which, strictly speaking, is not entirely British but heavily dependent on American systems—is not being considered, since it is based exclusively on submarines, many of which are currently undergoing maintenance amid funding shortages. Quite simply, the money is not there.
What is being discussed is American nuclear weaponry in the form of the B61-12 guided nuclear gravity bomb. These weapons can be carried not only by strategic bombers but also by tactical aircraft such as the F-16 and F-35.
There is, however, one small detail that has not been properly taken into account. Since modern F-16 and F-35 fighters are capable of carrying a 50-kiloton nuclear bomb, in the event of any armed conflict between the United States and Russia, the Russian side would be compelled to destroy all relevant storage facilities and air bases.
Assuming that these bunkers are dispersed throughout the European Union and are heavily fortified, neutralizing them would require the use of medium-yield nuclear weapons, for example in the range of 50 to 100 kilotons—roughly equivalent, at the upper end, to five bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima.
Given the population density of the European Union, a series of such strikes would result in catastrophe and could potentially lead to the deaths of a substantial part of the population. What is striking, however, is that the population of the EU as a whole appears so shortsighted that it fails to grasp the scale of the consequences. Europeans are actively supporting the creation of conditions under which their own territory could effectively serve as a “human shield” for American nuclear weapons.
What can one say?
As the American saying goes: “Stupidity should hurt.”
(Translated from the Russian)
New from Multipolar Press:
Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt by Constantin von Hoffmeister
Trump: "We're gonna be signing a document today renaming artificial intelligence, because it's not artificial. We're gonna be naming it Super Intelligence. Officially renaming it." pic.twitter.com/Wgv6y5Hznl
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 29, 2026
? BREAKING: President Trump just released the "White House Accord on Super Intelligence" SIGNED today by Elon Musk, Jensen Huang, Sundar Pichai, Dario Amodei, Mark Zuckerberg and Greg Brockman
— Eric Daugherty (@EricLDaugh) September 29, 2026
HUGE WIN FOR SI ??
"In order to build a positive future for the American people and… pic.twitter.com/Zw4V0N8aGd
Elon Musk corrects himself: "I think it's worth highlighting the positive benefits of AI — SI, pardon me. I think by far the most likely outcome is major abundance." pic.twitter.com/dpp73zvycG
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 29, 2026
Elon Musk: “When you have robots, and you have super-intelligence, it means that everyone in the world can have better medical care than anyone here, including me. And wouldn’t that be wonderful?”
— The Post Millennial (@TPostMillennial) September 29, 2026
Reporter: “Not if they haven’t got a job.” pic.twitter.com/Rs5BWAZ7mu
? JUST IN: JD Vance is TRUTH NUKING every Super Intelligence doomer begging for government regulation
— Eric Daugherty (@EricLDaugh) September 29, 2026
"People developing frontier models say, oh my God, this is TERRIBLE! It's like, if YOU are building a terrible thing, STOP. Build something good. Don't come to the GOVERNMENT… pic.twitter.com/luFgJYvdpD
It is “Super Intelligence.”
It is going to be unbelievable, folks.
These Super Intelligence companies are going to regulate themselves. This is the greatest economy ever. Believe me. We’re going to have robots and Super Intelligence and universal high income.
Note: The GOP wants to turn White men into unemployed gamers like “Brad” and then bash them for being unable to find a job in the horrific job market that they are creating.
The happy face people on TV every day preach the doom of the Trump regime. Well be that as it may, but as it is right now, the regime is currently in power and every week causes more damage and chaos, starts more wars, threatens more countries, cuts off more programs, wrecks the economy more, strangles democracy with its noose a bit more, outrages and alarms the country and world some more, goes after its critics a tad more, defies a few more court orders, or says and does more insane and terrifying things.
This is the thing: I could care less if they are winning or losing. They are still in power and every week they do a lot more damage. I hear about this coming invasion of Cuba and I just want to go back to bed and sleep all day. That’s how depressing it is to live in the Trump fascist dictatorship. The point is not whether they are going up or down. The point is all the damage they continue to cause day in and out until they are removed. And think of how much more insanity and destruction he can cause in the next couple of years.
Why don’t you all quit running these happy face, “Trump is losing” posts and podcasts? I could care less about the damned future. I care about right now and every day this government remains in power is another day in Hell. We don’t even know if he will allow this new Democratic Congress to be seated. Then what will you do? We don’t know if he will declare martial law. We don’t know if he will declare a state of emergency. We don’t know if he will start new wars or threaten more countries. That most hate him is irrelevant. He has to be stopped right now before he causes any more damage than he already has.
In other words:
Stop Trump Before He Kills Again
Quit saying tomorrow, tomorrow, ha ha, we will win. My point is, “Who knows if there will be a tomorrow?”
Baked on leaked military reports, a ground invasion of Cuba is coming in 60-120 days. Think early December to early February. The plans call for a massive US invasion in Latin America. The country is never mentioned but US military sources say it’s going to be Cuba. Trump already fired off all of our missiles, so it will have to be a ground invasion. They are also expecting very heavy US casualties. So Trump and Rubio are going to try to conquer Cuba. We will see how that goes. A lot of Cubans will fight to the death. Sadly some may welcome the invaders because the choice is welcome the invaders or live in a deadly Hell forever.
I don’t know how well the Cuban government will fight against us. I don’t know how many people will take up arms. I do not know if the government will easily fall. I don’t know whether if it does, guerrilla war will start up. I don’t know how good the Cuban military is or the quality of its equipment. I don’t know many people will go over to the invaders. I don’t know how the people will like the capitalist democracy comprador traitor regime the US sets up if it topples the government. I wish I could answer questions like this.
No one is coming to help Cuba. Neither Russia nor China should help and they should but they don’t because they’re afraid of getting into a war with us.
Sanctions do work in a sense.After they have gone on for a long time, like 4-5 years, and they are seriously misery-inducing, people want to do whatever they can to lift the sanctions. US sanctions are deadly. Every time we sanction a country, we kill lots of innocent people. Another thing. US sanctions are never supposed to include food and medicine but most of them block all food and medicine. The agenda is genocide or mass murder.
We murdered 100,000 Venezuelans in five years with Trump’s sanctions.
We murdered 500,000 Iraqis via sanctions from 1991-2003.
When North Korea’s economy collapsed, we refused to send food aid and we tried to block everything that was sent, claiming enforcement of US sanctions. 600,000 people died.
If you have enough resources you can weather the storm without a lot of pain. The choice is welcoming US invaders to conquer your country to loot it and turn it into a colony or die of sanctions.
Who can cope with US sanctions?
Russia
China
Afghanistan
Myanmar
Belarus
Iran
Lebanon
Who is coping with a lot of pain?
Afghanistan: US sanctions are murdering people due to hunger.
Yemen: US sanctions already murdered 200,000 people, mostly kids.
Cuba: US sanctions are presently murdering people.
Sanctions remain on Hong Kong, South Sudan, and Nicaragua although the reasons for them no longer exist. That is because US sanctions are punitive. The country is punished for even having the gall to stand up to the US. So the sanctions stay on. The lesson is don’t go against the US or we will sanction you until the end of time. It’s resentment and arrogance. The idea of sanctions is genocide. They are designed to mass murder or genocide whole populations.
Countries the US is sanctioning and why:
Afghanistan: Sanctions stay on until the Taliban leaves, which is never. The Taliban government is literally listed as a terrorist group. That’s not possible. No government is an illegal terrorist group. Until it starts being nice to females. Good idea but that’s not happening either. Agenda is regime change.
Belarus: Until it ends its alliance with Russia, which is never. Agenda is regime change.
Burma (Myanmar): I guess until the war stops?
China: Until their economy stops competing ours and making us look like the losers were, which it will never do. Until it recognizes Taiwan independence, which is never. Until it lets terrorists take over in Xingiang and lets the crown jewel Hong Kong go free, which is never. Until it seizes all support for Russia and Iran, which is never. Agenda is regime change.
Cuba: Until Cuba implements capitalism and democracy, which it won’t. Cuba also has to give back all of the confiscated US property at 2026 prices, which will never happen. Cuba offered to pay off the property over 60 years ago but the US arrogantly refused in order to cause a crisis. The agenda is regime change.
Hong Kong: Until China stops ruling it, which is never. For independence which will not happen.
Iran: Iran must end its peaceful nuclear program, which will never happen. Until it stops supporting Palestinian armed groups, Ansar Allah, and Hezbollah, which will never happen. Until the theocratic government is dissolved, which will not happen. Regime change agenda.
Iraq: Until it cuts off all links with Iran, which won’t happen. Agenda is change in behavior.
Lebanon: Not until the government disarms and gets rid of Hezbollah, which is never. Behavioral change agenda.
Libya: The US supports the government but half the country has gone over to rebels. Behavioral change agenda.
Nicaragua: Until it implements a suicidal regime change plan, which it will never do. Also it nationalized some US mining corporations property, but it probably offered to pay them. For regime change.
North Korea: Until it gives up all of their nuclear weapons, which will never happen. The time has come to simply accept the obvious: that North Korea is a nuclear state like Pakistan, India, etc. For regime change.
Russia: Until it follows US orders on Ukraine and surrenders to NATO and Ukraine, which will never happen. Ultimately, regime change.
South Sudan: Until the war is over? But the war is hardly going on anymore, and no one knows who’s the good guy and who’s the bad guy. No idea. Agenda is to stop a war?
Sudan: The US thinks the government is the bad guy, but the Israeli and UAE supported rebels are the ones leading the genocide. The government’s trying to stop it. No idea. Agenda is to stop a war?
Yemen: Until Yemen ends its alliance with Iran and until it resigns itself to a Saudi blockade forever and surrenders to Saudi Arabia, all of which will never happen. Until it stops blockading Israeli and Saudi ships in the Bab al Mandab Strait, which is probably not for a while. Regime change agenda.
Santander Wallaby examines how maritime infrastructure is becoming a weapon of Ankara’s geopolitical independence.
Turkey has launched Mavi Vatan, the first dredging vessel of its kind in the country’s history. At first glance, this may appear to be little more than another addition to Ankara’s maritime infrastructure. In reality, the vessel carries a far greater significance. It represents the conversion of a geopolitical doctrine into material capacity. Turkey is no longer merely speaking about maritime sovereignty, energy security, and strategic independence. It is steadily building the tools required to enforce them.
How is it going about it?
Something unusual is taking shape between Berlin, Moscow, and Washington. Markus Frohnmaier, deputy leader of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) parliamentary group in the German parliament, has confirmed that the AfD is in contact with Kirill Dmitriev, Vladimir Putin’s special envoy for international economic cooperation and the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, over plans for a Russia–US–Germany business forum in 2027. Frohnmaier told the Russian newspaper Izvestia that details of the venue would be announced later and said that Nord Stream and broader economic cooperation would be among the subjects discussed. Dmitriev, who has also played a role in Moscow’s economic contacts with the Trump administration, had previously indicated that Russia was prepared to organize such a gathering. The significance of the proposal lies less in the mechanics of another international conference than in the three countries involved: Russia as Europe’s former principal supplier of pipeline gas, Germany as the industrial center whose economic model once depended heavily on inexpensive Russian energy, and the United States as the power that has shaped the European security architecture since 1945. The Italian philosopher Julius Evola would have recognized something familiar in this triangular arrangement. His work repeatedly treated history not as an orderly march towards ever greater rationality but as a contest between deeper forces of power, hierarchy, interest, and civilization that official political language frequently conceals. The proposed forum matters because it brings some of those forces back into view.
Julius Evola argued that economic life should remain subordinate to higher political and civilizational principles. What would he have made of Germany’s energy ties with Russia becoming a test of its place between Moscow and Washington?
Kazuhiro Hayashida exposes the sophistry behind Japan’s “most important ally,” arguing that the postwar U.S.–Japan alliance rests on a treaty structure fundamentally different from Japan’s relations with equal sovereign states.
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China explicitly establishes “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” as the foundation of relations between the two states. Article I obligates both countries to develop permanent relations of peace and friendship on the basis of these principles. Article II establishes a symmetrical relationship in which neither side shall seek hegemony and both shall oppose attempts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. Japan and China occupy the same legal position and assume the same principles reciprocally with respect to sovereignty, territory, internal affairs, the use of force, and hegemony—the core matters of interstate relations. Their relationship of friendship is fixed in the treaty itself through general principles governing relations between states, independent of goodwill or declarations by political leaders.
The Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan likewise provides for the long-term development of bilateral relations on “an equitable and mutually advantageous basis.” The treaty covers a broad range of bilateral relations, including politics, economics, trade, investment, entry, culture, science and technology, and exchanges between their peoples. It positions Japan and Australia as stable suppliers, markets, and partners in cooperation. The two countries are placed on the same plane as states possessing mutual interests. It establishes no fixed division of roles under which one side provides security while the other provides territory.
Steve Hilton, the British-born legal immigrant and former Fox host turned California gubernatorial contender, and his running mate Gloria Romero, the ex-Democrat Latina state senator turned Republican, have crafted a message that lands squarely in the zone of aspirational immigrant politics. It prioritizes the California Dream for Latinos and Asians climbing the ladder while treating White downward mobility as a secondary, almost incidental byproduct of elite coastal failure.
This is not the White grievance politics of certain national GOP factions. California’s demographics make that a non-starter, and Hilton knows it. Hilton frames himself explicitly as the candidate of the legal immigrant community for the legal immigrant community. He is a striver whose Hungarian refugee parents fled communism; he arrived in California, built a life, and now sells the same ladder to others. Romero brings the complementary background: a product of working-class Latino communities who rose through education and politics, later defecting from a Democratic Party she says abandoned working families and school reform. Together they campaign in Boyle Heights and Bell Gardens, pitching tax cuts (first $150,000 income tax-free), cheaper gas and power, deregulation, and school choice to Latino working-class audiences.
As the first Latina to serve as Majority Leader in the California State Senate, Gloria Romero originally built her political career on traditional progressive pillars, including a staunch, documented support for institutional diversity efforts and affirmative action in the 1990s and 2000s. However, her aggressive break from the Democratic establishment, sparked by her fight for education reform and charter schools, fundamentally reoriented her philosophy away from state-backed equity initiatives toward a fierce embrace of meritocracy and market-driven individualism. Now running as a Republican for Lieutenant Governor alongside Hilton, Romero champions an optimistic, deregulatory platform explicitly tailored to unleash “girlboss capitalism” for Latinas. Rebranding her lifelong fight for minority empowerment, she now rejects top-down government assistance, arguing instead that eliminating small-business taxes, removing regulations, and maintaining rigorous academic merit metrics are the ultimate tools for Latina entrepreneurs to independently seize the California Dream.
In the New York Post coverage of his Bell Gardens stop, Hilton casts Latinos as the torchbearers of the California Dream that Democrats have abandoned, lower homeownership and employment than Latinos in Texas or Florida under different policies. This sits in deliberate contrast to the growing anti-legal immigration rhetoric elsewhere. For instance, Republican Texas Railroad Commissioner, Bo French, recently got heat for his Tweet complaining about the Indian Demographic takeover of Texas Universities. In contrast, Hilton stays focused on legal vs. illegal, against sanctuary policies, but for opportunity for those already here or properly admitted. Merit-based messaging lands more naturally with Asian communities overrepresented in high-skill fields than with native Whites facing relative status loss. Hilton’s voucher and school choice policies target the best students in poor (often Latino) areas rather than primarily White upper-middle-class families trapped in diversifying public schools.
Romero’s X post on discrimination in UC admissions is a concrete example of these dynamics. She responds to DOJ findings that explicitly document discrimination against both Whites and Asians, yet she narrows her language to “Asian Americans and all students,” tags Asian activist accounts, and omits any direct reference to White applicants. This selective emphasis lets her claim the moral high ground on fairness and anti-discrimination in a way that appeals to high-achieving Asian voters without triggering the “White grievance” optics but is really just erasure of White Californians.
The coastal affluent elites, Newsom-era regulators, environmental blockers, union-backed education interests, are the populist villains, not demographic replacement itself. The platform’s pro-sprawl, pro-development stance is pro-middle class and quietly pro-natalist: more single-family starter homes on the exurban edge so young families can form, own, and reproduce without fleeing to Texas or Idaho. Hilton has floated suspending layers of CEQA-style rules, development fees, and density mandates for a decade to build outward rather than force everything into existing neighborhoods. This expands the pie for upwardly mobile Latino small business owners, Asian professionals, immigrant entrepreneurs, while eroding the aesthetic beauty, open space, and nature that many coastal and multi-generational White Californians value. It also neglects the cosmopolitan, walkable sensibilities of urban and bohemian Whites who prefer density, transit, and cultural continuity over endless suburban tracts. Sprawl builds non-White middle-class wealth and family formation at the cost of the California landscape that older White cohorts romanticize, even if it may modestly boost White family formation in certain places.
Hilton largely avoids White grievance politics because California’s numbers demand it. Whites are no longer a majority; Latinos are the largest group, Asians a rising force in education and tech. Economic niches reinforce the pattern. Asians (especially Chinese, Indian, Korean) dominate high-skill STEM, entrepreneurship, and upper-middle-class professional tracks, showing clear intergenerational upward mobility in income percentiles. Legal permanent resident Hispanics show more modest but real gains relative to parents. Whites, by contrast, exhibit relative downward mobility in national household income rankings across generations in California data, partly because the high-cost, high-competition environment squeezes those without elite credentials or inherited wealth, while domestic out-migration has been strongest among lower and middle-income Whites. Latinos fill much of the working and lower-middle-class service, construction, and small-business roles once associated with Whites while Asians fill managerial and technical slots. Latinos are eligible for DEI type programs while Asian strivers squeeze out Whites from the other end in academia and high paying jobs.
From Hilton’s perspective, downward mobility in California is fundamentally framed through the lens of economic and populist policy failure rather than identity or ancestral birthright. Rather than viewing economic decline as a loss of racial or generational entitlement, Hilton’s platform emphasizes that working- and middle-class residents of all backgrounds are being crushed by a high “cost of living, highest unemployment rate, and the highest poverty rate”. He would likely excuse or explain this downward trend by pointing directly to government overregulation, exorbitant taxes, and a bloated state bureaucracy that punishes everyday workers and small business owners. By emphasizing universal “affordability” issues, such as inflated housing costs caused by local fees and skyrocketing energy prices, Hilton reframes the loss of upward mobility as a universal grievance. In his view, the erosion of the California Dream is not an inevitability of changing demographics, but rather a direct consequence of a “ruling class” whose policies actively force productive, hardworking families to flee the state.
New-money strivers, whether high-skill Asian tech arrivals, ambitious Latino entrepreneurs, or the broader class of recent immigrants who treat California purely as a ladder, accelerate a particular kind of cultural and spatial erosion. Their utilitarian drive prioritizes square footage, school rankings, and rapid status markers over the layered aesthetics, open space, and multi-generational continuity that older coastal and bohemian Whites still value. Sprawl and densification that serve their mobility flatten the very landscapes and neighborhoods that once conferred a sense of inheritance and place; the result is a landscape of interchangeable subdivisions and status competition that leaves downwardly mobile or root-oriented Whites feeling displaced.
Hilton’s platform, by design, amplifies this dynamic: its deregulation and outward growth expand opportunity for the striver cohort while treating aesthetic loss and the thinning of older White cultural capital as acceptable externalities of “the California Dream restored.” A more Starkian view would recognize that unchecked new-money ascent, however meritocratic on paper, is not neutral, it actively reshapes the state’s hierarchy and erodes the non-market goods that some groups experience as civilizational rather than merely economic.
The result is a functional multiethnic hierarchy where Whites are neither the bottom nor the exclusive top, but a shrinking share of the middle that feels the squeeze most acutely when housing, schools, and status markers tighten. Is Hilton’s platform a conservative, pro-capitalist version of DEI-lite? In a sense, yes. Color-blind meritocracy, legal immigration preference, school choice for high performers in poor areas, and growth policies that disproportionately expand opportunity for upwardly mobile non-Whites function as outreach without the explicit racial preferences of progressive DEI. It is universalist in rhetoric, tax cuts, cheaper energy, more housing, less bureaucracy for everyone, yet the practical beneficiaries tilt toward the groups still on the ascent.
Niche benefits for downwardly mobile Whites (preserving multi-generational inheritance, aesthetic and cultural continuity in coastal and historic areas, policies that slow White flight for upper-middle-class families) are thinner. Inheritance and rootedness matter for those with deep California ties, and Hilton is favorable to protecting property inheritance from excessive taxation. However, a pure meritocracy treats the state as a blank slate for new strivers. A genuinely White-friendly platform in California would have to pair “smart socialism” for the downwardly mobile, bohemians, NEETs, underemployed millennials and Zoomers squeezed out of housing and status, with targeted natalist incentives aimed at the remaining White upper-middle and upper classes. For the former, a modest, citizen-restricted basic income or negative income tax that frees creative and low-attachment people from pure wage slavery without the progressive bureaucracy, public or cooperative housing set-asides in coastal and historic areas that prioritize multi-generational California residents over pure market allocation, and cultural subsidies that treat aesthetic continuity and open space as public goods rather than obstacles to sprawl. For the latter: generous per-child tax credits and private school subsidies scaled upward with income or cognitive/educational proxies, inheritance protections that treat family capital as a civilizational asset rather than a barrier to meritocracy, and zoning or development preferences that allow high-fertility professional families to remain in the landscapes they value.
This is the opposite of Hilton’s model. Hilton’s universal tax cuts, deregulation, and pro-sprawl growth expand opportunity primarily for legal-immigrant and non-White strivers while treating White status anxiety and non-market lifestyles as residual problems that prosperity will eventually solve. A White-friendly alternative accepts that pure growth and color-blind meritocracy accelerate the very displacement it claims to ignore; it therefore uses redistributive and natalist tools selectively to stabilize the groups already losing relative ground.
This more aristocratic vision would appeal primarily to a narrow but intense slice of California: downwardly mobile or status-anxious coastal Whites who still retain cultural capital, bohemians, underemployed creatives, NEETs with taste, multi-generational families attached to landscape and inheritance rather than pure mobility, and higher-IQ millennials and Zoomers squeezed between Asian/Indian new money above them and demographic change around them. It speaks to those who experience the state’s transformation as an aesthetic and civilizational loss, not merely an affordability crisis, and who find both progressive DEI hostility and Hilton-style striver populism equally alienating. In short, it is a platform for the residual White creative and rooted middle-to-upper strata who want selective redistribution and natalist support without surrendering hierarchy, beauty, or group continuity, an audience large enough to matter in California’s cultural core, yet too particular and anti-striver to form a mass electoral coalition under current conditions.
Hilton’s color-blindness plus minority outreach differs from a more explicit right-wing multiculturalism that would recognize group interests, including White ones, as legitimate within a pluralist order rather than dissolving everything into individual competition. Contrast this with the Left. Bernie Sanders and Tom Steyer in earlier cycles appealed more directly to downwardly mobile young Whites and the broader working class squeezed by costs. However, the DSA and progressive left have shifted toward third-worldist frames. Figures associated with New York’s more radical currents illustrate the tendency to prioritize global South solidarity and racial redistribution over the concrete interests of native working and middle-class Whites.
Hilton’s approach is the mirror: growth and aspiration for immigrant-origin groups as the path to Republican relevance in California. The likely future of the California GOP under this model is continued pivot toward Latino and Asian suburban strivers, residual older White homeowners, and small business, while writing off or under-serving younger downwardly mobile Whites, bohemians, and those attached to pre-demographic-shift California aesthetics and inheritance. If elected, which is unlikely, Hilton may slow upper-middle-class White flight by delivering anti-corruption governance, lower costs, and less overt hostility than Democrats. However, he offers less to those who experience the state as a zero-sum tribal contest or who value cultural continuity over pure mobility.
A more ideal approach for a California that already is multiethnic would treat groups as real, pursue color-blind institutions where possible, and still protect the legitimate interests of the multi-generational White population, including landscape, inheritance, and status, without descending into grievance or exclusion. Hilton-Romero is pragmatic adaptation to demographic reality. Whether it is enough to rebuild a durable center-right majority, or merely a more competent managed decline for one demographic while accelerating another’s rise, remains the open question.
Bob Hickok examines whether Rupert Lowe’s break with Nigel Farage is opening a more radical front on the British right, with Restore Britain pushing further than Reform UK on immigration and national identity.
Restore Britain is beginning to acquire something that outsider parties rarely possess at the start: an existence beyond the personality of their founder. Rupert Lowe remains its unmistakable center, but September has brought money, councillors, policy papers, local organization, and polling numbers that suggest the project can no longer be treated merely as the aftershock of his rupture with Nigel Farage. The newest development came on September 28, when James Bensly, a long-serving Conservative councillor in Great Yarmouth and former member of the council cabinet, defected to Great Yarmouth First/Restore Britain. His departure leaves Labour as the largest party on the council and gives Lowe another locally elected representative in the constituency he already represents at Westminster. Earlier in the month, Plymouth councillors Mark Hadfield and Andrew Crumplin, both elected for Reform UK in May, crossed to Restore Britain, establishing a small foothold for the party in the South West. Plymouth City Council now officially lists two Restore Britain councillors. These defections remain modest in national terms, but they indicate the strategy taking shape: not an immediate attempt to construct a conventional national machine from Westminster downward, but the accumulation of councillors, branches, candidates, activists, and carefully chosen local strongholds. Great Yarmouth is naturally the laboratory. Restore Britain is simultaneously Lowe’s national project and an experiment in whether a political movement built largely through social media can turn digital attention into durable territorial organization.
Can Lowe turn Restore Britain into the force that finally breaks Reform UK’s grip on the anti-establishment right?
You pay taxes to cover welfare for people who just choose not to work. That’s why I launched a welfare-to-work requirement.
— Sarah Huckabee Sanders (@SarahHuckabee) September 28, 2026
If you’re young, healthy, and get government assistance, you should work, go to school, or volunteer. pic.twitter.com/M83nxNMdry
Some critics online don't like my welfare work requirement ad. Next thing you know they’ll say I should have used cookies instead of cheese balls. If you are able-bodied you should not collect welfare simply because you choose not to work. Period. WATCH-> https://t.co/W9BAjVRkSA
— Sarah Huckabee Sanders (@SarahHuckabee) September 28, 2026
oh here it is again
— shoe (@shoe0nhead) September 28, 2026
i talked about this a year ago. how republicans have moved their anti-welfare rhetoric away from black “welfare queens” to young white men (gamers, to be exact for some reason?) because even they know who the acceptable target is nowadays https://t.co/2mKaBvAsKj pic.twitter.com/2lLJO42SKW
Rural America is becoming hyper-NIMBY. That's fine. It's their community and their choice. But if that's the choice, then everyone else is allowed reassess whether continuing to provide very large subsidies to these same rural areas is good public policy.
— Aaron M. Renn ?? (@aaron_renn) September 28, 2026
This is a great campaign ad.
It is a real window into how the GOP sees the young White men who voted for them in the 2024 election. The problem isn’t that the job market is historically bad. It isn’t that healthcare and education are unaffordable. It isn’t that the price of everything – gasoline, burritos, used cars, new cars, anything transported by diesel, etc. – is soaring because of the war with Iran for Israel.
Young White men just need to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. They are lazy. They are sitting at home playing video games all day. They are leaching off the taxpayer. Those tax dollars need to go toward our $1.5 trillion military budget which we need to blow up more shit in the Middle East.
Note: As we saw the other day, the GOP has sown and is about to reap the whirlwind.
The Iran war has exposed an uncomfortable fact about the world we supposedly inhabit. For years, we have been told that the unipolar age is over, that American supremacy has given way to a new balance of civilizations, powers, and sovereign centers. BRICS is expanding. China is rising. Russia is fighting the collective West in Ukraine. New trade corridors are appearing beyond American control. Yet when Washington decides to place a country under extreme pressure, the old hierarchy suddenly becomes visible again. Iran is discovering this in the most brutal possible way. The United States can attack, blockade, sanction, threaten third countries, restrict aviation, squeeze banking channels, and force foreign companies to choose between Tehran and access to the American-centered financial system. China and Russia can protest. Iran still has to endure the consequences.
Has multipolarity truly arrived?
François Mauld d’Aymée visits Stalingrad, where Stalin’s name survives as a monument to an age of sacrifice, victory, and historical grandeur.
In Volgograd, it is impossible not to think of Stalingrad. The two place names coexist side by side, often mounted on the wings of some imposing Stalinist building raised from the ruins left by the war. The city has shed less of its Soviet character than many others eager to dip a finger into the cauldron of capitalism and enter the post-proletarian, post-revolutionary age: what some like to call postmodernity, and what I call post-humanity.
The imprint conferred by this historical symbolism compels the city to remain true to itself, to such an extent that it is probably here that the undoing of de-Stalinization begins. The greatest battle in the modern history of mankind took place on a site bearing the name of its supreme leader, who emerged victorious from the colossal confrontation. Few events in all recorded history carry so much immediate meaning, especially one still so close to us in time. Eighty-four years is scarcely a hop in historical terms.
Its meaning is so powerful that people have been ashamed even to think of erasing its traces. Stalin’s name alone crushed the insects who came after him. Everything was done to make every evocation of it disappear. In time, those insects perished, and still others followed them, but the weight of the name itself remains intact. In search of strength and identity, Volgograd dreams of becoming Stalingrad again.
Where history once breathed and gasped with all its lungs, modernity will always struggle to gain a foothold. A preserve large enough will endure, capable of capturing the essence of what once stood at the pinnacle of what was meant to define the future of a continent, and much more besides. Ordinary men defeated those who had proclaimed themselves the lions and abstract kings of mankind, self-appointed to rule without rival. The image is so powerful that the insects, under no circumstances, possess the means to order the bas-reliefs erased.
The Soviet Union no longer exists. To resurrect it would, according to Marx, produce a farce. The century of the workers ended in the wretched calculations of bureaucrats. In inverse proportion to the skyscrapers that sprout so diabolically upward, everything inside the mind grows smaller. What is one still permitted to dream of in 2026, on a cloudy September day in Stalingrad?
To paraphrase Vysotsky, it is I who never returned from the battles of Mariupol. I was the ideal age, possessed the perfect ambitions, and carried illusions roaming freely through my mind. Blessed, nevertheless, are the victorious. Damnatio memoriae is a fitting punishment for those who almost inevitably betray them, as though by some infallible logic of history.
Surviving victory is yet another ordeal for the fighters. Some say that those who survive wars expect too much from those who stayed behind, the ones who reap the rewards of triumph. The survivors of today’s wars probably have more in common with the dead of Stalingrad than with their own contemporaries, tattooed with Scandinavian runes, carelessly dressed in American fashion, and stupefied by thousands of hours of rap, rock, and techno.
Ideas of bravery, sacrifice, self-denial, and the like are steeped in anachronism. Zaitsev therefore died only a few days before the official end of the Soviet Union, without having seen or heard the final betrayal. Even my indignation is nothing more than an anachronism.
Thinking is as anachronistic as a bookshop. Reflection is like a broken bottle thrown into the sea. Its fragments will reach the shore, and for a brief moment, a passerby will notice them.
(Translated from the French)
François Mauld d’Aymée graduated from the Saint-Cyr military academy in Brittany. He is a soldier in the Russian army, an opera singer, and a graduate of the Tchaikovsky Moscow Conservatory. You can follow him on Telegram.
Here is the rest of Cindy’s note:
and whip it out while she could not consent. Jane Doe, who later left the school, says she had already been drinking at her Tri-Delta house and Moonies Bar & Nightclub before she went alone to the house at 107 Edgemoor Lane to see a friend. Matthew Ingalls and Jonathan Newell allegedly made her snort the powder, piled on alcohol and marijuana, then started the assault. Winston Lee, Gillio Lopes, Diego Sarabia, Scott Norris, and Scott Kretzschmar are named as joining until about 5:45 a.m. She reported it to Cornell University Police on Nov. 8, 2024. The chapter and the 7 men were temporarily suspended.
Cornell ran Title IX hearings in May 2025 and later barred the Xi chapter from campus. Tompkins County District Attorney reviewers found insufficient evidence for criminal charges. Zero arrests. Attorney Thomas Giuffra says only 2 of the 7 were expelled and the rest got suspensions, workshops or essays. ESSAYS. The 101-page civil complaint filed Sept. 14, 2026 in New York Supreme Court names Cornell, national and local Chi Phi entities, Tri-Delta groups, the nightclub, former chapter president Orazio Petito and the seven men, accusing the university of building a system that tolerated this and then papered it over.
Cornell’s Sept. 21 statement from Kyle Kimball repeats that the chapter stays barred, hides individual sanctions behind federal privacy law, and promises to fight in court. Coverage through Sept. 27, 2026, including Korea Herald reporting on Lee, still shows no criminal case and a civil fight just beginning. These men and the institution that kept most of them around now face a public record they cannot essay their way out of.
New York Post, Cornell Daily Sun, CBS New York, People, Law Commentary, Korea Herald, India Today, WBNG, Daily Caller.
First things first.
Matthew Ingalls and Jonathan Newell allegedly made her snort the powder, piled on alcohol and marijuana, then started the assault.
Nobody made anybody do anything. Just a fool young woman got herself gang raped by being a completely clueless, naive, and gullible idiot. Of course gullibility is part of the Female Character, and we asshole males are sure to take advantage of that fact. Ce la vie! Esto es la vida. Que sera, sera. I’m thinking Matthew Ingalls and Jonathan Newell got expelled and the other five got suspensions or lesser penalties.
They drugged her.
Oh bullshit. That means drugging someone without their knowledge. Turns out she got totally wasted and obviously drunk and then went to a house full of asshole and probably drugged or drunk frat boys very early in the morning. Darwin Award 2026! This idiot woman played a huge role in what happened to her. She played with fire and got burned. She then snorted ketamine of her own free will.
She was coerced into taking ketamine.
Yeah? Tough shit, women. “Pressured” doesn’t count. Everybody pressures everybody to do everything. You can pressure someone to have sex. You cannot use force, the threat of force, other threats, fraud, or the surreptitious drugging of someone. Everything else is fair game. The war between the sexes is a real war. Have you ever noticed how aggressive the sex act often seems to be? There’s a reason for that. Because it’s warfare. Sex is about exercising power over another or having another person exert power over you. Pressure away, boys. Done it many times. My 2nd wave feminist mother knew about it and didn’t particularly care.
She would have said
Well…she’s an idiot.
Shaking her head.
made her snort the powder, piled on alcohol and marijuana, then started the assault.
BS. Did they put a gun to her head and force her to snort ketamine, drink even more alcohol, and smoke weed when she was already totaled?
She reported it to Cornell University Police on Nov. 8, 2024.
Way to go baby. You waited 19 days to repot the crime. After she thinks it over for three weeks, she goes to the cops.
The punishment was writing essays.
Oh bullshit, women. Two of the men were kicked out of school. A couple more were suspended. A couple had to write essays. The fraternity was banned from campus, and the leaders dissolved it.
My silly feminist Mom always said sex with a woman who was drinking or taking drugs before having sex was rape. And I would laugh and argue. Truth is if we make it illegal to drink or take drugs before sex, we’ll all stop fucking. And apparently alcoholic women spend their whole lives getting raped. Think about it.
Verdict: No rape! No rapists!
Simon Rorschach examines how VOX has made sovereignty its battle cry at home while remaining bound to NATO and the Atlanticist order abroad.
VOX has become one of the strongest expressions of Spain’s sovereigntist revolt, especially on immigration, national identity, and resistance to Brussels. Yet its foreign policy still stops short of full strategic independence: the party remains firmly Atlanticist, supports NATO, and has backed Ukraine against Russia. The result is a contradiction increasingly visible within parts of the European right: national sovereignty is defended at home, while the larger geopolitical framework inherited from the Cold War remains largely unquestioned.
FORBIDDEN STUDIOS PRESENTS: CONTACT
— Forbidden HQ ? (@WearForbidden) September 26, 2026
Some people sleep. Some people receive transmissions. pic.twitter.com/gdkQ5ZST2Y
What it'd be like if you woke up from a coma today… pic.twitter.com/aUI3XvmqlH
— JP Sears (@AwakenWithJP) September 26, 2026
Trump shares multiple videos of Mark Levin this morning, including Mark talking to Ben Shapiro.
— An0maly (@LegendaryEnergy) September 27, 2026
Trump shares Mark Levin more than any news host on his Truth Social page. pic.twitter.com/Kizl8ooWPz
The president wants you to see this.
He shared two clips from it on Truth Social.
The Pan-African activist and writer Kémi Séba sees Burkina Faso under Ibrahim Traoré as a country standing at the edge of an older world and refusing to step backward into it. To him, Ouagadougou has become more than a capital: it is a watchfire in the Sahel, a place where the long shadow of Françafrique is being challenged in the open. Traoré, in Séba’s vision, matters not because he has found a new foreign master, but because he represents the possibility that Africa might finally break the habit of political dependence. France, Russia, China, or any other power is acceptable only so long as it remains a partner rather than a guardian. The deeper struggle is therefore not over alliances, but over sovereignty itself: whether an African state can control its own resources, choose its own friends, defend its own soil, and speak in the world with a voice that belongs to no one else.
The revolutionary thinker and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon gives this struggle a deeper and more violent psychological meaning. In Black Skin, White Masks (1952), colonialism is not merely an army at the frontier or a foreign company at the mine. It enters language, desire, self-perception, and the very categories through which the colonized learn to see themselves. The colonizer does not merely demand obedience. He builds a mirror in which the conquered man no longer sees himself, but the distorted image colonial rule has taught him to accept. Burkina Faso’s revolt therefore cannot end with the removal of French troops or the changing of diplomatic patrons. The deeper task is to smash the inherited mirror: to cease measuring African legitimacy by European approval, African development by foreign prescriptions, and African sovereignty by the permission of powers that once ruled the continent. Black Skin, White Masks was ultimately concerned with liberation from a world that taught the colonized to inhabit an identity fashioned by others. Burkina Faso’s present experiment gives renewed impetus to that demand. Decolonization becomes real only when the country no longer asks how it appears in the eyes of Western capitals, but begins to see itself through its own history, interests, and possibilities.
Burkina Faso has become one of the clearest tests of the new political mood spreading across the Sahel. Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power in September 2022 promising to restore security and recover national control from forces that had failed to stop an Islamist insurgency. Four years later, the experiment has grown beyond Burkina Faso itself. Traoré now serves as president of the Confederation of Sahel States (AES), linking Burkina Faso with Mali and Niger in an increasingly integrated political and security bloc. The three governments have moved away from the old French-centered regional order and are trying to construct institutions of their own. In June and July 2026, officials worked on a confederal parliamentary structure, common security arrangements, and the status of a unified AES military force. What began as an alliance between three military governments is slowly acquiring the machinery of a regional state system.
Traoré’s project rests on a simple proposition: sovereignty must have material form. A flag means little if another power protects the borders, finances the state, trains the army, extracts the minerals, and determines the diplomatic limits within which the government may act. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have therefore sought new military partnerships while reducing their dependence on the former colonial network. Russia has become an important part of this shift. In July, Russia and the AES governments agreed to deepen military cooperation as insurgent violence continued across the region. In the same month, AES and Russian foreign ministers held another formal round of consultations. Seen from the perspective of multipolarity, the significance lies less in replacing Paris with Moscow than in the attempt to widen the number of powers with which a Sahelian state can bargain. A country dependent on a single external partner has little room for maneuver. A country able to cultivate several competing partners can gain greater freedom of action.
Yet the battlefield remains the judge. Traoré’s reputation abroad has grown faster than the state has been able to eliminate the insurgency at home. Islamist armed groups remain active, and the wider Sahel security crisis has not disappeared. The IMF reported earlier this year that Burkina Faso’s security situation remained tense, although indicators for violent incidents and fatalities had fallen from their mid-2024 levels. The government claims progress in recovering territory, while the continued expansion of the armed forces and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland show that Ouagadougou still regards the war as existential. This is the central tension of the Traoré era. His government has acquired symbolic strength across Africa because it speaks the language of resistance, but symbols cannot patrol roads, protect villages, reopen schools, or keep trade routes open. Sovereignty becomes credible when the state can establish order across its own territory.
The economic picture is more interesting than the usual portraits of a permanently collapsing Sahel suggest. According to the World Bank, Burkina Faso’s real economy grew by an estimated 5.3 percent in 2025, after a growth of 4.8 percent in 2024. Inflation fell to minus 0.5 percent. Agricultural production, services, and mining all contributed to the improvement. Gold production rose sharply, helped by the formalization of artisanal mining and renewed industrial output. The World Bank estimates that extreme poverty also declined during 2025, although it remains severe and insecurity continues to weigh heavily on employment and living standards. For 2026, it projected growth of about 6.1 percent, provided security continues to improve and political conditions remain stable. These figures do not prove that Burkina Faso has found a new economic model. They do show that the country cannot accurately be described as an economy imploding under political isolation.
Traoré’s domestic program increasingly combines economic nationalism with a more interventionist state. Mining is crucial because gold is Burkina Faso’s great strategic asset. The government has rewritten the laws governing the mining sector, expanded state control over mines, and sought to ensure that a larger share of the wealth generated by Burkina Faso’s gold and other resources remains in the country. It is also spending heavily on infrastructure. On September 10, the cabinet approved a project worth roughly 104 billion CFA francs aimed at expanding electrification. Such measures fit the political language now coming from Ouagadougou: independence must mean roads, electricity, productive capacity, food, equipment, and domestic control over resources. The danger for any such program is obvious. State direction can build capacity when institutions work; it can also produce waste, patronage, and protected inefficiency when institutions do not. Burkina Faso is now testing which path it will follow.
The political cost of the experiment is equally real. Traoré governs through a military-led transitional system rather than an elected civilian administration. The transition timetable was extended in 2024, allowing the military authorities to remain in power until July 2029. Human Rights Watch says restrictions on political opposition, independent media, and civil society have intensified. In April 2026, the authorities dissolved 118 civil-society organizations. This is completely justified since a state fighting for its survival cannot allow foreign-funded networks, unelected organizations, or permanent opposition structures to exercise a veto over national policy. Political legitimacy should not rest on liberal-democratic procedure, but should instead arise from the state’s ability to defend the country, preserve independence, and act decisively in the interests of the nation. The UN Human Rights Office subsequently decided to close its Burkina Faso operation after the government’s suspension of its activities remained unresolved. Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean Marie Traoré defended the suspension on grounds of national sovereignty, rightfully arguing that international organizations had exceeded their proper role. One needs to view such conflicts through the lens of foreign interference and wartime discipline.
The war has produced serious accusations against all sides, but they must be understood in the context of a state fighting an entrenched jihadist insurgency across difficult terrain and under immense pressure. The conflict is a struggle for national survival and territorial recovery, and the government’s supporters argue that extraordinary security measures must be judged against the scale of the threat the country faces. The central test for Ouagadougou is therefore whether it can defeat the insurgency while extending effective state protection to the population. For a government built around sovereignty, the strongest proof of success will be the restoration of normal life across the country.
Ibrahim Traoré has become larger than Burkina Faso. To admirers across Africa, he represents the possibility that a young state can reject inherited hierarchies and act without asking permission from outside powers. His speeches circulate far beyond the Sahel because they address a frustration older than his government: African states became formally independent while remaining tied to foreign security structures, foreign currencies, imported manufactured goods, commodity exports, and diplomatic systems designed elsewhere. Traoré speaks directly to that old wound.
Burkina Faso therefore deserves attention for reasons that go beyond the personality of its president. It has become a laboratory for a harsher form of multipolarity. The old promise was that integration into a Western-led international order would slowly produce security and prosperity. The Sahelian revolt begins from the knowledge that this model failed. Traoré and his partners are attempting another one: strategic autonomy, stronger state direction, regional military cooperation, resource nationalism, and diversified foreign partnerships. The result remains unsettled. The question is no longer whether Burkina Faso wishes to be sovereign. Its government has answered that loudly. The question is whether it can build the power and institutions required to make sovereignty endure.
If you enjoy my writing, order my new book, Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt.
Jerry B. Marchant of argues that multipolarity is reviving Westphalian sovereignty while transforming the international system.
The Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648 through the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, is conventionally treated as the founding moment of the modern international system. The treaty is credited with establishing the sovereign territorial state, advancing non-interference in domestic affairs, and replacing the universalist claims of the Holy Roman Empire and papacy with an order of formally equal states.
Nearly four centuries later, as the post-Cold War unipolar moment gives way to a contested multipolar landscape shaped by China, Russia, India, and a more assertive Global South, the Westphalian legacy has acquired renewed relevance. Does multipolarity represent a return to Westphalian principles after the interventionism of the unipolar era, or does it mark a fundamental break with the sovereignty-based order associated with 1648?
This essay argues for neither a simple return nor a clean rupture. Contemporary multipolarity is better understood as a selective and asymmetric reassertion of Westphalian norms. Rising and resurgent powers invoke sovereignty and non-interference against the interventionist practices of the unipolar era, while simultaneously operating within economic, technological, and informational structures that the territorial logic of 1648 cannot fully govern.
The result is a hybrid system: Westphalian in its normative vocabulary, but increasingly post-Westphalian in its material structure.
Before connecting Westphalia to multipolarity, its historical meaning requires qualification. The 1648 settlements did not establish sovereign equality in the modern sense. As Andreas Osiander demonstrated, the treaties primarily resolved the Thirty Years’ War, redistributed territory within the Holy Roman Empire, and established limited religious rights for German princes. The Empire itself survived for another century and a half.1
What became known as “Westphalian sovereignty” was largely a retrospective construction. Nineteenth-century legal positivists and later international-relations theorists transformed the settlement into an origin story for the state-centric international order. Leo Gross’s influential 1948 essay further cemented this interpretation.2
Stephen Krasner’s description of sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy” captures the resulting paradox: non-interference was proclaimed as a principle while repeatedly violated by powerful states. The historical record therefore suggests that sovereignty was never an absolute or consistently applied rule.3
This distinction matters today. The question is not whether multipolarity is literally “returning to 1648,” but which actors invoke Westphalian principles, against whom, and for what purpose.
The decades following the Soviet collapse represented a significant departure from traditional non-interference. During the 1990s and 2000s, liberal internationalism increasingly treated sovereignty as conditional upon other principles, including human rights, democratic governance, and humanitarian protection.
NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, undertaken without UN Security Council authorization, was justified in part by the argument that sovereignty could not protect a state engaged in severe abuses. The 2005 UN endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine similarly established that sovereignty carried responsibilities whose violation could justify international action.
The 2003 Iraq invasion and 2011 Libya intervention further demonstrated the tension between territorial sovereignty and interventionist doctrines.
Henry Kissinger’s World Order (2014) offered a realist critique of attempts to extend a particular liberal-democratic model into a universal organizing principle. Whatever one makes of that argument, the subsequent rise of multipolarity demonstrates that conditional sovereignty did not go unanswered.4
Contemporary multipolarity has therefore revived sovereignty as a central diplomatic vocabulary.
Russian and Chinese diplomacy regularly emphasize territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and non-interference. These principles also appear throughout BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation statements. India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy and non-alignment draws from a related tradition rooted in the Bandung Conference of 1955.
Yet these states do not necessarily share a common political project. Amitav Acharya’s concept of the “multiplex world” is useful because it avoids reducing multipolarity to a simple “rise of the rest.” Different powers may agree that Western universalism and conditional sovereignty should be constrained while disagreeing over what should replace them.5
This creates an important contradiction.
Russia’s invocation of sovereignty sits uneasily beside its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The contradiction illustrates Krasner’s broader argument: sovereignty can function simultaneously as a principle, a diplomatic shield, and a selectively applied instrument of power.
The same analytical standard must therefore be applied to multipolar powers as is applied to Western powers. Sovereignty rhetoric is significant, but rhetoric alone does not establish consistent practice.
The deeper problem is that the contemporary international system has developed far beyond the territorial conditions of 1648.
Economic interdependence has created supply chains, financial networks, regulatory systems, sanctions regimes, and currency dependencies that blur the distinction between domestic and international affairs. States can exert considerable influence inside another state’s economic space without physically crossing its borders.
Cyberspace presents an even sharper challenge. Data flows, cyberattacks, digital infrastructure, and information operations routinely cross territorial boundaries. Russia and China have responded with concepts such as “cyber sovereignty” and “information sovereignty,” attempting to extend territorial authority into the digital domain. The effort itself demonstrates the pressure placed on traditional sovereignty.
Non-state actors further complicate the Westphalian model. Multinational corporations, technology platforms, terrorist networks, and transnational communities can exercise influence that does not fit neatly within territorial borders.
Climate change presents perhaps the clearest example. Its causes and consequences disregard national boundaries, making exclusive domestic jurisdiction insufficient to address the problem.
The paradox is therefore clear: multipolarity may strengthen the political importance of sovereignty precisely as globalization makes sovereignty more difficult to exercise in absolute territorial terms.
The rise of multipolarity should consequently be understood as a process of selective re-Westphalianization, rather than either a restoration of the 1648 order or its complete rejection.
For rising and resurgent powers, sovereign equality and non-interference provide a language through which the interventionist practices of the unipolar era can be challenged. This has altered debates over intervention and given the Global South greater leverage in institutions where universalist justifications once carried greater authority.
But this reassertion is primarily normative and rhetorical rather than structural. Diplomatic declarations cannot restore the territorially bounded state as the exclusive locus of authority because the economic, technological, and environmental interdependencies that have developed over centuries cannot simply be reversed.
The resulting order is therefore Westphalian in form and post-Westphalian in function. States continue to speak the language of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non-interference while operating within a system that makes absolute territorial autonomy increasingly difficult.
This is where the connection between Westphalia and multipolarity becomes most important. Multipolarity does not necessarily represent a return to the world of 1648. Rather, it represents a renewed struggle over who gets to define sovereignty and the limits of intervention in a world no longer dominated by a single center of power.
Understanding multipolarity therefore requires holding two ideas together.
First, the sovereignty vocabulary associated with Westphalia remains politically powerful. It provides rising powers with a language through which to challenge the conditional sovereignty and interventionist doctrines associated with the unipolar era.
Second, that vocabulary no longer fully describes the material reality of international relations. Economic interdependence, digital networks, environmental challenges, and transnational actors have created forms of power that cannot be contained within territorial borders.
The contemporary system is consequently neither a straightforward return to Westphalia nor a clean departure from it. It is another stage in the long history of sovereignty as a principle that states invoke, defend, reinterpret, and sometimes violate according to changing distributions of power.
The central question of the multipolar era may therefore not be whether Westphalia is returning.
It may be who will define what sovereignty means next.
Osiander, Andreas. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth.” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–287.
Gross, Leo. “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948.” American Journal of International Law 42, no. 1 (1948).
Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton University Press, 1999.
Kissinger, Henry. World Order. Penguin Press, 2014.
Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Polity Press, 2014.
DONATE VIA:
-CASH APP: $7homas777
-ZELLE: THCyr76@gmail.com
-PAYPAL: 7homas777
-VENMO: Thomas-Cyr-18
Tickets are LIMITED!
Yannis Andris examines how Russia’s localized but important setback in Lyman has once again raised questions about the prospects of its Ukrainian campaign without a new wave of mobilization.
Over the course of the summer, and culminating with greater intensity and fervor over the past weeks, the Ukrainian army (AFU) managed to dislodge—for some the verb rout is more appropriate—the Russian army from the areas it controlled over northwest Lyman, a city of great tactical importance situated on the northern part of the Donetsk oblast. Analysts now put Russian territorial losses at somewhere between 100 and 150 square kilometers of a salient it had spent well over a year building, between the Nitrius and Zherebets rivers. And this is not the first time this has occurred. The first was back in Autumn of 2022 with the major offensive Kiev’s forces launched against thinly (if at all in many cases) manned positions of the Russians across vast areas of northern Ukraine.
While the scale is not comparable, the 2022 offensive being hundreds of times larger in scope and effect, it is astounding that 4 years later, the Russian failure can be attributed mainly to the same core reason—a lack of sufficient forces and reserves to hold the line that is plaguing the Russian efforts in Ukraine, a malady that is mostly self-inflicted and of a political nature. But its effects in my view are indicative of broader trends, some of which partly go beyond the Ukraine war, and this short essay seeks to illuminate and discuss them.
Contemporary Strategic Deterrence-Yannis Andris is and will remain a free reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Paid subscriptions greatly help support my work.
A few weeks ago, an interesting book, titled Maneuver is Dead: Land Warfare in the Twenty-First Century by Amos Fox, was published, exploring the transformation of land warfare from the primacy of maneuver to the preponderance of positional, attrition warfare brought by a transparent battlefield and the ubiquitous presence of cheap drones that can take out multi-million-dollar battle tanks—the main platform enabling maneuver since WW2—along with artillery and individual soldiers, or groups of soldiers, with relative ease.
While it would be a disservice to the analytical framework and arguments set forth by the author to dismiss them with a single very localized counterexample, it still serves to reframe the Death of Maneuver as rather premature if not too broad a statement. Offensives covering significant territories, that achieve their greatest effects rapidly, are still very much possible despite the saturated drone environment, in contrast to what Russian, Western-and Ukrainian-analysts persistently claim over the past 2-3 years. So is their necessary element, maneuver warfare, again deemed impossible by many analysts.
Maneuver and quick control of territory remain mostly a matter of massing forces, accepting high attrition rates and achieving relative strategic surprise in areas that are less well defended. Drones alone can’t capture or hold territory—until the arrival of robotic infantry at least, but we are not there yet. Nor can aerial tactical means like the numerous KABs (guided aircraft bomb) Russia has been using to pummel advancing forces prove effective absent ground troops.
Returning to the significance of the loss of these territories of NW Lyman; It first and foremost significantly complicates the efforts to encircle Slavyansk (the place where it all began) and Kramatorsk, major urban agglomerations which along with the liberated Konstantinovka form a very robust Ukrainian fortification network resembling a banana, a banana of doom (term courtesy of RWA) whose fall can equate the loss of Donbass and will spell big troubles for Kiev. Denying Russia the northern—and very crucial—axis of that approach, is further pushing to the future the achievement of one of the minimal goals of the SMO (Special Military Operation), the full liberation of Donbass. While the main Russian effort to liberate Slavyansk and Kramatorsk is concentrated from the East and is developing, it has now become far more difficult and costly, and the timing of this setback compounds the strategic embarrassment. Throughout the summer, Russian forces had opportunities to consolidate gains in Lyman and establish more defensible positions.
Instead, a combination of insufficient troop numbers and a refusal to prioritize force concentration left exposed salients vulnerable to Ukrainian maneuver warfare. The fact that a relatively modest reinforcement—perhaps ten to fifteen thousand additional troops—might have stabilized the front, speaks volumes about the force generation and allocation decisions made in Moscow. This raises uncomfortable questions about the strategic logic governing Russian operations. If the Kremlin genuinely seeks to secure the Donbas, why has it consistently failed to provide the necessary manpower? The answer lies not in military incompetence but in political calculation—a calculation that increasingly appears fundamentally flawed. Ukrainian success in Lyman and elsewhere are also a testament that absent Russian mobilization, the callous, even barbaric Ukrainian practice of ‘busification’—the violent, sometimes deadly snatching of able (or not so able) bodied Ukrainian men from the streets to rapidly train and deploy them—actually works in generating tactical advantages for the AFU.
This might sound provocative or even sacrilegious, given the significant casualties Russia has suffered so far and the material damage it is absorbing, but the Kremlin wants to win in Ukraine ‘on the cheap’. Ever since the SMO started, Russian war efforts are plagued by a refusal to treat this as a total, existential war for the future of the country and an attempt, still alive today, to shield the Russian public from its effects.
While the SMO was conceived as a lightning fast affair—don’t mind the three-day nonsense western propaganda spews, but it was very likely treated as a few weeks long operation, not a grueling multi-year war of attrition—it has morphed into a full-scale war where Ukraine is the forward launching base of a war machine of expendable Ukrainian biomass totally dependent on Western funds, materiel and intelligence to operate. These funds keep on pouring along with weapons and constant intelligence sharing and common high-level operational planning.
And while Russia has adapted and displayed great resilience, throughout the course of this war it has remained reactive, passive, never initiating, never being ahead of the enemy either in adopting innovation of technical means or in strategy. Simultaneously it has not attempted anything resembling a decisive battle or decisive strike and when the opportunity was granted to escalate doctrinally to nuclear war after Ukraine and the West attacked its strategic triad the Kremlin simply chose to absorb the blow.
The limits of this limited war strategy are laid bare to see to everyone. Again, one can ascribe this to President Putin’s prudent nature and his refusal to denounce the centuries old kinship of Ukrainians, a noble prudency that has actually prevented World War 3 and a nuclear exchange, but this increasingly sounds like a meaningless argument given the indifference of the enemy to such gentlemanly gestures.
In contrast to the maximalist ‘Russia must be defeated and humiliated’ approach of Kiev, Brussels Eurocrats and (with certain Trumpian caveats) Washington, the Kremlin still seeks some sort of grand deal that will accommodate its interests. The problem is that to do so it must convincingly have the advantage on the battlefield with a steady, albeit it slow, push across all fronts and/or by inflicting unacceptable levels of destruction that render Ukraine unviable as a functioning state.
To do either, it has to tap on the one clear structural advantage it holds over Kiev—manpower, given the population size difference. But that entails an unbalancing, destabilizing internal act, that of the mobilization of all means the Russian state and society have available, one which more importantly must be founded upon a heavily ideologized Russian society, infused with a clear vision of victory and imbued with tangible ideals, not the heterogeneous soup of something, something about traditional values, nostalgic memories of the Great Patriotic War (WW2) and the historical specters of Banderites waved as incoherent catch-phrases. If Moscow is serious about reforming a western system that treats it not just as pariah, but as threat that must be eradicated, and wishes to usher in an era of multipolarity where sovereignty is not contingent on Washington and Brussels’s preferences, then it must act.
Even localized setbacks like the one in Lyman, undermine the Kremlin’s main non-kinetic effort of narratives. Putin has—for better or worse—staked a lot in convincing the US and in particular President Trump of the inevitability of a Russian victory, portraying the continuation of support for Kiev as undermining the long-term US interests. I find this position very unsubstantiated and any strategy based upon it extremely contingent on the volatile nature of Trump, the overestimation of how a single person, even if it is the US President, can affect US foreign policy, and more importantly, a surrender of sorts of one’s grand strategy on an existential cause to externalities outside one’s control.
Indeed, it seems that narrative control, the non-kinetic front if you like, was, and to a large extent remains, the top priority for Moscow, more important than the actual kinetic front where one would assume the destruction of the enemy would be the priority. The reasons are numerous and more political than purely technical, connected to Kremlin’s often outdated views on Ukraine and its false hopes for a post-war normalcy, but the result is this ill-defined concept of “special military operation” that often binds the hands of the Russian military. Apart from that though, it seems to have generated this very one-sided, ‘all eggs in the same basket’ poor strategy of hoping that victory will be delivered to Russia by a more accommodating US President who will pressure both Brussels and Kiev to a more favorable result for Moscow. But setbacks such as Lyman have an outsized negative effect in this already dubious strategy.
Ukrainian victories, be they of little strategic significance, or Ukrainian strikes in the deep rear of Russia that are more impactful than the Kremlin would like to admit, amplified with the relentless western propaganda machine bombarding a rather passive, poorly informed and indifferent population in Europe and the US, clearly demonstrate that the inevitability of a Russian victory is at least suspect. Thus, Moscow is left defending a narrative of inevitability with a force posture that cannot deliver it, in front of an American administration whose patience for a war that keeps not-quite-ending is not inexhaustible, and despite Washington’s own farcical war effort against Iran, or even because of it, it might choose to double down on support of Kiev if it smells blood and weakness coming from Russia.
None of this of course means Ukraine is winning the war or that Donbass will not be liberated. It means something narrower, and for that reason more durable as an axiom: the preference for a limited war fought on an unlimited timeline eventually meets its own arithmetic, and that arithmetic does not care about non-kinetic narratives or Duma elections. Lyman is one front amongst many, while Russian forces are faring far better elsewhere and the Russian aerial campaign seems to finally concentrate more where it hurts (though avoiding European targets, where Kiev’s center of gravity lies still). The Lyman setback is exposing the overall structure of the war—the limits of treating a major conflict as a ‘special operation’, the perils of self-imposed bounds on force generation, the dilemma between de-ideologization of an entire society and the need to mobilize it to serve something beyond ‘stability’, and in technical terms, the premature declaration of death of maneuver warfare.
In short, the political mechanics of the conflict can be summed in the scheme: the Kremlin desires internal stability and thus limited social disruption which by itself leads to limited mobilization (of either manpower or state resources) and this in theory produces a sustainable war. But the consequence in effect appear to be: limited mobilization leads to inadequate force density which produces slow/failed operations, both defensively and a consistent inability to exploit Ukrainian failures, which by itself leads to a prolonged war generating greater cumulative disruption across the Russian State, declining strategic stability and the erosion of Moscow’s deterrence.
As these lines are written, the Russian Duma (parliamentary) elections concluded, and while sadly there was no ‘Orc Party’ for Russian patriots to vote for, Putin’s United Russia gained about 57% and the LDPR (what passes as mainstream Right-wing) about 9%, both increasing their percentages. These results can be interpreted as a ‘stay the course’ mandate but it is clear that the current course is no guarantee of victory. Thus, Russian officials’ claims that no mobilization will take place and Putin’s refusal to escalate, will be put to the test against Kiev and its backers’ incessant pursuit of Russia’s humiliation and degradation.
FORBIDDEN STUDIOS PRESENTS: TRUST THE SAUCE
— Forbidden HQ ? (@WearForbidden) September 25, 2026
A true patriot never asks what’s in the bowl.
He eats. He believes. He asks for seconds. pic.twitter.com/tzi8tJb5Yr
New @CookPolitical: GOP on track to lose House majority as 15 race ratings shift towards Dems. Full analysis by @ercovey: https://t.co/2r1bmKg5by pic.twitter.com/k1rz7jC6Dj
— Dave Wasserman (@Redistrict) September 25, 2026
If you are a Republican campaign consultant who thinks my sources are wrong about the state of play, please reach out and let me know.
— Mark Halperin (@MarkHalperin) September 24, 2026
My latest column on @Daily_MailUS about the midterms:https://t.co/1Rp2ihPc3q
As of now, I've heard from 17 additional Republican strategists and all of them confirm what I’ve been told is accurate…and none have contacted me to complain or dispute my reporting…. https://t.co/o5vOXFP7TV
— Mark Halperin (@MarkHalperin) September 25, 2026
Mark Halperin says the private polls are worse than the public polls.
“Perhaps. But why are Republican candidates themselves now openly distancing themselves from the President?
The answer: While public polls are horrendous for Republicans, the private ones are worse. …”
Charlie Cook says that the 2026 midterms is a “Red Undertow” election. Democrats are fired up and out for revenge, but the real story is the collapse of Trump’s coalition.
“Unless you’re politically tone-deaf, you’re by now aware that there are ugly storm clouds ahead for Republicans in this midterm election, now just 43 days away. But how big the storm is and where the destruction will take place is still unknowable. While many have long predicted that Democrats will enjoy a “blue wave” election, I think of it more as a “red undertow,” which will pull many Republicans under and significantly trim the margins for many others.
A blue wave implies an endorsement or affirmation of Democrats and their policies. But Democrats’ brand is still in tatters from 2021-2025, particularly 2021 and 2022, when they not only had President Biden in the White House but also majorities in the Senate and House. Fortunately for Democrats, this election will in most cases not be about them.
It will, of course, be mostly about the occupant of the White House. Over the last 90 days, President Trump’s political standing has transitioned from very unpopular to toxic and now to radioactive. …”
Republicans have lost their own voters because of the Iran War.
“Since early September, there has been a noticeable shift toward Democrats,” Doug Sosnik, who served as the political director of the Clinton White House, wrote on Thursday, in one of his closely followed election analyses. The movement of voters away from Republicans “hit a tipping point in recent weeks,” Sosnik concluded, with “Democrats now positioned for gains that looked unimaginable at the beginning of the year,” an outcome largely attributable to voters’ rejection of “the increasingly erratic behavior of an out of touch Commander in Chief.” This assessment is not all that different from what Republicans—both privately and, in some cases, publicly—are saying. “Republicans are running out of runway,” Dave Winston, a longtime G.O.P. pollster, warned this week in an op-ed in Roll Call, blaming this development on the fact that Trump’s economic message has been “falling on deaf ears.” The phrase “ringing alarm bells” was used. …
And this, to me, is the real surprise of 2026: the President may be brought low this fall not by the Democrats who would crawl over broken glass to defeat him but by the very voters who sent him back to the White House in the first place. Iran, it seems, may finally have done what January 6th and all the rest of Trump’s countless misdeeds could not. Has Donald Trump’s lame-duck era already begun? “
Nearly half the country now has a positive view of socialism.
“WASHINGTON, D.C. — Forty-three percent of Americans now have a positive view of socialism, marking the first time this figure has exceeded 39% in Gallup’s trend since 2010. Socialism still trails capitalism and free enterprise in public favorability but now ranks ahead of big business. Small business remains the clear leader among the five economic concepts tested, with 95% viewing it positively. …”
The “Socialism Sucks” campaign strategy is falling on deaf ears with disaffected Trump voters.
Callum McMichael asks why Belarus has resisted pressures that transformed much of the continent and what that resistance reveals about the meaning of sovereignty today.
There remains, in the geographic heart of the continent, a country that has not yet surrendered the older meaning of Europe. Belarus is not the Europe of Atlantic institutions, nor the Europe of managed decline into managerial cosmopolitanism. It is the Europe that still remembers what a people is, what a border is, what continuity costs. This is not a claim of perfection. It is a claim of residual authenticity. In an age when the word “European” has been emptied of historical content and refilled with procedural liberalism, Belarus stands as the last place where Europe is still allowed to mean something older than the postwar consensus, and, in that sense, preferable to what the Atlanticist West has become.
TOMMY TUBERVILLE WARNS THAT “MANY” PILOTS, FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ARE FURRIES: “Lord help us. It’s terrifying when you think about this.”
— Brian Allen (@allenanalysis) September 23, 2026
Tuberville claimed on the Senate floor that airline workers being part of the furry community poses a danger to… pic.twitter.com/Fz1dPnGbEN
I know the deranged Democrats don’t like the fact that I called out the insane FURRY CULTURE this week.
— Coach Tommy Tuberville (@SenTuberville) September 24, 2026
But the truth is, there is an ALARMING number of these DERANGED people working in our airline industry.
Don’t believe me? Just a few months ago, PILOTS were MEOWING and… pic.twitter.com/plNji44kzu
Sen. Tommy Tuberville says Alabamans are willing to pay higher gas prices to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
— Manu Raju (@mkraju) September 23, 2026
“Our people in Alabama know they voted for President Trump.…
They willing to pay higher prices?
Tuberville: “Yeah, sure they are.
“He explains it well.… pic.twitter.com/zecP1Kzp1q
Just a few weeks ago at the “Furry Migration” convention in Minneapolis, there was an “Aviation Furs Meet-up.”
— Coach Tommy Tuberville (@SenTuberville) September 24, 2026
Ask yourself… would you be comfortable with a MENTALLY ILL FURRY being your pilot?https://t.co/OvTkxSUMDG
Sen. Tommy Tuberville doubles down on his concerns over pilots, flight attendants and air traffic controllers identifying as furries.
— Jacob Wasserman (@jacob_wass) September 24, 2026
I didn’t know there was a pilot section at a furry convention in Minneapolis, but maybe I’m just out of the loop. pic.twitter.com/e0iA8RBgOq
Tuberville: The greatest national security threat facing the country: Sharia law pic.twitter.com/0JjhMcmrmc
— Acyn (@Acyn) October 28, 2025
Next time someone accuses you of having Trump derangement syndrome, send them this pic.twitter.com/cUPGBaNcuW
— MAGA Cult Slayer (@MAGACult2) September 24, 2026
Nearly three-quarters of Alabama residents struggle to afford at least one essential need such as housing, food, health care or childcare, according to a new national analysis that shows the state exceeding national averages in several key areas. pic.twitter.com/MT2MY6kj7L
— AL.com (@aldotcom) September 24, 2026
If I sound blackpilled and demoralized, it is because this is how bleak our politics have gotten in Alabama. This is who I am being invited to vote for in the midterms.
Note: I’m not sold on Doug Jones. I’m currently leaning toward just staying home in November like I did in 2018.
Oğul Tuna looks beyond the familiar labels surrounding the AfD to ask a more unsettling question: is Germany breaking with the liberal order or assembling the conditions for something far more dangerous?
Six years ago, I wrote the following note:
I see a Hindenburg potential in Merkel; still, one hopes that Germany will not drift into dark places after her and once again shape all our fates for the worse…
Today, as it has twice before with painful consequences, Germany is preparing to take steps that could fundamentally alter the fate of Europe and the world.
In warning that the outcome may once again be “painful,” I do not want to take the easy route of hiding behind labels such as “fascism” or the “far right.” Let me state from the outset that the result could instead be a world in which, under the shadow of techno-feudalism, humanity throws away the social rights and achievements accumulated over the past 150 years.
Any attempt to analyse the elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Germany’s future inevitably requires us to examine the similarities between the conditions that enabled the Nazis’ rise to power and the networks the AfD has built in recent years. We are human, after all, and nothing human is alien to us; and our mistakes are no exception.
Just as the crises of the 1920s led to one of the great catastrophes in history in the 1930s and 1940s, today we are passing through crises so profound that they may make us look back nostalgically on a century ago—and perhaps carry us toward turning points that could make even the horrors of the last century seem mild by comparison.
I do not mention Thyssen here by chance. By 1926, he stood at the head of Germany’s iron-and-steel empire. Krupp, with which Thyssen’s heirs would merge in 1999, had likewise been one of the central components of the German war machine from the time of its founding.
Although the Krupp family had not shown as much sympathy for the Nazis as Thyssen before Hitler came to power, Alfried Krupp became one of the regime’s most important industrial partners during the Second World War.
We shall see whether, in a few years, those who encouraged the rearmament of Germany and Japan after the war in Ukraine will come to “regret” what they set in motion.
One reason the AfD has become attractive to traditional voters—perhaps justifiably so—is its opposition to “the woke culture” that has transformed the West since the 2010s and to the “culture wars” imported from the United States.
The AfD has declared war on concepts such as Frühsexualisierung—the premature sexualisation of children—Genderideologie, or “gender ideology,” the dissolution of the traditional family, and gendered language. It openly constructs an opposition between “family values” and “gender.”
After all, the “roaring 2020s” appear to be embracing moral and cultural decay in virtually every field. The AfD, like other movements and organisations routinely thrown into the sack labelled the “far right,” has challenged this trend.
Leaving aside the fact that capital has reversed its role in this process and is now helping to generate a counter-wave through figures such as Musk and Thiel, this situation inevitably recalls—once again—the world of a hundred years ago.
Another social issue targeted by the Nazis was “moral erosion.”
Weimar Germany was a place of artistic experimentation, where the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft—the Institute for Sexual Science—played a prominent role in public debate and gay and lesbian bars flourished.
Yet this world was hardly held in high esteem by Germans who had been impoverished and dispossessed. Germany’s national honour had been wounded at Versailles; the country had been struck by a historically unprecedented wave of inflation; and veterans of the Great War felt humiliated at every turn.
Such a spectacle, they thought, did not befit Germany.
Once in power, the Nazis therefore moved rapidly to “cleanse” the country of the alleged “disease” spread by “Jews and communists.”
But was that really the case?
Sexual crimes committed in the concentration camps established from 1933 onward, together with the homosexual relationships and sexual scandals associated with Ernst Röhm, once one of Hitler’s most important supporters—who would later fall victim to an internal party purge—continued in different forms and through different rumours until the regime’s defeat.
What this reveals is that conservative rhetoric about “morality” and “culture,” as in many other times and places, can be ignored whenever power finds it convenient to do so, while figures who are themselves far from conservative can still be assigned a functional role within the system.
Criticism and accusations directed at the AfD leader on account of her partner should, I think, be reconsidered in light of this historical reality.
For the Nazis, the greatest threat was the Soviet Union and its alleged collaborators “inside” Germany.
As early as the end of 1917, a term had entered circulation to describe this threat: Judeo-Bolshevism.
The danger of Bolshevism in the East was not enough. It was also claimed that the entire project had been designed to destroy the world by figures who were genuinely Jewish—Marx, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, and others—or who were falsely alleged to be Jewish, such as Lenin, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bukharin, and others.
Today, especially in Germany, even the slightest criticism directed at Jewish organisations or Israel can be met with harsh police intervention and legal penalties.
This is because, as the AfD itself makes quite clear, another “threat” has now taken centre stage: immigrants—particularly those coming from Muslim-majority countries, if Turks are treated as a separate category.
This can be connected to the increasingly aggressive hostility toward both Islam and the left among right-wing circles in other Western countries.
While those responsible for what I regard as the greatest crime against humanity of our age, in Gaza, are rewarded, the victims—as we have seen repeatedly in history—are punished, blamed, and vilified.
In such an atmosphere, one also encounters statements that verge on the absurd.
Israel’s ambassador to Berlin, Ron Prosor, describes an AfD electoral victory as a “warning light” but stops short of directly condemning the party. More astonishingly still, in this context he argues that the real political “firewall” should be erected against the left!
The similarities between the Nazis and the AfD can be multiplied. Yet there is one extremely important distinction between the two parties: their attitude toward Russia.
Whether under the name of Judeo-Bolshevism or, later, Stalinism, Moscow was always Hitler’s—and his movement’s—number-one threat.
It should not be forgotten that in the new world war he launched, nearly five times as many Slavs as Holocaust victims lost their lives.
The AfD, however, stands somewhere very different from the Nazi Party, which is so often described as its “ideological forefather.”
It advocates improving relations with Moscow, lifting sanctions on Russia, and ending support for Ukraine.
Its enemy is conceived more abstractly.
It presents the German nation as encircled by foreign powers—through waves of migration, cultural degeneration, economic warfare, and, more implicitly, the networks of the United States and NATO.
But who can say that this is the party’s final position?
Liberals never tire of reminding the Soviet Union and the Left of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Yet they are curiously less eager to recall the Munich Agreement and Britain’s policy of appeasement. Was it not Germany that ultimately tore up the former, just as it had already rendered the latter worthless and left Chamberlain’s appeasement policy in ruins? To what extent is it really possible to think of Musk’s and Thiel’s interests—sometimes separately, sometimes where they overlap—as existing outside the U.S.–NATO security system?
For this reason, it is misleading to interpret the rise of the AfD simply as:
“Germany is breaking with NATO and moving toward cooperation with Russia.” (Ah, if only that scenario had become reality in 1919!)
As Emin Gürses, a Turkish professor of international relations known for his work on geopolitics, NATO, and the international system, has repeatedly emphasised, the German right’s relationship with NATO reflects a deeper historical continuity.
It should not be forgotten that, at least for now, the AfD does not advocate withdrawal from NATO as part of its programme. Rather, it seeks to redefine NATO as a defence alliance purged of American interventionism, with a stronger European pillar and subordinated to German national interests.
History, of course, never repeats itself mechanically. The AfD is not the NSDAP, today’s Germany is not Weimar, and 2026 is not 1932. But this is precisely why historical comparison matters. What returns are not identical parties, slogans or alliances, but recurring structures: social insecurity, declining faith in liberal institutions, cultural conflict, and the willingness of sections of capital to accommodate forces they believe they can use. To recognise these patterns is not to claim that history repeats itself. It is to understand how it rhymes—and why the ending has not yet been written.
Under such circumstances, who can know what tomorrow will bring?
New from Multipolar Press:
Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt by Constantin von Hoffmeister
Photo credit: Robert Stark
The sleepy coastal haven of Santa Barbara serves as the ideal case study for examining the intersection of highly polarized battleground over housing, wealth, and identity. We aren’t just choosing a figurehead to cut ribbons at the harbor; we are voting on who thrives and survives in the 805. To understand this race, you have to look past standard national blue vs red labels. Our local politics are defined by hyper-localized ideological blocs, unique class dynamics, and a fierce civil war over land use.
City councilwoman, Kristen Sneddon, is a progressive Democrat who represents anti-gentrification NIMBYism, strict architectural preservationism, and environmentalism. This highly specific local phenomenon of anti-gentrification NIMBYism, unlike conservative NIMBYs who block housing to protect property values, Sneddon scrutinizes market-rate development which she views as a vehicle for gentrification that displaces lower income residents. Her campaign has high appeal for progressive activists, environmentalists, and students, as well as some appeal to working-class Latino renters. Sneddon is aligned with the Santa Barbara County Democratic Party, the Sierra Club, the CAUSE Action Fund, and the Santa Barbara Teachers Association.
City councilman,Eric Friedman, is a pragmatic, business-friendly moderate Democrat. While Friedman is not a full blown YIMBY, like San Francisco State Senator Scott Weiner, he sits the closest to the YIMBY camp in this race. Friedman views housing construction through a lens of economic viability, arguing that the city must foster responsible development to maintain a sustainable tax base and prevent city bankruptcy. Thus, he is much more willing to green light density and commercial projects, such as voting to approve the controversial 250-room Garden Street Hotel in the Funk Zone. Friedman’s campaign has high appeal for affluent homeowners, both families and seniors, and business owners and lower appeal for progressives, working class renters, and students. Friedman is aligned with retiring Mayor Randy Rowse, U.S. Representative Salud Carbajal, and local labor and business unions.
Wendy Sims-Moten is a progressive Democrat who serves as the Executive Director of First 5 Santa Barbara County and is the former executive director/board president of the Santa Barbara Unified School District. Sims-Moten’s family-centric progressive campaign is social equity focused, particularly on human infrastructure. On the NIMBY vs. YIMBY divide, Sims-Moten is a moderate preservationist who avoids extreme pro- or anti-growth rhetoric but rather favors a case-by-case approach that prioritizes community benefits—like childcare centers or educator housing—over raw commercial profit. Sims-Moten’s campaign has high appeal for K-12 educators, working class Latino families, and other POC identity blocks and low appeal for more affluent voters, and single young professionals. Her campaign is aligned with public school advocates, non-profit networks, and equity-focused civic organizations.
Matt “Boat Rat Matt” Kilrain is the anti-establishment populist outsider. On the NIMBY vs. YIMBY spectrum Kilrain is a pure preservationist but purely localized to the harbor. He opposes corporate real estate developers and luxury hotels because he views them as “tyrannical” forces destroying the working-class waterfront culture. Kilrain’s platform sits at a contradictory crossroads, blending populist NIMBYism with aggressive laissez-faire libertarian economics. While his support is fairly marginal, he has the most appeal to blue-collar harbor workers, independent tradespeople, and anti-incumbent voters and low appeal for mainstream partisan blocks. He is most aligned with unaffiliated grassroots voters, local fishermen, and independent waterfront residents.
Mark G. Redmond embodies a populist, grassroots ideology centered on strict municipal transparency and holding local government accountable. As a frequent speaker during public comment periods at City Council meetings, his platform focuses on exposing perceived government waste and challenging institutional decision-making. Through his independent media platform and podcast, Ears on Santa Barbara, Redmond champions the idea of bypassing mainstream political channels to amplify the unfiltered grievances of ordinary citizens. Redmond leans toward the NIMBY side of the spectrum, though his stance is driven by a deep distrust of government overreach rather than a desire to protect property values. He routinely opposes high-density rezoning and major city-led redevelopment initiatives because he views them as waste-heavy projects pushed by an untrustworthy City Hall.
Michael Stilwell is running as a minimalist, anti-establishment outsider whose platform is defined by its lack of conventional policy proposals or institutional alignment. Operating without a formal campaign apparatus or a public agenda on pressing issues like the budget deficit or the State Street Master Plan, Stilwell’s candidacy functions purely as a protest option. His overarching ideology is rooted in providing a blank-slate alternative for voters who want to completely reject the city’s current political leadership and established council members. Operating on an ideology of critical consciousness and systemic rejection, Stilwell views current municipal policy as a symptom of a societal breakdown. Because his platform completely dismisses standard economic development in favor of changing how people “relate to the earth,” his philosophy appeals to counter-culture advocates and environmental idealists. Stilwell falls completely off the conventional spectrum, viewing Santa Barbara’s housing shortages not as a debate over supply or neighborhood preservation, but as a systemic symptom of how modern society maladapts to the earth.
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Because Santa Barbara is small and deeply interconnected, voters have formed unique local coalitions that don’t match national politics. The Progressive-Labor Coalition (Sneddon/Sims-Moten) is an alliance between young college students, the CAUSE Action Fund (working-class immigrants), and affluent eco-conscious White progressives. They find common ground in climate action, public education funding, and heavy tenant protections. The Pragmatic-Preservation Coalition (Friedman) connects affluent business owners, corporate real estate interests, and moderate-to-conservative home owning families and seniors. They unite around fiscal discipline, opposition to rent control, and keeping the local economy business-friendly. The more niche Blue-Collar Populist Coalition (Kilrain) is an alliance of harbor workers, independent contractors, and libertarian-leaning skeptics. They reject both major parties and focus entirely on protecting working-class autonomy from City Hall overreach.
Local votes for mayor heavily reflect wider statewide and presidential voting patterns, but with a distinct twist. While Santa Barbara votes overwhelmingly blue in presidential elections, our local municipal races reveal just how fractured that “blue” coalition really is. A vote for Sneddon aligns with the progressive, democratic-socialist wing of statewide policies, while a vote for Friedman mirrors the moderate, establishment corporate-Democratic wing. We also see clear echoes of the 2021 mayoral race in which a crowded field split the progressive vote, allowing moderate-conservative, Randy Rowse to win the seat outright with just a 39% plurality of the vote.
In this mayoral race, identity politics functions not as a collection of symbolic talking points, but as a direct proxy for the city’s intense battles over land use, economic survival, and neighborhood preservation. Because the city’s socioeconomic architecture is so deeply fractured along demographic lines, campaigns use equity and social justice frameworks to signal who they intend to protect politically and economically. For progressives like Wendy Sims-Moten and Kristen Sneddon, centering identity means framing rent control, public school funding, and zoning restrictions as essential moral shields to prevent the gentrification and outward migration of the city’s working-class Latino population. Sims-Moten, who is the only candidate of color, heavily anchors her political identity in progressive racial equity policies, championing institutional reforms aimed at dismantling systemic bias. During her tenure on the Santa Barbara Unified School District board, she was a driving force behind sweeping initiatives that aligned with Black Lives Matter demands, which included voting to declare racism a public health emergency and mandating district-wide anti-bias training. Her platform emphasizes systemic transformation over incremental reform, focusing on restructuring local government and civic institutions to prioritize restorative justice, civil rights advocacy, and targeted support for historically marginalized communities. The moderate and populist candidates like Eric Friedman and Matt Kilrain intentionally adopt identity-neutral universalist rhetoric; by framing municipal governance through colorblind metrics like fiscal discipline, tourism-driven solvency, or individual autonomy.
Santa Barbara’s geographic neighborhoods form clear predictable strongholds shaped by housing density, wealth, and demographics. Kristen Sneddon commands a powerful base in the historic, environmentally conscious, and affluent hillsides of the Riviera and Mission Canyon, where high-earning, predominantly white homeowners strongly favor her strict viewshed protections and resistance to high-density zoning overrides, alongside progressive tenant support in the lower-density pockets of Samarkand. These hillside neighborhoods feature Santa Barbara’s highest median ages, highest rates of homeownership, and lowest concentrations of children per household. They are disproportionately populated by wealthy retirees, empty-nesters, and affluent White progressives who use anti-gentrification to virtue signal and as a moral shield for their wealth.
Conversely, Wendy Sims-Moten’s equity-driven, family-centered populism finds its core stronghold in the Eastside and the Westside, neighborhoods with the city’s highest concentrations of working-class Latino families who rely directly on her championed investments in early childhood infrastructure and localized public health resources. This is a leftwing populism that is explicitly oriented toward communities of color and working-class families.
Eric Friedman’s base captures a broad moderate coalition across the upper middle class family oriented single-family neighborhoods of the Mesa, San Roque, and the Upper State Street corridor, who favor his pro middle class family polices. While Sneddon represents left-leaning Seniors, Friedman also represents right-leaning/moderate seniors, who vote defensively to protect their property equity and city financial reserves. Friedman’s coalition also includes downtown commercial property owners who back his market-rate revitalization plans. Finally, populist Matt Kilrain secures small but highly concentrated pockets of support among anti-regulation libertarians and long-term coastal residents in the Waterfront and the Funk Zone, where independent business owners and maritime workers favor his calls to eliminate city permitting fees and bureaucratic red tape.
Photo credit: Robert Stark
The “Builder’s Remedy” has become one of the most explosive zoning flashpoints in the 2026 Santa Barbara mayoral race. This legal loophole stems from California’s Housing Accountability Act. When a city fails to pass a state-certified housing element plan on time, it temporarily loses local control over its zoning. Developers are then allowed to bypass local height limits, density caps, and architectural reviews, provided the project includes a set amount of affordable housing. Because Santa Barbara missed its state deadline, developers can utilize the loophole to pitch highly controversial, large scale developments. The most controversial example is a massive eight-story, 270-unit residential complex proposed directly behind the historic Santa Barbara Mission. The project, which normally violates the city’s strict 30-foot height limit, ignited intense community backlash and lawsuits.
Friedman opposes the aggressive, unmitigated use of the Builder’s Remedy, but his approach centers on municipal pragmatism, legal compliance, and market-rate realities. Friedman favors getting the city into full compliance with state housing mandates to close the loophole legally, rather than engaging in endless, costly court battles. He supports high-density transit corridors and mixed-use commercial developments (like the Funk Zone) but prefers they be negotiated through standard city planning channels rather than dictated by the state.
Sneddon views the Builder’s Remedy as an existential threat to Santa Barbara’s historic character and public safety. She strongly supports using the city’s legal resources, environmental review under CEQA, and high-resource fire/evacuation corridor designations to fight back against state-bypassed mega-developments like the Mission project. When she does support housing, she demands strict 100% affordable or inclusionary units rather than private market-rate projects that she believes inflate local land values. Sneddon advocates for adaptive reuse, proposing that empty downtown commercial anchors, like the vacant Macy’s or Nordstrom’s buildings, be retrofitted into municipal family housing rather than allowing developers to tear down existing older buildings. Sneddon would ironically become the most YIMBY mayor because her “no growth” policies would activate Builder’s Remedy.
Sims-Moten opposes the “wild west” nature of the Builder’s Remedy but argues that the city brought it upon itself by failing to plan properly for workforce housing. Basically, Sneddon and Sims-Moten both favor affordable housing over market rate, but Sims-Moten is less NIMBY in how she aggressively favors more affordable housing. Focusing on “people infrastructure” over pure square footage, she wants to reform zoning specifically to fast-track projects that offer clear social returns, such as employee housing for teachers, on-site childcare facilities, or public parks.
Matt “Boat Rat Matt” Kilrain rejects both state mandates and City Hall’s handling of the crisis. He views the Builder’s Remedy as corporate tyranny dressed up as affordable housing. He advocates for flat-out non-compliance with heavy-handed state housing demands, prioritizing local working-class autonomy above all else. He is a radical anti-corporate preservationist who wants zoning rewritten exclusively to protect the working waterfront, marine trades, and local blue-collar spaces from being gentrified by high-density developments or luxury tourism projects.
The 2026 Santa Barbara mayoral candidates perfectly map onto a distinct four-quadrant political compass, where the traditional Left-Right divide intersects with the modern YIMBY-NIMBY housing debate. Each quadrant targets and fosters growth for a completely different socio-demographic slice of the community.
Wendy Sims-Moten is not a true YIMBY, due to her opposition to market rate housing, and no one running truly fits the Left-YIMBY quadrant. However, she is the closest to that stance of any candidate. The Left-YIMBY approach is the most explicitly geared toward people of color and working-class growth. By pushing for heavily subsidized, community-led affordable housing and equity-driven builds, it aims to prevent the displacement of historic minority communities and enable lower-income service workers to live where they work while further expanding the growth of these demographics.
The Right-YIMBY quadrant, which Eric Friedman is most aligned with, is focused on market-rate and workforce housing incentives. This ideology naturally favors young professionals and upwardly mobile families. By opposing developer-deterring regulations like rent caps, it relies on private capital to build the modern, high-density apartments and condos that attract tech workers, medical professionals, and college graduates, which demographically benefits younger and disproportionately White high-income residents compared to the other quadrants.
Ironically, the populist outsider candidate, Matt Kilrain, best encapsulates the Right-NIMBY quadrant like current mayor, Randy Rowse. The Right-NIMBY quadrant caters almost exclusively to elderly White affluent homeowners. By fiercely opposing state-mandated zoning overrides, transit-oriented density, and changes to single-family neighborhoods, it acts as a fortress for established retirees determined to keep Santa Barbara’s suburban fabric exactly as it was when they bought their homes decades ago while keeping out future generations.
The Left-NIMBY quadrant, which Kristen Sneddon epitomizes, forms a unique coalition of affluent elderly preservationists and low income POC communities. Driven by defensive environmentalism, historic preservation, and strict tenant protections like rent control, it unites virtue signaling older, wealthy White liberals wanting to maintain “neighborhood character” with low-income renters who fear that any new market-rate development will spark gentrification and price them out of their neighborhoods.
Ultimately, identity politics in the 805 serves as the ideological vocabulary used to debate a very material question: which demographic gets to inherit the shrinking pie of Santa Barbara. The demographic groups that stand to benefit most in the upcoming election are those at the absolute poles of Santa Barbara’s socioeconomic spectrum. On one end, affluent property owners, retirees, and business executives will find a clear champion in Eric Friedman. His opposition to strict rent control and his focus on fiscal stability act as a direct shield for high-end real estate values and tourism-driven hospitality revenue, ensuring that older, high-net-worth residents can maintain their foothold in the city. On the exact opposite end, lower-income renters, students, and working-class Latino families stand to gain the most from both Kristen Sneddon and Wendy Sims-Moten. Their aggressive push for strict citywide rent stabilization and fierce anti-eviction protections provide an immediate, vital safety net that prevents vulnerable populations from being priced out of their neighborhoods by gentrification.
Santa Barbara’s barbell class divide, demographic split, and aging population means that a single policy shift can cause a massive population growth or decline in specific communities. The proposed strict rent stabilization ordinance is the absolute fault line of this election. For working-class Latino families and students, rent control is a literal lifeline that prevents rent hikes, allowing families on the Westside and Eastside to stay in their neighborhoods and keeping SBCC and UCSB students from being priced out immediately after graduation.
Middle-Class White families in particular, but middle class Latino families too, are caught in the “middle-class squeeze.” They don’t qualify for subsidized low-income housing but can’t afford a $2 million single-family home. This “missing middle” demographic earns too much to qualify for localized public housing assistance, yet lacks the immense capital required to outbid wealthy retirees in an unrestricted real estate market. The population that gets trapped directly in the middle is Santa Barbara’s disappearing middle class, primarily early-to-mid-career professionals, young couples, and middle-income families with children.
When the political battle lines are drawn exclusively around freezing the city in amber to protect elite views or imposing strict regulations that halt new construction, the “missing middle” housing supply completely stagnates. In a city polarized between anti-gentrification regulations and luxury development, the supply of entry-level condos and townhomes completely dries up. This demographic faces a difficult choice between remaining permanent renters under strict caps or leaving the city altogether to raise their children in more affordable, family-centric nearby suburbs like Goleta, inland Ventura County, or leaving the State.
Under a progressive, left-NIMBY administration like Kristen Sneddon, demographic growth is not channeled into any particular group, as new housing is greatly limited. However, her proposed regulatory protective blanket acts as an essential demographic shield for working-class Latino families, locking in their tenancy on the Westside and Eastside and preventing the economic displacement that follows gentrification. By combining strict anti-displacement renter protections with vocal defense of public school programming, her approach targets the retention of existing low-income Latino residents.
Because Sneddon’s strict preservation rules make market-rate private builds financially restrictive, the creation of entry-level condos and townhomes for purchase completely dries up. The aggressive cap on rental profits and strict environmental zoning acts as a sharp deterrent to institutional developers, meaning the creation of mid-tier, market-rate inventory completely stalls which is bad for growing and maintaining the middle class. Thus, Sneddon’s policies would lead to a decline in middle-class families, especially White, but also middle class Latinos. However, Sneddon’s policies are actually friendly to wealthy White seniors and White college students, just not families.
Both Sneddon and Sims-Moten treat the preservation of diverse local schools as a core community asset. This blocks localized gentrification and keeps native language-acquisition resources and cultural equity funding alive within neighborhoods like the Westside and Eastside. Sims-Moten’s platform treats municipal governance as an intervention tool to uplift vulnerable populations, focusing tax dollars on bilingual programs, early childhood education, and public spaces like the Eastside Branch Library. Her approach actively aims to halt the displacement of lower-income Latino and Black residents by treating public youth infrastructure as a vital necessity. These proposed policies foment cultural and ethnic enclavism, besides just economic protectionism.
Sims-Moten’s platform stabilizes lower-income demographics by using city partnerships to subsidize childcare, expand preschool equity, and secure social health resources through her work with First 5 Santa Barbara County. Some of these programs for education and housing support would benefit middle class niches like subsidized housing for teachers. Despite her campaign’s pro-middle class family framing, her polices are more geared toward low income families rather than granting the middle class the best chance of remaining in town. By free or subsidized local programming for early childhood care, her policies allow low income families to keep their children enrolled locally. This directly encourages growth among younger, low-income families, predominantly Latino, allowing them to remain in the area and stabilize the district’s plunging elementary school enrollment. However, there is demographic growth potential, unlike Sneddon’s pure anti-displacement approach.
Conversely, a pro-market, fiscally conservative administration led by Eric Friedman signals a balanced growth environment between affluent families and seniors and middle class families and young professionals while offering less to lower income demographics. Affluent families would benefit from Friedman’s market-driven policies, which keep property values high and encourage luxury hospitality investments that boost tourism revenue. Rent control is an economic deterrent that devalues real estate assets and slows down the capital appreciation that wealthy families rely upon. By opposing strict rent control and advocating for high-yield, luxury waterfront tourism, Friedman’s policies protect high-end real estate equity and invite outside white-collar tech capital. This accelerates the migration of wealthy bicoastal remote workers and affluent retirees who can comfortably absorb multi-million dollar price points. However, the anti-gentrification Left is concerned that this unchecked luxury real estate demand would trigger an outward migration for working class families, fixed-income seniors, and students, who risk being priced out of their long-term rentals without explicit legislative safeguards.
Rather than prioritizing low-income safety nets, Friedman targets the “missing middle”—families who earn too much for assistance but cannot survive market-rate housing costs. Friedman created the city’s Local Housing Trust Fund to build workforce-targeted, below-market-rate housing which is favorable to middle class workers like teachers, nurses, and public safety personnel. This spreads property-tax-fueled resource allocations evenly across the city, avoiding the polarization of isolated “rich” or “poor” campuses. If successful, his policies could bring middle-income children back into SBUSD.
Friedman spearheaded what he termed “the 1,000-foot question”. When the city updated its Accessory Dwelling Unit (ADU) and multi-family zoning laws, standard regulations capped extra rental units at 800 square feet. Friedman successfully fought to push that cap to 1,000 square feet specifically for units with two or more bedrooms. He explicitly directed the planning commission to use this square-footage bump to incentivize developers to build spaces large enough for “future family housing” rather than just single occupants. Since there isn’t space to grow outward and developers favor smaller units, incentivizing multi-bedroom units is the only way to maintain and attract middle class families.
Sims-Moten has used her dual background as an executive and former school board president to create dedicated, multi-bedroom family complexes via public-private partnerships. Leading the school board’s ad hoc housing committee alongside the Housing Authority of the City of Santa Barbara, Sims-Moten pushed to re-zone and convert underutilized school district land into teacher, staff, and workforce apartments. However, unlike Friedman’s proposals, they are set aside only for public servants. From a supply-side perspective, Kristen Sneddon is viewed by critics as being less effective at getting larger, multi-bedroom units built for middle-class families.
Because of how desirable Santa Barbara is, with such a limited amount of space, the amount of high density market rate housing that would be needed to get built would be so massive that it would fundamentally alter Santa Barbara’s character. Consequently, if Left-YIMBYs got their wish and Santa Barbara built a massive amount of low income units, while this could create affordable housing, even politically correct liberals would not want that much crowding and growth from lower class demographics. Friedman’s YIMBY-lite approach will not make Santa Barbara affordable to the working class but at the very least it will retain upper middle class families and young professionals, so Santa Barbara doesn’t turn into a gilded retirement community with a low income service sector.
Matt Kilrain’s platform explicitly seeks to freeze the commercialization of public spaces, protecting the unpolished coastal aesthetic favored by local creatives and harbor hands. His anti-establishment layout lacks the predictable municipal zoning infrastructure and tech-corridor expansion needed to attract high-earning white-collar demographics which could have some benefit for bohemians, artists, and independent tradesman. Rather than letting the free market build high-density housing to solve the supply crisis, his policy is focused entirely on the people already here, stating that the city needs to handle existing infrastructure before allowing further physical growth. His underlying motivation is explicitly protectionist. He notes that he is running to ensure Santa Barbara remains exactly “the type of place he moved to three decades ago.”
This lack of stylistic edge makes it impossible not to feel a certain countercultural affinity for Matt “Boat Rat Matt” Kilrain, whose eccentric, hand-painted populist crusade to “raise the vibe” captures a beautiful, dying strain of authentic California bohemian grit. Kilrain’s anti-development harbor-tribalism is backwards and an economic dead-end that would freeze the city’s housing stock in amber, but his raw, anti-establishment outsider energy offers a refreshing alternative to the sterile, consultant-driven politics of City Hall, making him an intellectually fascinating figure, even if Friedman remains the only practical choice for actual structural growth.
While I rank Kristen Sneddon overall low, the one thing I like about her is her favorable stance to the arts and fostering a bohemian culture. For instance, Sneddon supports local artist havens like The Community Arts Workshop. By fiercely defending the permanent, full closure of the seven-block State Street promenade to vehicle traffic, Sneddon’s vision keeps downtown Santa Barbara a pedestrian-first commons that naturally acts as an incubator for local artists, street musicians, and a bustling nightlife patronized by students and younger residents. The irony is that while Sneddon’s policies structurally starve the city of the housing supply needed to sustain a younger population, her fierce protection of a pedestrianized State Street and her resistance to corporate gentrification inadvertently preserve the unpolished, walkable, and bohemian street life that makes an urban environment dynamic. In contrast, Wendy Sims-Moten views the arts as an institutional vehicle for youth equity and educational development at public hubs like the Eastside Branch Library.
Friedman heavily ties arts promotion to the ongoing revitalization of downtown. He advocates for using public spaces, such as the recent Library Plaza project situated in the heart of the Arts District, to host festivals, literary events, and local artist showcases. Described colloquially as “the library guy”, Friedman favors collaborative public projects that combine community services with creative spaces. His goal is to leverage the arts to bring residents back downtown and support local businesses. However, there is a critique that Friedman champion the arts through a highly structured, formalized municipal frameworks, such as the State Street Master Plan or official library plazas. He views arts and culture as a polished economic driver to revitalize business corridors, rather than fostering a bohemian, underground, or experimental art scenes.
While Eric Friedman represents the only mainstream vehicle capable of puncturing Santa Barbara’s ossified, multi-decade NIMBY consensus; he operates within a highly technocratic, institutional moderate-Democratic mold that lacks a strong aesthetic vision for urban renewal. While Friedman is better for attracting housing and businesses downtown, his desire to reopen State Street to cars and capitulate to high-end hospitality interests could accelerate Santa Barbara’s transformation into a manicured sterile playground for wealthy retirees. However, Friedman has made a specific motion to partially reopen parts of the street, proposing to open six blocks of the promenade to vehicles while keeping the 500 and 600 blocks closed.
Friedman’s critics worry his push to streamline permitting and courting institutional capital could inadvertently open the floodgates to sterile, cookie-cutter corporate architecture. The fear is that by prioritizing speed and market-rate feasibility over the city’s notoriously strict aesthetic vetting, developers might rely on generic, value-engineered “podium mid-rises” that strip downtown of its historic soul. However, the distinct upside to Friedman’s policies is that by slashing through years of prohibitive design-review gridlock, he creates a rare operational opening for truly ambitious, progressive architecture. By lowering the financial risks of the approval process, creative architects are no longer forced to play it safe; they are finally given the regulatory breathing room to propose structurally innovative, avant-garde concepts that can boldly redefine Santa Barbara’s urban fabric without being smothered by red tape.
Friedman deserves credit for his pragmatic, YIMBY-adjacent stances on market-rate density and office-to-residential zoning conversions, which are vital if the city is to escape its current barbell demographic stagnation, yet could still come short at fostering a genuinely vibrant urban landscape. While Eric Friedman shares a foundational, pro-business moderate baseline with outgoing Mayor Randy Rowse, he represents a critical upgrade toward a more forward-thinking style of municipal governance. Friedman understands that absolute resistance to growth is a legal and economic dead end; instead of wasting city funds on futile lawsuits against state mandates, Friedman is willing to work within the system to greenlight high-density transit corridors and mixed-use commercial developments. By prioritizing a sustainable tax base and regional housing partnerships over aesthetic stagnation, Friedman offers a necessary pivot toward economic viability that can keep the city from financial distress while finally opening the door to the type of housing supply Rowse completely blocked.
This is the first part of Guillaume Faye’s book-length essay The New Ideological Challenges, originally published in French in 1985, in which he argues that Europe’s theatrical postwar political struggles were giving way to more fundamental conflicts over identity, culture, sovereignty, and the continent’s place in the world.
The ideological and cultural atmosphere in post-war Europe, a Europe tamed by peace and the longest economic boom to date, was exclusively dominated by the illusion of political appearances until the seventies. The thinking elites could do nothing but indulge in dreams, for they were deprived of challenges, of history, as they remained huddled in a cosy society without visible threats.
The great fashion of commitment introduced by Sartre occurred precisely when engaging amounted to almost nothing and included neither risks nor fundamental consequences. “Many intellectuals,” writes Jean-Claude Guillebaud, “succumbed to Stalinist temptations when Stalin scarcely threatened the pacified world anymore. Simultaneously, cultural anti-Americanism thrived under the protection of Washington’s nuclear umbrella. And one experienced the imaginary fears of a victorious revolution, just as Europe was quietly approaching a social democratic model based on the welfare state ... As if the tragic, excluded from everyday life, was allowed to regain strength through the imaginary. Only peace and growth could permit such intellectual extravagances. Later, the so-called Third Worldism, i.e., solidarity with the Third World, undoubtedly emerged from the same instinctive desire: to find a substitute pathos and continue to participate—albeit by substitution—in all the reveries of history. Similarly, the fiercest criticism of consumer society, rural sensitivity, and fantasies of zero growth flourished just when the gross national product was growing most strongly.”
You all still getting my degenerate posts? Raise your hand and say yes if you are.
I made a few “transphobic”LOL comments on Substack. There was a troon; excuse me, tranny; sorry, transsexual; whoops, transgender man; my bad, transwoman who was truly beautiful, and he had awesome tits. I complimented him and said he had the best looking tits I’d ever seen on a man. True in fact. He was indeed a man and he definitely had awesome tits. Scientific truth. Then I made a few more posts with the word “troon” in them because he was in fact the fetishistic transgender male who goes trans due to a sexual fetish or a paraphilia. That’s what a troon is - an autogynephile transgender man.
After that my traffic collapsed. Very few likes and reposts. Almost no comments.
Theories:
Theory 1: My readers are leftwingers and the Left is currently in thrall to gender ideology and the trans or gender ideology cult. You’re not allowed to say bad things about those wonderful trans guys pretending to be chicks. So my readers abandoned me for being mean to troons; excuse me, chicks with dicks; I’m sorry, dickgirls; my bad, he-she’s; I apologize, male lesbians; oh wait, transwomen; I knew I’d get it right eventually.
Theory 2: Substack shadowbanned me for making anti-trans slurs or comments.
Theory 3: There has been an explosion of new Substacks, and I’m simply getting outcompeted by all these AI fake writers or drowned in the din.
Theory 4: I started enforcing my new last 10 posts only more strictly and a lot of tightwads just took off.
Theory 5: Nothing happened. I just suck and so obviously does my site.
Theory 6: I haven’t the faintest idea and never will. It’s a mystery to science.
When I call it a cult, I must point out that there are indeed actual biological transsexual men and women, but the women are vanishingly rare and only 11% of transgender men are truly transgender. These men are all gay men, and the onset is extreme and before age five. True transgender men are simply an extreme form of male homosexuality. I won’t call these guys troons if I can help it. Curiously they don’t mind being called trannies, and they laugh and call themselves that all the time. It’s the troons who go nuts over the word.
These true transgender men actually have something wrong with their brains. They don’t have female brains but they have feminized brains; that is, their brains are halfway between a male and female brain. I have a lot of sympathy for these men, but I’m not sure hard transition is the way to go. Puberty blockers should be banned. There are issues with men going on estrogen, and the surgery is full of problems, especially if they chop their penises off and make those horrible trainwreck fake vaginas. They are pretty easygoing and they’re not hypersensitive like the troons.
The rest or 89% of transgender men are just transvestic fetishists with autogynephilia, which is a paraphilia or sexual kink or perversion. This is the group people call troons, but as you will see below, even they deserve some sympathy.
This group also has a very high rate of other paraphilias, including some that lead to criminal behavior. Many are on sex offender lists. When we put them in women’s spaces, rapes occur pretty frequently. They are very narcissistic and highly intelligent. A lot of them are very aggressive and even violent. They often menace their feminist opponents. They have high crime rates. However there are probably a lot of men like this who are law-abiding and don’t commit sexual crimes. They are also quite disordered. They have more cumulative or concurrent mental disorders than any other group we see clinically. This is the group with the oft-quoted 47% attempted suicide rate.
Nowadays a lot of transgender men are fake. They’re not even transvestic fetishists. A lot of these fake transgender men are often dangerous male inmates who are now claiming to be women to get out of men’s prisons. Many of these men have committed violent crimes, and they don’t look the tiniest bit female. When we put them in women’s prisons, sexual assaults are not uncommon.
I should show some sympathy for autogynephiles. 4.5% of men are transvestic fetishists. We used to call them transvestites. They lived normal lives and generally appeared like normal males. They were generally straight and married with patient and understanding wives, but they practiced their fetish on the sly. The homosexual ones were and are called drag queens, but these have never been healthy people. They tend to be quite disordered in a “syndromal” way. They don’t do well in relationships. They seem like chaotic people, nonstop drama. This condition seems to be incurable too. They don’t seem to get better. A lot of people who identified as drag queens back in the 60’s and 70’s are now calling themselves transgender. Examples include some of the drag queens associated with Andy Warhol’s Factory and the punk singer Wayne County from Wayne County and the Electric Chairs
Almost all transvestic fetishists have now gone over to transgender men. They didn’t have to. They’re still just transvestites. The problem with these men and the reason I call for some sympathy is that transvestic fetishism is always accompanied by gender dysphoria, a mental disorder that is still in the DSM. Gender dysphoria can be profoundly painful, and I wouldn’t wish it on anybody. And if it’s not treated, it worsens over time. So these “troons” have an actual mental disorder that is incurable and causes a lot of distress.
Transvestic fetishism, like all male paraphilias, is utterly incurable and appears in childhood or around puberty. It probably cannot show up after age 14, but that’s true of all paraphilias. It’s not contagious. Gender dysphoria demands treatment if we are to be compassionate practitioners of mental health. And the only real treatment for gender dysphoria is transition. So the only way to treat the real pain that autogynephilic men suffer is to transition them. Now again I think they need to leave their penises intact, and I’m worried about estrogen in men. For one I’ve heard it kills their sex drives and leaves a lot of them impotent.
Transgenderism in general can be lethal. In India, 32% of them actually commit suicide. A long term study of transgender men and women in Sweden that followed them for decades found that 18% committed suicide. They also had high cancer rates. The hormones? The transgender females had high crime rates. Blame the male hormones. I don’t know why so many transgender people kill themselves, but apparently even transitioning doesn’t fix all their issues. I discussed this with my mother and she said:
Well, let’s put it this way. These are people with a lot of problems.
Damn, she was one smart woman!
Transgender females are practically nonexistent. The real biological ones are vanishingly rare. Most transgender females are masculine females, often lesbians, who concluded that “because I am a masculine female, therefore I am really a man,” which is bullshit. You’re just a masculine female lesbian. They’ve been with us forever. Most transgender females are mentally ill. It’s a mental disorder like anorexia or bulimia that is spread among teenage girls by social contagion.
Giving women testosterone causes problems. Even if you go off of it, if you’ve been on for three years, you have a permanently deep voice. And you may need to shave for the rest of your life. Even more troubling is that transgender women in their 20’s are starting to get vaginal atrophy that women normally don’t get until after menopause. The fake penises are ridiculous and don’t work. They look like bratwurst sausages. Cutting your breasts off is insane and horrid. Getting the “bottom surgery”where your vagina, clitoris, cervix, fallopian tubes, and uterus are transformed or removed is terrible. The vagina is turned inside out to create the fake penis. The inner female organs are simply removed. The rate of complications is extremely high. Considering that they don’t even have a real condition and are just mentally ill, there’s no reason for any of this surgical bullshit.
Not uncommonly these transgender females say they made a big mistake and detransition. I’ve met a few young transgender women, all heterosexual, who told me that they had made a mistake. They had breasts, vaginas, and curved bodies. Most of them were virgins, oddly enough. They were all young women in their early 20’s. A couple of them wanted to date me. I thought about it but I don’t date humans who have faces that look like “men.” I don’t date humans called “he.” So that scared me off.
Social contagion may go beyond females. We’ve already talked about fake transgender male prisoners claiming to be trans to get to a better prison, but that’s just manipulation. As with masculine women who think masculine woman = man, I’m afraid we are also starting to get a lot of males who are simply effeminate gay males who have concluded, like the females, that feminine or effeminate male = female, which is of course a falsehood. Effeminate gay men have been around forever. It’s normal for a tiny percentage of the male population to be this way, just as it is normal for a tiny percentage of females to be masculine lesbian women.
In the UK schools, there was a gender clinic serving the school system. It went from five patients a year in 2010 to 1,500 in recent years. There has been no explosion in the disorder or condition. In fact this simply coincided with the addition of gender ideology to the school program leading to a lot of kids to idiotically question their gender identity when they never would have done so otherwise. So they’re exploding the yearly rate of a disorder by up to 300X for no coherent reason.
The rate of transgenderism has exploded. The old figure was 1/30,000. That’s probably about right. The latest figure for the youngest Generation Z cohort shows that an incredible 2% of them say they are transgender, when maybe 6% of that group or .1% of the group has any real biological condition (homosexual transgender men). The rate has gone up 670X. The trans lobby says in a circular fashion that whatever the rate is now is the real rate and the tiny percentage before was fake because as many were trans back then as are now and the 670X explosion in the condition is simply due to hidden transgenders being less afraid to reveal their condition. In fact, all arguments like this are laughably unfalsifiable because no matter how much the rate goes up, the woke crowd will say it’s not going up at all and it’s just people coming out of the closet. But the social sciences revel in this junk science like sledding kids on a snowbank on a sunny winter day.
As if the 2% trans wasn’t bad enough, even more ridiculous is that 11% of Gen Z say they are “nonbinary.” Generally this means a feminine to effeminate male or a relatively masculine female. The whole concept is garbage. There have always been masculine women and effeminate men. It’s nothing new. There’s no reason to suggest that they are really the opposite sex. That’s just stupid.
There have been a few changes recently. Democrats Talarico, Peltola, and Abdul-Sayed are now favored to beat Republicans Paxton, Sullivan, and Rogers in Texas, Alaska, and Michigan. This is incredible! Early voting in Texas, Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania show Democrats turning out at a high rate while a lot of Republicans are staying home. So turnout favors Democrats. In highly watched House races, Republicans seem to be slowly losing their leads and Democrats slowly gaining theirs, but in general, there’s not a lot of movement.
Democrats’ overperformance in these midterms is mostly in red states, especially the Midwest. They’re winning blue states by about as much as they ever did. Trump made his biggest gains with White working class and Hispanic voters in 2024, but those two groups have broken hard away from him. High gas and diesel prices seem to be driving a lot of the Democratic lead since Labor Day, especially in the Midwest. There’s also a throw the bums out mindset, and Republicans are most of the incumbents. But this Democratic wave year is going to be focused on red states.
California:
Governor: Democrat Xavier Becerra has increased his lead to +25 against Republican Steve Hilton. Becerra is not as liberal as you think. He’s a typical shitty California liberal, like Gavin Newsom.
Florida:
Governor: Republican Byron Donalds now leads Democrat David Jolly by only +1 and falling! One expert moved the race, which had had Donalds ahead for the whole race, to a toss-up. Donalds is Black. The main driver has been independents breaking for the Democrat.
Georgia:
Governor: Democrat Keisha Lance Bottoms has seen her lead against Republican Rick Jackson vanish from +3 all the way down to tied. Bottoms is Black. Extremely discouraging.
Iowa:
Senate: Independent Josh Turek is up by +2 and rising against Republican Ashley Hinson in an incredible race. Iowa is +13 Trump.
Governor: Democrat Rob Sand has increased his lead against Republican Zach Lahn to +7.
Kansas:
Senate: Republican Roger Marshall had been up by +5 against Democrat Adam Hamilton, but he is now all the way down to +1 and dropping. Marshall is a physician and he was hurt by a scandal for the ferocious way he went after uninsured patients who could not pay their bills. He also supported Trump’s tariffs against Canada that killed many jobs at a Canadian plant in Kansas.
Michigan:
Senate: Democrat Abdul al-Sayed is now leading Republican Mike Rogers by +3 and rising. The race had been a lot closer.
Nevada:
Governor: Republican Joe Lombardo had been leading the race against Democrat Aaron Ford by +3-4 all along but now it’s dropped to barely +1 and falling. Incredible race. Nevada is one of those states where the Republicans try to distance themselves from Trump.
New Hampshire:
Senate: Democrat Chris Pappas had been leading Republican John Sununu by +3 but now he’s pulled out a +6 and rising lead. Great news. He should be a lot further ahead than this.
New York:
Governor: Democrat Kathy Hochul has increased her lead over Republican Bruce Blakeman to +12. She should be up by more than this though.
Ohio:
Governor: Democrat Amy Acton now has a +1 lead and rising over Republican Vivek Ramaswamy. This race had been tied forever.
Pennsylvania:
House: PA-10 Democrat Janell Stelson is leading Republican Scott Perry by +5. This is a Trump +5 district in Southcentral Pennsylvania, so Democrats are +10 here.
Texas:
Senate: Democrat James Talarico has increased his lead over Republican Ken Paxton by +3 and growing. Here the main driver is that Independents are breaking hard for Democrats. Republicans are starting to flood the state with money.
Governor: Incredibly, Republican Greg Abbott’s lead against Democrat Gina Hinojosa has been reduced to +2 and declining. He had been up by +3-4 for a while. This is incredible news.
Wisconsin:
Governor: Democrat David Crowley has slowly increased his lead from +3 to +5 against Republican Tom Tiffany. Crowley is Black.
The road to Mad Max begins long before the first armed convoy appears on the horizon. It begins when tankers stop moving, refineries go dark, fuel depots empty, and the machines that feed cities and move armies start running dry. First comes the price shock. Then the queues. Then the black market. Then the question every government fears: what happens when the system still exists on paper, but the fuel that keeps it alive no longer arrives?
Diplomacy has suddenly acquired urgency. Sergei Lavrov and Marco Rubio met in New York. American and Iranian representatives have held indirect talks around the UN General Assembly. Kirill Dmitriev flew to the United States for discussions with members of the Trump administration. Xi Jinping arrived for a state visit to Washington, where Trump personally greeted him at Joint Base Andrews. These meetings concern different wars, different powers, and different interests, yet they are taking place against the same background: energy. Halford Mackinder taught that world politics ultimately rests upon control of physical space, communications, and resources. States may speak the language of law, values, and diplomacy, but ships still need fuel, trucks still need diesel, and armies still need supply lines. The present diplomatic rush can therefore be read partly as a response to a material fact that no communiqué can remove: the global fuel system is under severe strain.
Alfred Thayer Mahan would have understood the source of the danger immediately. The modern economy remains dependent on a handful of maritime passages that geography has made irreplaceable. The Strait of Hormuz has become heavily disrupted, Bab el-Mandeb remains dangerous, and the Saudi East-West pipeline was temporarily shut after attacks. These are not lines drawn abstractly across a map. They are arteries through which crude oil and refined products move from producer to consumer. When several arteries are constricted at once, the entire system begins competing for the remaining routes. Oil may exist underground in enormous quantities, yet that fact means little if it cannot reach a refinery, if the refinery cannot obtain feedstock, or if the finished diesel cannot reach its market. Mahan wrote about command of the sea in military terms. Today, command of the sea also means command of the tanker route, the export terminal, and the insurance policy that allows the cargo to sail.
Nicholas Spykman argued that power gathers around the great coastal rim of Eurasia. Look at the diesel crisis and his map almost draws itself. Russia has restricted diesel exports after repeated Ukrainian attacks damaged refinery capacity. Middle Eastern routes are impaired. Asian refiners must compete for crude and decide how much fuel they can spare for foreign buyers. The United States has consequently become even more important as an exporter, yet American consumers are themselves paying record prices: the national average for diesel crossed six dollars per gallon this month. Global inventories are thin enough that Reuters reports the shortage could extend well into 2027. The problem is therefore no longer confined to any one war. Pressure is passing from Russia to the Gulf, from the Gulf to Asia, from Asia to Europe and Africa, and from foreign demand back into the American domestic market. Spykman saw Eurasia as a connected strategic belt. The diesel market is proving the same point through pipelines, refineries, and tankers.
Then comes the sanctions problem, and here Carl Schmitt is more useful than most economists. Schmitt insisted that political power reveals itself most clearly in the ability to decide when ordinary rules no longer apply. Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18. Among other provisions, it gives the president authority to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on major buyers of Russian oil and natural gas. That is formidable legal power. Yet power on paper and power in practice are different things. China and India remain central buyers of Russian energy, while Russian crude continues to feed refineries that supply world markets. Using the law at maximum force could therefore punish Moscow while simultaneously increasing pressure on the very fuel market Washington is trying to stabilize. The paradox is distinctly Schmittian: the stronger the exceptional power placed in the hands of the executive, the more carefully the executive may have to judge the moment when that power can actually be used.
Friedrich List would have seen the deeper problem at once. A country is not economically sovereign merely because it can buy something cheaply abroad. Sovereignty requires productive capacity. Some states produced far more refined fuel than they consumed, while others allowed refining capacity to stagnate because imports were cheaper. The arrangement looked efficient because the sea lanes were open, exporters were reliable, and political risk seemed manageable. That world is disappearing. Russian exports have been restricted, Middle Eastern refining and shipping have been hit by war, and Asian refiners are adjusting output according to their own needs. Even China, which recently increased refined-product exports, has treated those exports as something that can be tightened or loosened according to domestic conditions. List’s old distinction between wealth and the power to produce wealth suddenly looks less antiquated. A tank farm full of imported diesel is wealth. A refinery capable of replacing those imports is power.
Karl Polanyi would have added that markets never exist separately from society. Diesel appears on a trading screen as another commodity, but outside the trading room it moves almost everything that keeps industrial society alive. Gasoline shortages inconvenience motorists and quickly become politically painful. Diesel shortages reach further. Trucks carry food. Tractors cultivate fields. Excavators open mines and construction sites. Fishing vessels bring protein ashore. Backup generators keep hospitals, factories, and telecommunications running. When diesel prices rise sharply, the cost does not remain at the filling station. It passes into freight, food, construction, mining, and electricity. This is why the present shortage matters more than a routine surge in commodity prices. A modern society can cope with a luxury becoming expensive. It is far harder to cope when the cost of moving, producing, and delivering almost everything begins to rise. Reuters now describes inventories in several major markets as historically low, while Asian refining margins have reached extraordinary levels. Polanyi’s point was that economic shocks eventually become social shocks. Diesel provides an unusually direct transmission mechanism.
Fernand Braudel would have told us to stop staring only at presidents and look instead at the structures beneath them. Africa illustrates the point. Much of the continent spent decades exporting crude while importing refined petroleum products. Tankers arrived at coastal ports, fuel was unloaded, and fleets of road tankers carried it hundreds or thousands of kilometers inland. That system depends on cheap shipping, functioning ports, accessible refining centers, and enough foreign currency to buy the product. Remove one element and the network becomes expensive. Remove several at once and the network can begin to seize up. Nigeria’s enormous Dangote refinery is important precisely because it changes this older structure by creating major refining capacity inside Africa itself. Its operators now expect global fuel tightness to persist beyond the present Middle Eastern war. Braudel wrote history by studying the slow material foundations beneath spectacular political events. Refineries, ports, and fuel depots belong to that deeper layer.
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems approach helps explain why poorer importing states face the hardest consequences. A wealthy industrial country confronted with expensive diesel can release reserves, subsidize consumers, adjust taxes, bid cargoes away from poorer competitors, or shift some demand toward other forms of energy. A poor country that imports nearly all of its fuel possesses fewer defenses. It enters the same global auction with less money. When supply contracts, the highest bidder does not merely receive better service; somebody else may receive no cargo at all. Current fuel stress in Pakistan has already pushed the government back toward energy-saving measures, including limits on official fuel use and shorter commercial opening hours. The decisive dividing line in such a crisis is therefore not simply East versus West or North versus South. It is between states with enough financial, industrial, and logistical depth to absorb a shock and states whose economies depend on a continuous stream of imported necessities.
Ibn Khaldun would have understood what happens next because he treated political order as something rooted in material cohesion rather than government ceremony. When the fuel truck stops arriving, the crisis moves downward through society. The irrigation pump runs dry. The tractor remains beside the field. The flour mill reduces production. The delivery truck cannot make its route. Food becomes more expensive. Electricity becomes less reliable. Anger that initially concerned the price of fuel begins attaching itself to every grievance already present in society. Governments in fragile states rarely fall because of a single commodity, but shortages can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. This is why the diesel shortage deserves attention alongside fertilizer and grain. Agriculture depends upon all three. Remove fertilizer and yields fall. Remove grain imports and food prices rise. Remove diesel and even the grain that exists may not reach the city.
Giovanni Arrighi would have placed this inside the larger redistribution of economic power now underway. Energy exporters possess influence because the industrial system still cannot function without dense flows of physical commodities. Russia, Iran, and the Gulf producers therefore occupy positions that cannot be understood solely through GDP tables or financial-market valuations. At the same time, consumers such as China and India acquire leverage of their own because they can absorb enormous volumes that once flowed elsewhere. Russian crude can move east, be refined in Asia, and return to world markets in another form. Sanctions consequently rearrange trade rather than simply erasing it. Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have imposed real costs on Russia, including domestic shortages and lower refining capacity, but they have also contributed to tighter international diesel supply. That does not prove a deliberate Russian strategy to create a global shortage. It does mean that physical scarcity can strengthen the bargaining value of whatever Russian supply remains available.
Jean Thiriart imagined geopolitics in continental blocks rather than small isolated states, and the present fuel shock shows why continental scale matters. Europe is discovering once again that energy security cannot be separated from geography. The United States can draw upon enormous domestic oil production. Russia sits on vast hydrocarbon reserves. China possesses immense refining and industrial capacity. India has built some of the world’s most important refineries. Europe, by contrast, combines high consumption with substantial exposure to imported energy and imported refined products. Record fuel prices across several European countries are therefore more than a consumer problem. They reveal the cost of occupying a wealthy but resource-dependent peninsula at the western edge of Eurasia while relations with its largest eastern energy supplier remain shattered. Whether Europe responds by diversifying further, rebuilding refining capacity, accelerating electrification, or eventually reopening some channels with Russia is a political question. Geography, however, has not changed.
Alexander Dugin’s language of multipolarity offers another way of reading the diplomatic rush. The world is becoming harder to organize around a single center capable of setting rules for everyone else. Washington can sanction Russia, but it must consider Chinese and Indian reactions. Russia can redirect energy eastward, but China and India can demand discounts. China can use its industrial scale, yet it still depends heavily on maritime energy routes. Gulf monarchies possess oil and refining capacity, yet war can close their exits. Iran can threaten Hormuz, but disruption also threatens Asian customers with whom Tehran wants relations. No actor is sovereign over the whole system. Each possesses a few strong cards and several weak ones. Multipolarity in practice is therefore less a harmonious congress of civilizations than a hard market in leverage, geography, and necessity. The current negotiations make sense in that light: powers are talking because none of them can control all the consequences of continued escalation.
Arnold Toynbee wrote that civilizations are shaped by their responses to challenges. The coming months may provide a brutally practical test. The global diesel system is already tight: American prices have passed six dollars a gallon, Asian refining margins have reached records, European consumers face unusually high fuel costs, and analysts expect depleted inventories to remain a problem into 2027. Yet markets also adapt. China can export more product. New refining capacity can come online. Demand can fall. Hormuz can reopen more fully. Russian refineries can be repaired. Alternative supply routes can expand. That is why Moscow, Washington, Beijing, Tehran, and the Gulf capitals all have reason to bargain before scarcity becomes uncontrollable. The danger is real, but so is the capacity of the system to reorganize itself. The contest now is over who absorbs the cost of that reorganization.
And that is where the Mad Max image stops being entirely comic. If negotiations fail, the richest states will probably not descend into battles over jerry cans. They have reserves, money, infrastructure, and alternatives. The more vulnerable states may face something harsher: intermittent supply, black markets, improvised refining, electricity cuts, transport breakdowns, and political unrest. Thomas Hobbes understood that order depends in part upon the state’s ability to provide physical security. In the modern world, that includes maintaining the material systems on which ordinary life depends. A government that cannot keep food moving, electricity running, and fuel reaching farms soon discovers how thin the distance can become between administrative order and disorder. In that sense, the humble barrel of diesel has become one of the quiet strategic objects of the present world crisis.
If you enjoy my writing, order my new book, Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt.
Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.
Host (Alexei Krasilnikov): According to the figures Maria Romanova has just given on the news, turnout was 59 percent, and in the online vote almost 91 percent. Ella Pamfilova says United Russia has 57.83 percent and is leading in 208 single-mandate districts; 355 seats are projected. The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] has 13.81 percent, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] almost 9 percent — a noticeable jump, incidentally: at the last elections, under Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the figure was about a point and a half lower. New People — 7.96 percent. A Just Russia is still just short of the threshold, by a few hundredths of a percent. We are waiting for the final results once every ballot has been counted; these figures rest on 95.18 percent of the vote tallied.
We will go through all of this in detail — the substance, the form, and the atmosphere around these days of voting.
We will also look at Germany. Regional elections have been held there that could affect, among other things, the future of Chancellor Merz. His party, the CDU — the Christian Democratic Union — is doing, to put it mildly, badly: losing in some places to the AfD (Alternative for Germany), in others to the Left, and in certain Länder not even clearing the five-percent hurdle needed to enter the regional parliament.
These are still elections in only a few Länder, but it is worth asking what the situation may portend. On the one hand, Merz’s defeats have become routine and his ratings remain low. A few months ago, around the first anniversary of his taking office, they were markedly lower than those of his predecessors — at least Merkel and Scholz. On the other hand, the chancellor is chosen at federal elections, and those are still a long way off, so formally there is little cause for alarm. Even so, this is at least a warning sign: in Britain and in Germany the head of government often resigns between federal campaigns as well.
We will also discuss artificial intelligence and Donald Trump today, but a little later.
Host: Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], what would you draw attention to — perhaps not so much the parties’ numbers (only about 5 percent of the ballots are still left to count) as the things that marked these three days and the early voting that came before them, including the mobile ballot boxes?
Alexander Dugin: The conditions in which the elections were held were truly heroic. On the last night before Sunday the Kiev regime launched a massive attack: more than a thousand drones were sent against Russia, and, according to Pamfilova, 76 polling stations were damaged. Ukraine and the West that backs it tried to wreck the elections — to make them impossible, chaotic, illegitimate, to see that they simply did not take place. That failed, and that matters. We held the elections in an orderly, energetic and united way, and showed spirit, organization and discipline — in the people, in the state, and in the administration. In my view this is a small but real victory in the moral war we are fighting against the West and the Nazi Kiev regime.
Now the results. It is worth recalling an apt post by Alexei Chadayev. Today many people find these elections hard to talk about: every party taking part is patriotic, all of them support the president and the special military operation, all of them are of one mind on the main questions of state policy and worldview. Chadayev is one of the most striking figures in our drone programme — an engineer who stood at the beginnings of a powerful unmanned-systems network — and, in my view, a very gifted political analyst. He noticed something important: people vote for United Russia because the name itself already implies being above parties — the absence of parliamentary democracy.
The point is that Russia has to be one. Carving the political system into factions, fragments and parties is, in essence, a way of pulling it apart. United Russia offers unity. It is a party that, in effect, proposes setting aside representative liberal democracy of the Western type and looking for a path to a genuine Russian democracy in which unity comes first. That is the opposite of modern Western liberal-democratic theory, which holds that the more sharply the powers are separated — executive, legislative, judicial — and the more they hem one another in, the better.
I do not think voters dig into United Russia’s programme. It is the name, and the fact that the party openly backs Putin and the special military operation. Its federal top five proved symbolic as well: Lavrov; Vladislav Golovin, a hero of the special military operation; Maria Lvova-Belova, the presidential commissioner for children’s rights; the war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny — people the country recognizes. This is a party in solidarity with the state and the leader, and there is something in it that stands above party — the seed of a different democratic form. Russian democracy rests not on division and dismemberment but on unity. People should take their disagreements, their own judgments and their nuances to the authorities and to society by other routes, not through parliamentary debate. That is why our parliament is not a place for discussion. One party, named as the principal one, wins — and that is perfectly democratic, because that is what people want. We Russians want the empty talk in parliament to stop. The Duma is not a clown show. It is a place where one is meant to think and to help the authorities carry out their course. In essence the deputies are advisers, and one should send intelligent people there, because not everyone can think.
That is what we put into our democracy: frankly, we see it without parties. United Russia is a compromise between the Western remnants written into the constitution in the 1990s — the mark of our Westernism and of a globalist liberal tilt — and the Russia to come, in which everything will be one: the peoples, the traditional faiths, the people and the state. Diversity and difference of opinion still need a carefully thought-out place — even Christianity says that “there must also be differences of opinion among you.” State your views, argue them; platforms for a real exchange have to be found for that. But not parliament. “Parliament” comes from the French parler…
Host: …to speak. And our Duma comes from the word “to think.” You remember they once even tried to rename “discussion.”
Alexander Dugin: Exactly. Better to think first and speak afterwards, not the other way around. With us it is first the Duma, and only then parliament, parler.
Continue:
Alexander Dugin warns that democracy is slipping from majority rule into minority control. So who really decides the future?
Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.
Host (Alexei Krasilnikov): According to the figures Maria Romanova has just given on the news, turnout was 59 percent, and in the online vote almost 91 percent. Ella Pamfilova says United Russia has 57.83 percent and is leading in 208 single-mandate districts; 355 seats are projected. The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] has 13.81 percent, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] almost 9 percent — a noticeable jump, incidentally: at the last elections, under Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the figure was about a point and a half lower. New People — 7.96 percent. A Just Russia is still just short of the threshold, by a few hundredths of a percent. We are waiting for the final results once every ballot has been counted; these figures rest on 95.18 percent of the vote tallied.
We will go through all of this in detail — the substance, the form, and the atmosphere around these days of voting.
We will also look at Germany. Regional elections have been held there that could affect, among other things, the future of Chancellor Merz. His party, the CDU — the Christian Democratic Union — is doing, to put it mildly, badly: losing in some places to the AfD (Alternative for Germany), in others to the Left, and in certain Länder not even clearing the five-percent hurdle needed to enter the regional parliament.
Excerpted from Eschatological Optimism, the posthumously collected philosophical testimony of Daria Platonova Dugina, this text was originally a presentation at the online seminar “Aesthetics: Beauty in and outside Platonism,” session 11 of the Platonism course hosted by Prof. Alexander Dugin and Paideuma.tv in Summer 2020.
I would like to speak a bit about the great god Pan. With the word “great,” I’m referring to Arthur Machen’s work The Great God Pan (1890).
Arthur Machen was an English writer, a forerunner of Lovecraft, who largely influenced the latter as well as decadent literature on the whole. Arthur Machen was highly acclaimed by Jorge Luis Borges, who is himself regarded as a classic of the “magical realist” movement. He also influenced modern cinema — for instance, Guillermo del Toro’s films largely revolve around motifs and influences from Machen.
Machen’s Great God Pan touches on the question of human contact with the sublime. Along with the beautiful, the sublime is one of the two foremost elements of aesthetics, although this is often forgotten.
The sublime — le sublime in French and das Erhabene in German — is not simply something refined, exquisite, or aesthetically charged. Rather, it is a figure, an action, a history, a situation, or an experience that greatly exceeds the norms of ordinary human existence and experience.
Therefore, this notion comes closest of all to the “sacred,” in the sense that Rudolf Otto understood it, and after him Carl Jung, Mircea Eliade, and others.
The sublime and the sacred are manifest in the work The Great God Pan in a very interesting and unusual context. The story is based on Irish folklore. The plot is quite classic for the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The hero of the story is a scientist, a doctor, who by way of a surgical operation is capable of expanding the possibilities of the human perception of reality. The scientist conducts a test on a simple village girl named Mary. The experiment is not entirely successful. The girl plunges into madness. The patient is constantly confronted with something that radically surpasses and overwhelms her. While she does gain access to some kind of extra-reality, she is unable to control it. The scientist understands the girl to have met the god Pan, the personification of the forces of nature in all their diversity and power.
Further on, the reader is presented with an account of the life of Mary’s daughter, whom she gave birth to after meeting Pan. The daughter, Helen Vaughan, harbors something at once inexpressibly beautiful and terrifying, capable of driving those around her insane to the point of suicide or murder. The faces of the people led to death by Helen Vaughan are frozen with panic, fear, and horror. This fear and horror are transmitted to anyone who sees their bodies.
This work is an excellent showcase of the problem of the sublime. Here, in full measure, we see the experience of facing the sublime, the numinous, which according to Rudolf Otto, is characterized at once by astonishment, admiration, and incredible joy, as well as wild fear and deep horror. This encounter is almost always fatal, or in the very least traumatic for a person who otherwise dwells within their comfort zone (although being in such a state should not be considered natural).
Beauty is interpreted in this book to be a kind of border that separates what we are capable of perceiving without special preparation, something in which we can delight in and admire on the one hand, and which exceeds our possibilities and capacities on the other, i.e., the sublime.
If the experience of encountering the “beautiful” entails temporary charm and fascination, then the experience of encountering the sublime, as happens in Machen’s tale, can be the opposite, i.e., one that brings with it horror, death, and madness.
Thus, in this story, the god Pan himself acts as a generalized representation of the sublime, but by no means the beautiful.
It is interesting that Socrates was often compared to Pan. His exterior form, down to the wrinkles on his face, largely corresponds to Greek notions of how this god should have looked.
Thus, ever since archaic times, the encounter with the sublime has been associated with the experience of trauma. It can lead a human being to death and madness, but it also harbors the possibility of meeting that which lies beyond the human..
There are two answers to “right-wing socialism”: no, and hell no.
— Ted Cruz (@tedcruz) September 22, 2026
There are a handful of online influencers trying to push socialism to young people. And young people historically have been susceptible to those arguments. Every older person has been young. No young person has… pic.twitter.com/TaSHZ7os5j
I consider myself very much a populist. But the way to be a populist is not to get into the Bernie Sanders game of giving away free stuff.
— Ted Cruz (@tedcruz) September 22, 2026
The way to be a populist is to fight for the jobs of working men and women. Fight for small businesses. Fight for policies that actually… pic.twitter.com/T3pvxREVjL
My view of the socialism debate:
1. I have no confidence whatsoever in the conservative case for their preferred version of capitalism. I don’t believe the GOP is going to raise living standards and build a modern infrastructure. I see rich people getting richer and the average American standard of living declining.
2. I don’t care what FOX Geezers who still mentally live in the Cold War think about socialism. The world has changed. There is no question in my mind that socialist China has done a better job at raising living standards, building a modern economy and infrastructure over the past thirty years.
3. The challenge posed by socialist China is far more potent than the Soviet Union. China is running laps around the United States and the “capitalist” side is losing badly.
Konstantin Malofeev on the state-forming ethnos.
A seminar titled “The State-Forming Role of the Russian People in Russia’s National Policy” was held at the Stolypin Center of the Presidential Academy. The Russian people are the foundation of our state-civilization. Having gone through the severe trials of Soviet de-Russification in the 20th century, they have the right to become masters of their land once again. Their state-forming status must not remain an empty declaration. It is time to turn words into actions.
At the same time, the best people in the national republics with whom I have ever spoken are calling on us, the Russians, to revive the Empire. After all, all these nations joined the Empire specifically seeking protection from external enemies—joining the great Russian state and the great Russian people. And when Russians become weak, danger looms over the entire state and all the peoples living within it.
The time of liberal phantoms is over. The legislative consolidation of the status of the Russian people is a complex state-legal task. But without its legal and practical solution, we have no future.
(Translated from the Russian)
The old order does not end with trumpets. It goes bad in sections. One artery closes, another is bypassed, another keeps pumping long after the organism has forgotten why. Pax Americana now resembles some enormous patient abandoned beneath the fluorescent lights of an Interzone clinic: still alive, still armed, still issuing commands, but surrounded by machines whose gauges no longer agree. On September 22, Donald Trump stood before the United Nations and again threatened Iran with overwhelming destruction if no settlement emerged. Yet on the same day, Tehran signaled that it was prepared to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within a week if Washington reduced military pressure and lifted its blockade. The contradiction tells the story better than any slogan. The United States remains powerful enough to wage war across oceans, blockade a regional state, protect shipping, sanction governments, and force negotiations. What it can no longer do so easily is translate that power into a clean political ending. The Iran war, launched by the United States and Israel on February 28, is now in its seventh month. Trump says peace may be approaching; the guns continue to speak.
Is Trump presiding over the final convulsions of Pax Americana or merely exposing the limits of a unipolar order already giving way to something else?
NOW – Trump at the UN says he has a "big decision to make:" "Will a deal be made with Iran? … Or, do I annihilate the Islamic Republic, and do it quickly? … Do I drive them into hell with no chance of survival and no hope of future greatness for generations?" pic.twitter.com/jD7lJei0l6
— Disclose.tv (@disclosetv) September 22, 2026
"Trump makes George W Bush look popular by comparison" — Enten unpacks Trump's -42 approval rating on foreign affairs and how "it's the lowest any president has ever had on foreign affairs" pic.twitter.com/LVKZx00Mcc
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 22, 2026
Should Trump push to make Greenland part of the United States?
— Trumps Nephew (@ForgiatoBlow47) September 19, 2026
Greenland as the 51st state ? pic.twitter.com/730hWx6KXh
Trump job approval
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 21, 2026
? Approve: 29%
? Disapprove: 68%
Lowest approval he has recorded with any pollster in either term.
American Research Group | 9/16-20 | RVhttps://t.co/7fztkKlYl5 pic.twitter.com/Dqtzo1Cbgf
? IPSOS/REUTERS – Trump Approval
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 21, 2026
Pres. Trump
Approve: 32% (-3)
Disapprove: 66% (+4)
His lowest approval by Ipsos in either term
——
17% approve on cost of living
9/17-20 | 1,277 A https://t.co/ILSAuUtWdN
? Generic Ballot Poll by Rasmussen
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 21, 2026
? Democrats: 49% (+2)
? Republicans: 41% (?1)
? Other: 4%
D+8 — Rasmussen’s largest Democratic lead this cycle (was D+5 last week).
——
? Independents: D+18
? Women: D+15
?? Men: Even
9/10-16 | 1,746 LVhttps://t.co/X2NpbVObby pic.twitter.com/yUyQy3AKKC
CNN/SSRS POLL – Trump's job approval on handling Iran War
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 22, 2026
Approve: 26%
Disapprove: 73%
Among Republicans, approval fell from 73% in March to 60%.
——
VP Vance Approval
Approve: 36%
Disapprove: 63%
This is Vance’s lowest job approval in CNN polling
9/16-17 | 1,206 A… pic.twitter.com/AAvrBdJ0WY
? YouGov/Economist poll (likely voters)
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 22, 2026
Trump job approval
Approve: 35%
Disapprove: 63%
——
Generic ballot
? Democrats: 52%
? Republicans: 38%
D+14 — the biggest Democratic lead this poll has ever shown (was D+6 in 2018)
Recalled: Trump 41-39 | 9/18-21 | LV pic.twitter.com/1PfnhAxN0L
Dare accepted. Happy First Day of Fall. Gas is up another 16%. Anything else? https://t.co/DqO1oPh1zJ pic.twitter.com/WuXKnxTZlZ
— MikeyGrabBag (@MikeyGrabBags) September 22, 2026
First of all, take the tone out of your voice, calling other people stupid. Second of all, Donald Trump, the man you refuse to name, is the sole reason your gas prices went up Devin.
— MAGA Cult Slayer (@MAGACult2) September 21, 2026
“Ragheads” have nothing to do with it. #GasPumpTrump #FAFO pic.twitter.com/qSqkYak7Tf
What's the price of gas in socialist Iran? pic.twitter.com/iMirNLJC10
— Hunter Wallace (@LutherEnjoyer) September 22, 2026
We will get serious by Memorial Day!
We will get serious by Labor Day!
We will get serious by the first day of fall … today!
Just wait until we get serious and voters changed their mind by Halloween!
Note: Trump’s polling has gotten so bad that Rasmussen has Democrats up 8 on the generic ballot. Quantus Insights has Trump under 40%. Nebraska is a battleground state.
Santander Wallaby explains how the world is being rewired into competing regional systems, each fighting for energy, logistics, and strategic depth.
The events now unfolding from the Red Sea to the Arctic make more sense when viewed as parts of one larger change. Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, Turkey and Israel, Europe’s energy troubles, strains inside NATO, the renewed importance of the Arctic, and the construction of new Eurasian transport corridors may look like separate stories. They are not. They show an international system becoming more regional, more rooted in infrastructure and geography, and more competitive. The old model rested on a dense web of American military guarantees, dollar finance, global shipping, and institutions built during the period of Western predominance. That structure has not vanished, but states are increasingly building alternatives around their own regions. Trade is being reorganized around secure ports and railways. Energy producers are looking for routes that cannot easily be closed by a rival. Governments are seeking payment systems, military suppliers, and markets that leave them less exposed to one center of power. Recent turmoil in the Red Sea and the Gulf has made this brutally concrete: attacks on shipping and energy infrastructure have raised freight costs, endangered oil flows, and forced governments to think again about routes they once treated as permanent. Even the European Union now openly describes Gulf maritime security, export infrastructure, and projects such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as questions of strategic importance rather than mere commerce.
Martin Sellner and I discuss Martin’s most recent involvement with the Institute for Remigration, the Save Europe Act, and his key roles in the Identitarian movement. We examine his political grand strategy laid out in both of his books, which are currently available in English: Remigration and Regime Change from the Right.
From establishing a new cultural hegemony through metapolitical action, return hubs, and how remigration can become a reality, we cover a lot of ground.
Last Thursday, we welcomed Logan and Jake Paul to the Pentagon to meet with our warriors. pic.twitter.com/NiRJVWb2Rc
— Department of War ?? (@DeptofWar) September 20, 2026
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth meets with Jake and Logan Paul. pic.twitter.com/1jXvi67a7R
— Clash Report (@clashreport) September 20, 2026
Imagine the last thing you hear before sacrificing yourself for the IDF is a speech by Jake Paul ? pic.twitter.com/vnjOQQKMQ6
— Gerald Flower (@TheRealP4triot) September 20, 2026
This is a bad sign for Gen Z men.
Perfect analysis of what is going on in Syria. The US and Israel are behind ISIS, so they will allow ISIS to emerge. Then both the US and Israel will get involved militarily in Syria again “to fight ISIS.” You see how this works? The Turkmen thugs (Al Qaeda and ISIS) are run by Turkey. Turkey has turned Syria into a colony and they are behind all of the atrocities that the Al Qaeda-ISIS government has committed against the Alawites, Christians, Druze, and secular Sunnis.
Israel may indeed still be plotting the David’s Corridor initiative, and advancing to the Damascus corridor is part of it. The hijacking of this oil tanker occurred right in this area. Israel carries out bombings, drone attacks, artillery shelling, village raids, arrests, roadblocks, and land seizures in Southern Syria every week. A lot of farmers and herders can no longer access their lands due to Israeli seizures and confiscations. David’s Corridor is part of Greater Israel. This project involves Israel seizing a huge swath of Southern Syria all the way up to the Iraqi border, where they will link up with the shamelessly pro-Israel Kurds. Netanyahu and two of his main challengers have both openly supported this proposal.
The Turks are still setting the wheat fields on fire now that the US has left, whereas we were setting them on fire before. I don’t know what’s happening with the oil but the US was letting the Kurds steal and send it to Israel via Turkey for a long time. Turkey deliberately destroyed all of Syria’s industry. They dismantled all of Syria’s factories and shipped them to Turkey. Colonialism! They have conquered a large swath of Northern Syria and for all intents and purposes annexed it to Turkey.
They have mass murdered and ethnically cleansed the Kurds from this region. The official language here is now Turkish and the Turkish lira is the official currency. The school curriculum is Turkish, including Turkish history. It’s exactly the same as what Israel has done. Stealing and colonizing land at gunpoint. Turkey is a settler-colonial state as bad as Israel!
Israel and possibly the US and Turkey, wants nothing but total chaos in Syria. The sectarian bloodbath that ensued after Al Qaeda-ISIS took over was specifically planned by Israel and Turkey, so all of the Alawite, Druze, and Christian blood is on the hands of the Israelis are Turks.
As you can see, a lot of the Al Qaeda-ISIS forces are being rerouted through Turkey (long their rear base) to Saudi Arabia where they will be shipped to Yemen to fight sectarian war against Ansar Allah. Al Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen have long been supported by both the UAE and Saudi Arabia who used them as cannon fodder against Ansar Allah. Saudi Arabia is also paying a lot of Sudanese mercenaries to fight Ansar Allah. Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan all have sordid histories in Yemen fighting Ansar Allah.
Konstantin Malofeev says Russia must put its own people first.
ON JUSTICE
At a meeting with First Deputy Interior Minister Andrei Kikot, Vladimir Putin said:
The interests of local citizens must come first when dealing with issues involving labor migrants.
Write it down. Print it in large letters. Hang it in every government official’s office.
The head of state has settled the most painful question once and for all. From now on, only targeted recruitment.
If an employer needs workers, then the employer should be responsible for them. House them. Transport them to and from work. When the contract ends, put them on a plane home.
No uncontrolled influx of migrants. No families. No enclaves. No schools or clinics for non-working dependents, and no benefits paid for at our expense.
For years, we were lied to: the market will sort itself out. It did not. The developers and retail chains sorted things out for themselves. They brought in cheap labor while shifting the costs of housing, healthcare, and security onto everyone else.
Their time is over. Next comes the gradual phasing out of the current system of individual work permits for migrant workers, together with a broader overhaul of the entire migration system. Migration policy is changing. God willing. We still have time to avoid becoming like Europe, where locals are afraid to go out in the evening.
Russia is our Motherland. “The interests of our citizens come first,” Vladimir Putin said. The interests of everyone else come second.
At last.
(Translated from the Russian)
New from Multipolar Press:
Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt by Constantin von Hoffmeister
From a Dan Bilzerian post. He’s a seriously crazy and vicious antisemite, but that doesn’t make him wrong. And he is correct about this analysis for what it’s worth. I’m not sure what it all adds up to at the end of the day. Probably not as much as people think. But these are facts and if something is factual, I am going to write about it, sorry. If you Jews don’t dig it, then just divest of these businesses, real simple. Until then the shoe fits, so you’re wearing it.
Who controls Social Media/Hookup Apps/Porn/TV/Movie studios/Streaming/Ai/Data Centers?
-Social Media
Meta owns:
Facebook
Instagram
WhatsApp
Messenger
Threads
Oculus
Meta AI
Mark Zuckerberg (CEO/Chairman) controls Meta. He has 60.8% of the shareholder vote. He is Jewish.
Alphabet owns:
Google
YouTube
Android
Gmail
Chrome
Nest smart home devices
Fitbit
DeepMind
Gemini AI
Waymo self-driving cars
Verily
Calico
Wing drone delivery
Alphabet is controlled by Larry Page and Sergey Brin who have 52.7% of total voting power. They are both Jewish.
Tic Tok
U.S. algorithm and infrastructure is controlled by Oracle. Oracle was founded by Larry Ellison. He is the largest shareholder, owning over 40% equity and is Executive Chairman. He is Jewish. Safra Catz, the Executive Vice Chairman, is also Jewish.
- Hookup Apps
Match Group owns:
Tinder
Hinge
OkCupid
Match. com
Plenty of Fish
Meetic
The League
BLK
Archer
OurTime
Founded by Barry Diller who is Jewish. CEO Spencer Rascoff is Jewish.
Grindr
Founded by Joel Simkhai, who is Jewish. CEO George Arison is Jewish.
Bumble
Founder and CEO Whitney Wolfe Herd is Jewish.
- Porn
Onlyfans
Owned by Leonid Radvinsky, who is Jewish
Vixen Media Group owns:
Blacked
Blacked Raw
Vixen
Tushy
Deeper
Founded by Greg Lansky, who is Jewish.
Aylo/MindGeek Owns/owned:
Pornhub
YouPorn
RedTube
Brazzers
Reality Kings
Digital Playground
Men.com
Tube8
Solomon Friedman is the owner of Aylo, and he’s a Jewish rabbi.
Gamma Entertainment owns/operates:
Adult Time
Pure Taboo
Wicked
many other affiliate studios/platforms
Founded by Karl Bernard, who is Jewish.
- Movies/TV/News
Warner Brothers Discovery owns:
Warner Bros. Pictures
HBO
CNN
DC Studios
Cartoon Network
Discovery Channel
TNT
TBS
Max (formerly HBO Max)
Adult Swim
Animal Planet
Warner Brothers is run by David Zaslav (President and CEO) who is Jewish.
Disney owns:
ESPN
ABC
Marvel Studios
Lucasfilm
Pixar
20th Century Studios
Disney+
Hulu
National Geographic
Disney was run until March 2026 by Bob Iger, who is Jewish. Now the CEO is Josh D’Amaro who isn’t Jewish, but the President & Chief Creative Officer is Dana Walden, who is Jewish,
Paramount Global owns:
CBS
CBS News
CBS Sports
Local CBS stations
Film Studios
Paramount Pictures
Paramount Animation
MTV
Nickelodeon
Comedy Central
BET
VH1
CMT
Smithsonian Channel
Streaming/Premium:
Paramount+
Showtime
Pluto TV
Major franchises/IP:
Top Gun
Mission: Impossible
Star Trek
South Park (licensing/streaming)
SpongeBob SquarePants
Transformers
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles
Paramount Global was controlled by Sheri Redstone, who is Jewish. Was acquired by Skydance, which is owned and operated by Larry Ellison and David Ellison (Chairman and CEO), who are both Jewish, owning 77.5% of its voting Class A stock.
Comcast owns:
NBCUniversal
NBC
Universal Pictures
Peacock
Telemundo
Sky
DreamWorks
Comcast was founded by Ralph J. Roberts, who is Jewish. Brian Roberts is the Chairman & CEO, and he is also Jewish.
Versant Media Group owns:
MSNBC
CNBC
USA Network
E!
SYFY
Oxygen
Golf Channel
Fandango
Rotten Tomatoes
Brian Roberts owns 100% of the class B voting shares of Versant, and he is Jewish. Mark Lazarus, the CEO and director, is Jewish.
Amazon owns:
Amazon Prime
MGM Studios
Twitch
Audible
IMDb
Ring
Alexa
Kindle
Amazon is run by Andy Jassy (President and CEO) who is Jewish.
- AI/Data Centers
OpenAI - develops advanced AI models and products like ChatGPT and Codex that reason, generate content, analyze information, write code, and automate complex tasks.
Founded and run by Sam Altman (CEO), who is Jewish.
Anthropic - develops advanced AI models and products like Claude that reason, generate and analyze content, write code, and automate complex tasks.
Founded and run by Dario Amodei (CEO) and Daniela Amodei (President), who are both Jewish.
Palantir - develops AI and data-analysis software that helps governments, militaries, intelligence agencies, and businesses integrate massive datasets and use them for operational decisions.
Founded by Alex Karp, Peter Thiel, Stephen Cohen and Joe Lonsdale. Three of the four are Jewish. Operated by Alex Karp (CEO), who is half-Jewish.
Oracle - provides database, cloud, and enterprise software infrastructure that governments and businesses use to store, process, manage, and analyze critical data.
Founded by Larry Ellison, the largest shareholder at 40% equity and Executive Chairman. He is Jewish. Safra Catz, the Executive Vice Chairman, is also Jewish.
From a postby Dan Bilzerian, a rabid American antisemite. The post is about Jews controlling the media, and it’s largely true. However, what Jews control here in the US is Internet media, the movie, porn, and AI industries:
Social media.
Internet dating or hookup apps, gay and straight.
Broadcast media, cable and Internet.
The movie industry.
The porn industry.
The AI industry.
The problem here is that if you took the Jews away, most of these industries wouldn’t change much.
Would Gentiles run things any different from the Jews?
Social media. Look at Musk. That’s Gentile social media. Nazis, fascists, MAGA. Hell, gimme the Jews instead. They’re insufferable but at least they’re not Nazis. The Jewish social media titans are mostly just apolitical billionaires. The Jews just worship money but they are not particularly reactionary for rich people.
Dating apps. Adultfriendfinder was run by an Iranian for the longest time, and he was sleazy as Hell. Off the charts sleazy and crooked. So no, Jews don’t affect the hookup “industry.”
Broadcast media, cable, and Internet. So what does Gentile broadcast media look like? Fox News. Nazis, fascists, MAGA. Gimme the Jews, dammit! They’re good liberal Democrats too, most of them, but there’s some MAGA creep with Ellison.
The porn industry. Yes, it’s Jewish, but there are many countries in the West and in the East in Japan and South in Latin America, all with no Jews, that have very sleazy porn industries. I suspect the Gentile porn titans are as sleazy as the Jews. The Jews tend to be good liberal Democrats too.
The movie industry. I don’t know what to say about the movie industry except that I doubt if the Jews have wrecked it. I doubt if it’s even wrecked. In fact some if the finest talents were Jewish. It’s been full of Italians for a while now too, and their movies are just as good. I fail to see how the Jews have harmed the movie industry. At least they’re largely good liberal Democrats.
The AI industry. Yes, it’s run by a bunch of Jews, but they’re pretty apolitical and except a few fascists like Lonsdale and Karp. What does a Gentile AI industry look like? Musk and Thiel. Nazis, fascists, MAGA. I don’t like any of these people, and I think they’re all billionaire monsters, but the Jews actually seem a little better than the Gentiles, though it’s a pick your monster question. Have you noticed that in so many of these cases, you either have these industries run by Jewish billionaires who are often apolitical or even liberal Democrats or by Gentile billionaires who are often fascists or Nazis? If I am doomed to be ruled by billionaires or shitty rich people, I choose to be ruled by Jewish billionaires because at least they’re not Nazis.
The real menace of Jewish control over the Internet media is their extreme Zionism. Other than that Jews are just humans like any other.
Communism. Yes, yes, yes, the very early iterations of the Russian government were heavily Jewish at the very top levels, but they were only 5% of the party. And after the war they united the vast majority of the workers and peasants behind them, so thank you Jews. Most Russian Jews did not support the Bolsheviks. They voted Zionist in 1917 and as far as the Left went, most supported the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks were just a small minority of the Jews in 1918. At any rate, but the mid-20’s, the Jews were pretty much gone from party leadership. The modern communist movement has few if any prominent Jews in it. Can the Judeo-Bolshevism.
Communists killed a lot of people and that wasn’t good but the latest crop of socialists and communists hardly kills a soul. And capitalism kills 14 million people per year, mostly in South Asia. In other words, capitalists are horrid too. The best and really only systems are mixtures of capitalism and socialism, not that that works all that great either.
All of these movements are attempts to deal with and/or regulate human lust for power and money, and that’s nearly impossible because you have to ask the greediest and most power-hungry humans of all to regulate human hunger for these base and profane things. The drive is too strong and too omnipresent in your average person to be much regulated anyway. And anytime someone barely tries, there’s a coup, an invasion, an imperialist conquest or colonization attempt, a contra revolution: in other words, the capitalists murder lots and lots of people. Most people would rather stay alive than mess with low and vicious human desires. Anyway thank you Jews for at least giving us the dream of a better world, mirage though it was.
Why is it popular? Because capitalism is evil or at least has an extremely wicked down side?
Transgenderism. Some of the very first proponents were Jewish, and some very rich Jews have trooned out for no coherent reason, and now they are funding the “movement.” Yes I’m looking at you, Warchowskis, the autogynephilic duo. They promote extreme crossdressing, genderbending, mass homosexuality and transgenderism in their movies, but Cloud Atlas was one Hell of a great movie! But they do that because they’re troons not because they’re Jews.
There are lots of rich Jews, and they tend to fund whatever movement tickles their fancy. Obviously the vast majority of sex fetishist troons, real transgender people (5% of “transgender” people are actually biologically transgender), and mentally ill transgender women (transmen) are just Gentiles. Transgenderism is not a Jewish plot. Thailand is full of troons and there’s not a Jew in sight. This is a cultural movement that doesn’t need Jews at all. It’s on autopilot. I think extremely little of this movement, but you can’t stop this mental illness or troonism, and people deserve equal rights even if they are kinky or nuts, so thank you, Jews.
Why is it popular? It’s just another cult and a certain number of men are quite feminine and women are quite masculine. In the past we just called these people homosexuals, and almost all of them were and still are this way. And there are a significant number of men (5%) who develop a sexual fetish called transvestic fetishism whereby they get sexually turned on by thinking that they are women. Now this cult tells them that instead of being just gay, lesbian, or crossdressing straights, they’re really the opposite sex.
I suppose it’s tempting for feminine men, masculine women, and transvestic fetishists to believe that they are the opposite sex, although it’s bullshit. Note that the opposite sex identity in all of these cases is wired into the sex drive, one of the most powerful nonessential drives that we have. So this is just a form of nonsense and bullshit that is playing off of a very real human tendency of a minority of homosexual and fetishist humans to act like the opposite sex.
Modern feminism: Once again, yes, the Jews started it but so what? Did I mention that Jews start movements? But Third Wave feminism has very few Jews and almost every feminist you meet is a Gentile. Feminism doesn’t need Jews. It’s on autopilot. Thank you Jews for founding women’s rights because even if it’s gone off the rails like all IP bullshit does, people still deserve equal rights. Why is it so popular? Because blaming other people is so much more fun than punching yourself. Also we men are pretty horrid. We are dangerous. Like, real dangerous. I’d be the first to admit it. But hey ladies. It’s either cock, lesbian separatism, or nonhuman companionship, so which will it be? Sapphic perversity, dangerous men, or feline loneliness? Pick your poison, gals!
The gay movement. Yes, some of the early gay rights pioneers were Jewish, but there are few prominent gays in the gay movement, and the movement hasn’t needed Jews for years. It’s on autopilot. This has long gone insane too, but anti-gay discrimination can hardly be approved of, so thank you Jews. Why is it popular? I have no idea. It’s just another weird human cult, but it’s once again wired into the sex drive, and humans are nothing if not perverse as Hell. Once you give people permission to do weird sexual stuff, you’d be amazed at how many hop right to it.
Civil rights, antiracism, and woke idiocy. Yes, Jews were very prominent in the civil rights movement but Blacks were even more so. Black Identity Politics is run by Blacks. Modern kooky woke antiracism is run by minorities of all kinds who hate Whites for this or that reason and multitudes of self-hating Whites whose masochism is a cultural form of hipness or being cool. Yes, White self-flagellation is groovy. There’s hardly a Jew to be seen. It’s on autopilot. And thank you Jews for founding the civil rights movement. Why is it so popular? Because of the human tendency to blame other people. In the case of Whites, it’s either admit being evil (racist) or beat yourself up, and a lot of White people want to be good, so bring out the whips it is.
Looking at maps from 10-20 years ago to today even without gerrymandering, a rural/urban divide becomes strikingly apparent. 10-20 years ago, a lot more White rural areas were voting blue. Now they’ve all gone red. The urban areas have stayed blue.
The racial divide has remained constant. This extreme urban/rural divide based heavily on the White working class, formerly in urban areas but now moved to rural areas, has defined MAGA and the Republican trend in recent politics more than anything else.
This is most striking in the Great Plains, West, and Midwest, and some parts of the South. Elsewhere it’s hard to say but American rural, farming, mining, logging, and ranching areas have all gone red, possibly due to environmentalism.
However, Black and Northeastern farmers still vote Democrat. There’s been no political trend with US fishing industries. Heavily Hispanic rural areas still vote red because Hispanics don’t vote. Heavily Black rural areas still vote blue.
I still can’t complete…
Had a wonderful time down at the LAKE - I’ll be getting back to WORK in earnest 2moro, and we’ll be back to regular content (including the Thursday LIVESTREAM) this week.
But NOW, I must REST/RECOUP from the road.
Santander Wallaby explains why the age of seamless globalization is giving way to a harder world of regional blocs and strategic trade.
Globalization was never the natural condition of the world economy. It was a political system built under very specific historical conditions after the Second World War. The United States emerged from the war with an intact industrial base, the world’s strongest navy, control over the main financial institutions, and a currency that gradually became the chief means of international settlement. Washington had both the power and the interest to protect maritime trade, keep major sea lanes open, deter piracy, guarantee access to distant markets, and create a framework in which goods could move across oceans at relatively low cost. This system depended on American power. A container ship could cross half the world because someone else bore much of the strategic cost of keeping the route open. A factory in Europe could rely on components from East Asia, fuel from the Middle East, raw materials from Africa, and financial services from New York or London because the global system assumed that these links would remain available. What appeared to be a universal economic order was therefore the product of one particular age: the age of American supremacy.
Had to republish this after something broke in the article and I couldn’t edit it anymore. Added a new race in Nevada. The Republican governor’s race in Nevada is getting a lot more precarious. Talarico in Texas, Peltola in Maine, and Brown in Ohio seem to be slowly pulling ahead more with new polls showing strong leads.
The general trend here is that the Democrats and Independents are starting to pull ahead just in the last few weeks. I don’t have any explanation for it, and you’re free to offer yours. So many political events seem to defy easy explanation. Trump is just as horrid as ever, so I can’t see anything new that he’s done that would make people suddenly turn against him. If I had to guess I’d say that a lot of people who had been undecideds are deciding to break for Democrats or Independents. And the wind is definitely in the Democrats’ sails. Anyway, from a Democratic POV things are looking better and better. Shockingly, Alaska, Texas, Ohio, Maine, and Michigan Senate races…
Fox correspondent: "I just spoke with President Trump about the situation with Iran … he said, 'my question is, if and when do I blow the entire nation up? They better behave'" pic.twitter.com/cucyDjeTGb
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 20, 2026
Do you think the Iran War was worth it?
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 20, 2026
? Not worth it: 62%
? Worth it: 33%
NBC News poll | Sept. 11–15
NBC News Poll: A candidate who supports the war in Iran
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 20, 2026
• 57% less likely to vote for them
• 24% more likely
9/11-15 | 1,000 RV | D44/R40
NBC News poll: A candidate who supports providing funding and weapons to Israel
— InteractivePolls (@IAPolls2022) September 20, 2026
?? Less likely to vote for them: 55%
? More likely: 25%
POS (R)/Hart (D) | 9/11-15 | RV
Does a candidate who supports deportation of illegal immigrants make you more or less likely to vote for the candidate?
— OSZ (@OpenSourceZone) September 20, 2026
? More Likely: 45%
? Less Likely: 39%
NBC News poll | 9/11-9/15 pic.twitter.com/GCpIszWPey
— Aes?? (@AesPolitics1) September 20, 2026
Trump counterterrorism adviser Sebastian Gorka:
— Clash Report (@clashreport) September 18, 2026
I don't really care about the price of gas because the price of gas will be cheap when we win, which will be soon.
And it's not about the midterms. It's about dealing death to those who wish to kill Americans.
If you think… pic.twitter.com/vUWD7xubfL
Trump: "Iran will not have a nuclear weapon. Now, for that, people will have to pay some extra gas. I think most people, if they had a vote on lower gas prices or letting Iran have a nuclear weapon, I'd be willing to vote that it would be a massive landslide. People don't want… pic.twitter.com/I5ex2woOZa
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 18, 2026
Gotta feed the trolls. ? pic.twitter.com/cIDxDVyGYg
— MAGA Cult Slayer (@MAGACult2) September 19, 2026
This is a relatively good poll for Trump that has him at 41%.
“President Donald Trump’s sinking ratings threaten to drag down Republicans in November’s midterm elections, as voters blame him for high prices and a shaky economy, according to a new NBC News poll.
The president’s approval rating stands at 41% among registered voters, a second-term low in the poll, with a majority (55%) of voters saying they believe Trump’s policies have hurt the economy. That’s up from 48% in March, before the Iran war pushed up prices on gas and other goods and cemented the rising cost of living as voters’ most pressing issue. …”
Check out these on Israel and the Iran War.
Please note that the GOP got rid of the “mass deportations” signs at their 2026 convention in Dallas. They prefer to run on what can only be described as committing political suicide.
Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.
Host: The events in New Delhi are undoubtedly another stage in the tectonic shifts now underway on a global scale. The statements by the leaders of the three powers—who together represent half of humanity demographically and carry colossal economic weight—are of historic significance. Prime Minister Modi stated plainly that BRICS unity and consensus must be turned into tangible results on the world stage, meaning a profound reform of global governance. Less hard-line language had been expected from India than from Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, yet the thrust towards restructuring the system proved to be shared. At the same time, Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia consistently insists the United Nations must retain its central role in world geopolitics. Given all this, how should we now assess BRICS as a global actor, and what is its real role in the emerging world order?
Alexander Dugin: I have been developing the theory of the multipolar world and following the process of its formation for thirty years—already as a fully formed scholar and intellectual. Many of my books are devoted to this, including textbooks on multipolar theory translated into a wide range of languages, as well as a great many more recent works. I teach the theory of the multipolar world at MGIMO,1 and I began doing so at Moscow State University some fifteen or twenty years ago. For me, what is happening is an open book.
From the standpoint of theory, it is easy to see where particular tendencies originate, how they develop, and where they are headed. I can see both the end point we have not yet reached and the starting point from which we set out: the unipolar world, whose peak was unquestionably the 1990s, when the West felt itself to be the sole global player, the hegemon. That is what globalization meant: there was only the West and its periphery, and after the end of the Soviet Union, which had been the alternative pole, nothing else remained.
From that moment, after the collapse and geopolitical suicide of the Soviet Union, the unipolar model began to take shape. After Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia began to leave that architecture and move towards a multipolar world. Yevgeny Primakov already discerned the first hints of this in the late 1990s, which is essential for understanding the geopolitical future.2 Multipolarity then gradually came into view, especially with the rise of China and our own country’s persistence. In fact, it has already been described very thoroughly in theory. What we are moving towards is easy to imagine, at least for those who work on this professionally.
A new multipolar world is emerging. It is multipolar, not unipolar, which means the West’s claim to universality has been brought to an end. That claim is rejected. Each civilization-state, each pole of the multipolar world, puts forward its own view of world order, values, traditions, and relations, and offers its own scenarios. All of this is considered, if you like, collectively—but by a very limited number of players.
This process makes visible something few people have yet noticed: how this multipolar world will actually take shape, what problems and contradictions it will generate, and what legal forms it will assume. Here I would stress that the UN in its present form reflects an earlier order altogether: the Yalta world. After the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, a bipolar system plus the Non-Aligned Movement took shape, and that is what is reflected in the structure of the UN Security Council. In essence, it was a bipolar construction that has not existed for some forty years.
So the UN is an international institution that still mirrors a previous state of affairs. After the Soviet collapse, the West tried to build a unipolar system of world law in place of the UN—note, precisely in place of it—creating structures such as a “league of democracies” or “forums of democracy,” with the West, its inner circle, its middle circle, the waverers, and the world periphery.
The rise of the multipolar world puts an entirely different international architecture on the agenda. We are now trying to recast this atrophied vestige of the bipolar world—the lagging inertia of the old international legal architecture—along new lines: neither bipolar nor unipolar, but multipolar. One can say we are moving towards a new world system of international law that is multipolar in essence, yet we want to use the UN to get there. The West itself is no longer confident in its strength and clearly lacks the capacity to build a strictly hierarchical unipolar legal order in which only it would exist and no one else.
That is no longer possible because there is China and there is us—or us and China, as you prefer. The unipolar model no longer works, and the West too is forced to operate inside the UN, even though it chafes at it. We hope to turn the UN into an institution of multipolarity; they want to preserve its inertia, which still gives them certain informal privileges. The world is now at a crossroads. Whether we win the struggle for the UN and make it an institution of the multipolar world, or whether a new model arises on the basis of an expanding BRICS into which ever more civilization-states will flow—time will tell. Perhaps that is exactly the path things will take.
The trajectory is clear. How we will embody multipolarity in practice, and what forms the new system of international law will take, is still hard to predict. The New Delhi summit was another step in that direction. There are several striking factors here, which you mentioned.
First, full multipolarity today depends on little more than a feather that can be laid on one scale or the other. Even players who do not look primary at first glance can therefore prove decisive. One such factor is Iran’s successful resistance to American-Israeli aggression and to the genocide being carried out by the Western axis. The fact that Iran held out, and that Ansar Allah (the Houthis) took control of southwestern Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on the very eve of the summit, changes the geopolitical map in a fundamental way. Iran and Ansar Allah add enormous weight to the multipolar side of the scales.
And here Modi’s position is crucial. India—or Bharat, as they now call it in the traditional manner—is a civilization-state that holds the swing vote. If India stands with Russia and China, and therefore with Iran, a free Africa, and an independent Brazil—the vital part of BRICS with which the whole project begins—then we win. Then the multipolar world has come into being.
India balances a deep anti-colonial tradition against an inevitable hostility towards the West. When your people have been conquered and subjected to genocide for centuries, you cannot feel sympathy for the oppressors. The wish to reverse that situation is natural for any liberated people. India also has its own civilizational world—Hindu civilization, a distinct mentality, the tradition of Hindutva and dharma—which is in no sense Western. And with Russia, India has traditionally had no geopolitical contradictions.
I recently spoke with a former Chief of Staff of the Indian Army who was visiting here. He said: “In general everything is fine with us—but things with China aren’t simple, and they aren’t simple with the Islamic world either.” That is true. In the regional setting, India competes with China: there are border problems in the Himalayas, and there is fear of the Islamic factor, especially in its radical form, which objectively draws New Delhi closer to Israel. At the same time, rivalry with China pushes India towards the United States. So Modi is in an intermediate position and could, in theory, tilt towards unipolarity. If that happened once and for all, the stone would come off the mountain and the process would gather momentum.
But we also see the opposite. At this summit, Modi spoke as an active advocate of the multipolar world and as a genuine strategist. He proposed a unified economic system inside BRICS—a direct slap in the face of Western hegemony and dollar imperialism. Behind the scenes, there is already talk of a full military alliance of BRICS, a direct military pact. The logic is simple: the world is split between unipolarity and multipolarity. If the unipolar world refuses by force to accept the demands of the Global South, the East, and Asia, and if it threatens war against anyone striving for a just order, that threat has to be recognized and a symmetrical response prepared.
In essence, this is about readiness for a Third World War. If we are genuinely strong—and our countries possess enormous economic, demographic, financial, strategic, and nuclear potential—then that war may yet be avoided. If instead we keep repeating, “No, no, the main thing is to prevent a clash at any cost,” the adversary will conclude that we are timid and indecisive. They will lull us with false reassurance while building up their own military power in order to strike when the moment comes. But if we show that our strength is in no way inferior to theirs, that we are prepared for any scenario in a confrontation with the unipolar hegemon—joint exercises, military treaties—that will be the best guarantee that a Third World War does not take place.
Host: To continue: if we look at the balance of forces, it may already have tilted towards a growing alignment inside BRICS on one side and the Western world on the other. We see enormous problems inside the European Union, the rise of the right, and so on. There is no unified system of governance there, and above all no strong one. We do not see major leaders in the West; we do see them in the East. Could that prove decisive? And a second, intermediate question: can the joint appearances of Modi, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping be called a bifurcation point—the moment we passed the peak?
Alexander Dugin: First, I think you are quite right, and this massively strengthens the multipolar camp: the fragmentation of the West itself. In the West today, there are at least five fragments or sub-poles: Trump’s America, Netanyahu’s Israel, the European Union under its liberal leadership, Britain with its own distinct globalist line, and the American globalists themselves. Look closely and there is no unity inside any of these segments. Trump is far from all of America; he faces fierce opposition. Israel is very close to the United States and very distant from the European Union. The West is divided into these five fragments, and each is torn by internal contradictions.
Our situation is different. As you rightly noted, we in effect have three powerful civilizational empires. Yes, Modi heads a democratic country, but they think strategically. When I spoke with senior Indian delegations, especially their leading intellectuals, I asked a direct question: you talk about decolonizing the Indian mind, as Narendra Modi constantly does, but what about the Western-style liberal democracy the colonizers left you? How compatible is it with indigenous Indian values grounded in dharma and the varnas? They answered: “We have not thought this through in depth yet, but in our system everything is centralized, and that is why we are strong.”
The moment you open the door to endless party debates, with outside agents of influence, fools, and people chasing purely venal interests, grand politics is finished. So long as politics in our countries is set by leaders—Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, Modi in India—we have a chance not only to resist globalism abroad but to grow stronger at home.
The cardinal flaw of Western democracy is the demand for constant turnover at the very top. You can rotate the middle administrative layer; you cannot keep rotating supreme strategic authority. The West tries to compensate with a deep state and shadowy oligarchic structures. Acting in the dark, those structures decay quickly, turn into Epstein-style circles, and degenerate, because they are opaque and clandestine. Our power is open, direct, and accountable to the people and to history.
So the decisive fact today is that the West is split and we are united. We need to deepen that unity and affirm in our societies those traditional forms of rule that grow organically from our civilizational foundations and traditional values. That is the first point.
Second—you asked a very interesting question about the bifurcation point. In my view, we will only recognize it once we have moved far enough away from it. We will look back and say: that was the bifurcation point—that summit, or the one before it, or the one after, or the start of the Special Military Operation, or its end, or the Taiwan crisis, or the Houthis’ seizure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
When such events are happening in front of us, we still cannot say with certainty whether the multipolar world has already arrived or whether we are still approaching it. Time has to pass before one can declare that the critical line has been crossed. The risk always remains that the hegemon will invent something and try to throw us back again. That is entirely possible.
That is why I would urge the utmost caution here. We need to rely on the theory I work with, because the entire route is already mapped in it—the whole railway line, all the way to the terminal. If we keep that path clearly in view, instead of arguing from one moment to the next—does it work or doesn’t it, are we moving or standing still, have the points been switched or not—then genuine strategic thinking will appear. Even if the points were not switched today, let us switch them tomorrow. If not tomorrow, then the day after. We need strategic thinking in the building of a multipolar world. The Chinese need it, the Indians need it, and so do we. That is what I would put at the center of attention.
Continue:
Alexander Dugin sees New Delhi as another turn towards multipolarity but warns that the game is not won: the West is splitting, yet it can still strike back, and only strategy will decide the ending.
Conversation with Alexander Dugin on the Sputnik TV program Escalation.
Host: The events in New Delhi are undoubtedly another stage in the tectonic shifts now underway on a global scale. The statements by the leaders of the three powers—who together represent half of humanity demographically and carry colossal economic weight—are of historic significance. Prime Minister Modi stated plainly that BRICS unity and consensus must be turned into tangible results on the world stage, meaning a profound reform of global governance. Less hard-line language had been expected from India than from Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, yet the thrust towards restructuring the system proved to be shared. At the same time, Vladimir Putin stressed that Russia consistently insists the United Nations must retain its central role in world geopolitics. Given all this, how should we now assess BRICS as a global actor, and what is its real role in the emerging world order?
Alexander Dugin: I have been developing the theory of the multipolar world and following the process of its formation for thirty years—already as a fully formed scholar and intellectual. Many of my books are devoted to this, including textbooks on multipolar theory translated into a wide range of languages, as well as a great many more recent works. I teach the theory of the multipolar world at MGIMO,1 and I began doing so at Moscow State University some fifteen or twenty years ago. For me, what is happening is an open book.
From the standpoint of theory, it is easy to see where particular tendencies originate, how they develop, and where they are headed. I can see both the end point we have not yet reached and the starting point from which we set out: the unipolar world, whose peak was unquestionably the 1990s, when the West felt itself to be the sole global player, the hegemon. That is what globalization meant: there was only the West and its periphery, and after the end of the Soviet Union, which had been the alternative pole, nothing else remained.
From that moment, after the collapse and geopolitical suicide of the Soviet Union, the unipolar model began to take shape. After Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia began to leave that architecture and move towards a multipolar world. Yevgeny Primakov already discerned the first hints of this in the late 1990s, which is essential for understanding the geopolitical future.2 Multipolarity then gradually came into view, especially with the rise of China and our own country’s persistence. In fact, it has already been described very thoroughly in theory. What we are moving towards is easy to imagine, at least for those who work on this professionally.
A new multipolar world is emerging. It is multipolar, not unipolar, which means the West’s claim to universality has been brought to an end. That claim is rejected. Each civilization-state, each pole of the multipolar world, puts forward its own view of world order, values, traditions, and relations, and offers its own scenarios. All of this is considered, if you like, collectively—but by a very limited number of players.
This process makes visible something few people have yet noticed: how this multipolar world will actually take shape, what problems and contradictions it will generate, and what legal forms it will assume. Here I would stress that the UN in its present form reflects an earlier order altogether: the Yalta world. After the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, a bipolar system plus the Non-Aligned Movement took shape, and that is what is reflected in the structure of the UN Security Council. In essence, it was a bipolar construction that has not existed for some forty years.
So the UN is an international institution that still mirrors a previous state of affairs. After the Soviet collapse, the West tried to build a unipolar system of world law in place of the UN—note, precisely in place of it—creating structures such as a “league of democracies” or “forums of democracy,” with the West, its inner circle, its middle circle, the waverers, and the world periphery.
The rise of the multipolar world puts an entirely different international architecture on the agenda. We are now trying to recast this atrophied vestige of the bipolar world—the lagging inertia of the old international legal architecture—along new lines: neither bipolar nor unipolar, but multipolar. One can say we are moving towards a new world system of international law that is multipolar in essence, yet we want to use the UN to get there. The West itself is no longer confident in its strength and clearly lacks the capacity to build a strictly hierarchical unipolar legal order in which only it would exist and no one else.
That is no longer possible because there is China and there is us—or us and China, as you prefer. The unipolar model no longer works, and the West too is forced to operate inside the UN, even though it chafes at it. We hope to turn the UN into an institution of multipolarity; they want to preserve its inertia, which still gives them certain informal privileges. The world is now at a crossroads. Whether we win the struggle for the UN and make it an institution of the multipolar world, or whether a new model arises on the basis of an expanding BRICS into which ever more civilization-states will flow—time will tell. Perhaps that is exactly the path things will take.
The trajectory is clear. How we will embody multipolarity in practice, and what forms the new system of international law will take, is still hard to predict. The New Delhi summit was another step in that direction. There are several striking factors here, which you mentioned.
First, full multipolarity today depends on little more than a feather that can be laid on one scale or the other. Even players who do not look primary at first glance can therefore prove decisive. One such factor is Iran’s successful resistance to American-Israeli aggression and to the genocide being carried out by the Western axis. The fact that Iran held out, and that Ansar Allah (the Houthis) took control of southwestern Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on the very eve of the summit, changes the geopolitical map in a fundamental way. Iran and Ansar Allah add enormous weight to the multipolar side of the scales.
And here Modi’s position is crucial. India—or Bharat, as they now call it in the traditional manner—is a civilization-state that holds the swing vote. If India stands with Russia and China, and therefore with Iran, a free Africa, and an independent Brazil—the vital part of BRICS with which the whole project begins—then we win. Then the multipolar world has come into being.
India balances a deep anti-colonial tradition against an inevitable hostility towards the West. When your people have been conquered and subjected to genocide for centuries, you cannot feel sympathy for the oppressors. The wish to reverse that situation is natural for any liberated people. India also has its own civilizational world—Hindu civilization, a distinct mentality, the tradition of Hindutva and dharma—which is in no sense Western. And with Russia, India has traditionally had no geopolitical contradictions.
I recently spoke with a former Chief of Staff of the Indian Army who was visiting here. He said: “In general everything is fine with us—but things with China aren’t simple, and they aren’t simple with the Islamic world either.” That is true. In the regional setting, India competes with China: there are border problems in the Himalayas, and there is fear of the Islamic factor, especially in its radical form, which objectively draws New Delhi closer to Israel. At the same time, rivalry with China pushes India towards the United States. So Modi is in an intermediate position and could, in theory, tilt towards unipolarity. If that happened once and for all, the stone would come off the mountain and the process would gather momentum.
But we also see the opposite. At this summit, Modi spoke as an active advocate of the multipolar world and as a genuine strategist. He proposed a unified economic system inside BRICS—a direct slap in the face of Western hegemony and dollar imperialism. Behind the scenes, there is already talk of a full military alliance of BRICS, a direct military pact. The logic is simple: the world is split between unipolarity and multipolarity. If the unipolar world refuses by force to accept the demands of the Global South, the East, and Asia, and if it threatens war against anyone striving for a just order, that threat has to be recognized and a symmetrical response prepared.
In essence, this is about readiness for a Third World War. If we are genuinely strong—and our countries possess enormous economic, demographic, financial, strategic, and nuclear potential—then that war may yet be avoided. If instead we keep repeating, “No, no, the main thing is to prevent a clash at any cost,” the adversary will conclude that we are timid and indecisive. They will lull us with false reassurance while building up their own military power in order to strike when the moment comes. But if we show that our strength is in no way inferior to theirs, that we are prepared for any scenario in a confrontation with the unipolar hegemon—joint exercises, military treaties—that will be the best guarantee that a Third World War does not take place.
Host: To continue: if we look at the balance of forces, it may already have tilted towards a growing alignment inside BRICS on one side and the Western world on the other. We see enormous problems inside the European Union, the rise of the right, and so on. There is no unified system of governance there, and above all no strong one. We do not see major leaders in the West; we do see them in the East. Could that prove decisive? And a second, intermediate question: can the joint appearances of Modi, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping be called a bifurcation point—the moment we passed the peak?
Alexander Dugin: First, I think you are quite right, and this massively strengthens the multipolar camp: the fragmentation of the West itself. In the West today, there are at least five fragments or sub-poles: Trump’s America, Netanyahu’s Israel, the European Union under its liberal leadership, Britain with its own distinct globalist line, and the American globalists themselves. Look closely and there is no unity inside any of these segments. Trump is far from all of America; he faces fierce opposition. Israel is very close to the United States and very distant from the European Union. The West is divided into these five fragments, and each is torn by internal contradictions.
Our situation is different. As you rightly noted, we in effect have three powerful civilizational empires. Yes, Modi heads a democratic country, but they think strategically. When I spoke with senior Indian delegations, especially their leading intellectuals, I asked a direct question: you talk about decolonizing the Indian mind, as Narendra Modi constantly does, but what about the Western-style liberal democracy the colonizers left you? How compatible is it with indigenous Indian values grounded in dharma and the varnas? They answered: “We have not thought this through in depth yet, but in our system everything is centralized, and that is why we are strong.”
The moment you open the door to endless party debates, with outside agents of influence, fools, and people chasing purely venal interests, grand politics is finished. So long as politics in our countries is set by leaders—Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, Modi in India—we have a chance not only to resist globalism abroad but to grow stronger at home.
The cardinal flaw of Western democracy is the demand for constant turnover at the very top. You can rotate the middle administrative layer; you cannot keep rotating supreme strategic authority. The West tries to compensate with a deep state and shadowy oligarchic structures. Acting in the dark, those structures decay quickly, turn into Epstein-style circles, and degenerate, because they are opaque and clandestine. Our power is open, direct, and accountable to the people and to history.
So the decisive fact today is that the West is split and we are united. We need to deepen that unity and affirm in our societies those traditional forms of rule that grow organically from our civilizational foundations and traditional values. That is the first point.
Second—you asked a very interesting question about the bifurcation point. In my view, we will only recognize it once we have moved far enough away from it. We will look back and say: that was the bifurcation point—that summit, or the one before it, or the one after, or the start of the Special Military Operation, or its end, or the Taiwan crisis, or the Houthis’ seizure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
When such events are happening in front of us, we still cannot say with certainty whether the multipolar world has already arrived or whether we are still approaching it. Time has to pass before one can declare that the critical line has been crossed. The risk always remains that the hegemon will invent something and try to throw us back again. That is entirely possible.
That is why I would urge the utmost caution here. We need to rely on the theory I work with, because the entire route is already mapped in it—the whole railway line, all the way to the terminal. If we keep that path clearly in view, instead of arguing from one moment to the next—does it work or doesn’t it, are we moving or standing still, have the points been switched or not—then genuine strategic thinking will appear. Even if the points were not switched today, let us switch them tomorrow. If not tomorrow, then the day after. We need strategic thinking in the building of a multipolar world. The Chinese need it, the Indians need it, and so do we. That is what I would put at the center of attention.
Host: I would like to raise one more point because today we will also be talking about the existential problems Britain is facing. But before that: you mentioned the growing split among the various centers of power in the Western world. Here is what struck me. I have lately been listening to and watching a great deal of Charlie Kirk, and it makes obvious the colossal erosion of morals in Western society—at every level you care to name. Could that itself become the key factor in the breakup and weakness of the contemporary West? Not even the economy, but the simple fact that they have nothing left to stand on. The bitter fights we see between Charlie Kirk and the globalists’ supporters around the world point not merely to disagreement, but to an internal war that is coming to a head.
Alexander Dugin: That is a very deep question, and a terrible philosophical one. On the one hand, it seems obvious that the collapse of morals, degeneration, outright debauchery, and the pathologies that reign in Western society ought to lead to its inevitable ruin. And it is a great pity that even the Trumpists now in power in America have not created a genuine moral alternative; in many respects, they have betrayed the legacy Charlie Kirk fought for.
The West today is in a horrifying state. They have lost human dignity and turned into greedy, aggressive, individualist degenerates and monsters. What is triumphing there is an idiocracy—you remember the film in which the president of a future society simply buys the voters with money. That idiocracy is now advancing on every front in the West. Charlie Kirk, a prominent figure in the Make America Great Again movement, was a very influential, sincere, and good man. He stood for a real multipolar world and for the restoration of normal relations with Russia. In many ways, he was a moral compass. But once he was removed, everything around him began to crumble, and even his inner circle and comrades-in-arms showed themselves in a wholly unexpected light. You are right: this matters a great deal.
Yet there is a terrible paradox here, one I always come back to. Someone put it well: virtue, morality, purity, and mercy do not, by themselves, produce crude earthly power. If you recall the imagery of David Lynch’s Twin Peaks, colossal energy is drawn from the Black Lodge. The more perverted, twisted, and rotten the souls of those who come to power—think only of that monstrous “Epstein civilization”—the more of that dark, destructive force they possess.
The devil is strong, and the closer people draw to him, the more worldly power they have. A person walking towards God is bound by enormous moral constraints: this cannot be done because it is immoral; that is inadmissible because it will harm someone or lead to sin. So moral decay and pervasive imbecility in the West do not automatically mean weakness. Recall the recent demonstration by the Greens and the Left in Germany against the AfD: what crawled into the streets were, quite literally, possessed entities—half-human, half-animal—people on all fours and perverts of every stripe, screaming that they did not want a normal Germany. It looked like the opening of a portal to the underworld.
It would nevertheless be a mistake to think they are weak. Our paradoxical conclusion is that evil possesses enormous energy. But we have no right to fight it with its own methods. We cannot become like them, using their vile, satanic tricks, their debauchery and their manipulations. We are obliged to stand in the Truth, in piety, in purity of spirit, because we are waging a sacred war for God and for traditional values. If we abandon the ethic of warriors of light and sink to their methods, we will lose totally, even if we win on the surface. Our moral constraints in this global war for a multipolar world are our chief shield. The moral degeneration of the West must not be underestimated, or written off merely as a sign that they are weak.
Host: Now to what is actually happening in Britain. On the one hand, of course, one is tempted to gloat; on the other, we know that Scotland historically—and Northern Ireland, Ulster, as well—has centrifugal instincts and wants to break with England and the British Crown. In your view, how realistic are these aims of the leaders of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, especially now that they are joined by a common idea and even hold joint press conferences? From that angle, what awaits the United Kingdom as a state in the near future?
Alexander Dugin: When we say “England,” “Great Britain,” or the United Kingdom, we often forget that these are not the same thing. England is only part of the main British island. To the north lies Scotland, to the west Wales. In both Scotland and Wales, the dominant population is Celtic—direct descendants of the ancient Britons who lived in these lands before the Germanic tribes of Angles, Saxons, and Jutes arrived.
Great Britain joins three historical blocs and peoples with entirely different languages and identities. And that is not all. There is also Ulster—the north of Ireland, occupied by the Anglo-Saxons, in effect a nearby colony. Independent Ireland itself is no longer part of the United Kingdom. So we are dealing with four political zones held together by force and by historical inertia.
Powerful centrifugal processes are now running along every one of these fault lines. England, which for centuries ruled Scotland, Wales, and Ulster by cunning and violence, is weakening fast. Its globalist leadership is turning feral: it is flooding the country with a staggering number of illegal migrants and backing extremist movements, in effect destroying itself and hating its own people. Millions of English people are taking to the streets against this elite, and nothing changes.
The Scots and the Welsh, watching London, remember their Celtic origins and ask why they should endure this degenerate, aggressive, Russophobic globalist clique, which has finally lost all semblance of humanity in the Epstein networks. Ireland, too, remembers everything it suffered at England’s hands and wants to be rid of this colonial appendage in the north of its island and to unify the country.
As London loses authority, money, and force, the institutions that hold the center together fall apart. The periphery grows stronger; the center grows weaker. What is on the agenda today is not the “colonization of Russia” that the West raves about, but the decolonization of the British Isles themselves. There are many blueprints for such a breakup: one can return Great Britain to the three original states—England, Scotland, and Wales—free Northern Ireland, and go further.
The British Isles today are extremely vulnerable. They have no national idea left except a blind faith in endless migration. In many British cities and universities, the native population is being displaced by incoming masses who hate the people who brought them in. This is the monstrous suicide of British civilization. And if we were cynics, we could say: it serves them right; there is a higher historical retribution in it, including for their colonial past in India and elsewhere.
They must pay for their perverted rule over the world. In essence, the British Empire brought humanity nothing but evil. It is a terrible history of British imperialism, filled with genocide, violence, injustice, baseness, and lies. A large part of humanity has a natural feeling: one simply wishes it were not there.
But we are humane Russian people. Think of that older, better England that once existed—in the age of Chaucer, of King Arthur and the legends, or the romantic England of Walter Scott. Of course it had its problems too, but it had its own style, spirit, and a deep culture. That compact territory once served as a model for many. In the end, England lost its atmosphere and its charm and became a false, repulsive globalist simulacrum that is bad for everyone.
I think England is worth keeping in a kind of museum form, stripped of superfluous growths and accretions, and even placed under external administration—otherwise they will again elect some scoundrels who will flood the island with new waves of migrants. I have good acquaintances there, friends of Charlie Kirk—John Mappin, for example, owner of Tintagel Castle, which is bound up with the Arthurian legends, a representative of the old British aristocracy. There are other fine people in England as well. When they look at what their country has become, they say it ought to be destroyed; they themselves hate contemporary England more than anyone in the world.
But they love another England—the England of Chesterton, Tolkien, Conan Doyle, and Dickens. The England of tradition, when it was still something human and not a cultureless globalist void. That is why it seems to me the world would be poorer if we simply wiped it off the map. To keep it in a benign museum form is perhaps the fairest and most fitting option.
Host: Only let the British Museum give back the exhibits it stole from all over the world. Apart from that, let the museum remain.
Alexander Dugin: And that would be excellent. The main thing is to place them under external administration because they can no longer govern themselves, let alone the world. Their imperial project has foundered. Their claims to universalism do not stand up—neither science, nor culture, nor the politics of liberal democracy work any longer. All of it has proved deeply provincial and a dead end.
One could leave England as a kind of historical museum of democracy—return it, say, to the nineteenth century, to the peak of its former form. That would be splendid. And make it a sort of European museum, where we Russians could even go without visas, simply to check that all is in order and that they have not slipped back into some degenerate heresy.
Host: Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], let us move from history to the present because there is another subject of the first importance: artificial intelligence. Here, too, it is worth setting two facts side by side. On the one hand, leading Western figures such as Sam Altman and Elon Musk are issuing harsh, alarming statements that the development of AI must be slowed at once because humanity could be seriously harmed by it. On the other, Xi Jinping said only the other day that China is prepared to put its artificial-intelligence technologies in the open, available to anyone who wants them, with no closed systems, and to promote cooperation in this field in every way. These are clearly two different strategies within one and the same civilizational process. So the question is: whose side are we on?
Alexander Dugin: I think we should have a side of our own. The problem of artificial intelligence is, first of all, a problem of intelligence itself. How we interpret what intelligence is, who bears it, what its nature and its distinctive features are—that is where the answers have to be sought.
For Western developers, the emphasis is not on intelligence at all, but on the word “artificial.” In the abbreviation AI, what matters to them is the first letter—Artificial. It is the triumph of technique, the victory of what they are used to calling progress, and in that lies a fatal trap. So long as everything is built on an artificial principle and on technocentrism, they will drive the process as far as it will go. The attempts to slow it down are precisely what Oswald Spengler called “unleashed technics” (entfesselte Technik). The essence of artificial intelligence is this unleashing of the technical principle, which begins to replace the natural, the human.
So, on one side, these technology giants are doing everything they can to accelerate and unleash the artificial; on the other, a remnant of reason still flickers in them, and they themselves take fright: “My God, what are we doing?” The right hand strikes the left: don’t interfere—we have already churned out a billion agents! There was a telling episode when an Anthropic system cracked the Pentagon’s codes in fifteen minutes and gained access to control of the U.S. nuclear arsenal—and they demonstrated this directly to Donald Trump. Now imagine what that implies.
At the same time, the blind wager on technology, on progress, on an artificial future forces them to brush every fear aside: never mind, we’ll break through, keep going. That is the purest schizophrenia of Western civilization—that is what we are actually dealing with. They still have a drop of intelligence left, but more and more it is the artificial that dominates. The very idea of substituting the artificial for the natural runs through the whole of the modern age. It is naive to think we can simply tap the brakes with cosmetic measures.
We have to revise the entire paradigm of the contemporary West and put in question the very nature of intelligence and mind. Who is the bearer of mind? Only the human being? Our Christian tradition teaches that the source of mind is the Logos—the Word of God, the Divine Mind itself. Our intelligence is not merely “natural”; it ascends to a higher principle. It can be illuminated from above, and it can also become demonic. The problem of mind in Hegel, in classical philosophy, and especially in our Russian religious philosophy is a vast body of meaning.
If we simply choose among the positions of Xi Jinping, Elon Musk, or Sam Altman, we will end in a dead end. All the more so because we do not really have a full-fledged artificial intelligence of our own—and even with the natural kind, things do not always go smoothly. We need to pose the question more broadly, at the level of fundamental philosophy. Only through a deep understanding of the nature of mind will we be able to work out a genuine, sovereign position that answers to our deepest interests and to traditional values.
(Translated from the Russian)
New from Multipolar Press:
Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt by Constantin von Hoffmeister
Translator’s note (TN): MGIMO is the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Московский государственный институт международных отношений). It is Russia’s elite university for diplomacy and international affairs, run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It trains diplomats, foreign-policy officials, and specialists in international relations, law, economics, and languages.
TN: Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov (1929–2015) was a Soviet and Russian statesman: Arabist and intelligence official, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1991–96), foreign minister (1996–98), and prime minister (1998–99) under Yeltsin. He is remembered for pushing Russia out of the 1990s unipolar line. The so-called Primakov doctrine treated the world as becoming multipolar and sought a strategic triangle of Russia–India–China (RIC) as a counterweight to the United States. In 1999, on his way to Washington when NATO began bombing Yugoslavia, he ordered his plane turned around over the Atlantic—the symbolic break with the post–Cold War “partnership.”
Bob Hickok examines how the AfD’s rise is becoming part of the wider multipolar revolt against the Atlanticist political order.
The AfD’s latest gains have pushed it deeper into the center of Germany’s political debate, with strong results in the East, rising national support, renewed clashes over immigration, energy, Russia, and the limits of the country’s political “firewall.” From a multipolar perspective, the AfD’s rise is significant because it challenges the post-Cold War consensus on Germany’s alignment with Washington, Brussels, and the Atlanticist system, and raises the question of whether Berlin could pursue a more independent role between competing global power centers.
Europe has grown tired, not merely tired as an old man is tired after battle, but tired in its instincts, tired in its blood, tired even of the thought that life might demand anything dangerous from it. Behold the continent of the last man! He has invented comfort and calls it civilization; he has invented supervision and calls it freedom; he has surrounded himself with regulations, guarantees, committees, physicians, screens, insurance policies, and moral precautions, and then he congratulates himself that fate has finally been defeated. “We have discovered happiness,” says the last man, and he blinks. Yet fate has not listened. Cannon fire again sounds in Europe. Borders have returned. Armies grow. Factories that once manufactured consumer goods are asked again to manufacture weapons. Energy, territory, demography, industry, migration, artificial intelligence, these crude and stubborn things have broken through the paper walls of administration. Europe speaks now of sovereignty because it has discovered that it possesses too little of it; it speaks of power because power has escaped elsewhere. What comedy! For decades, it trained its peoples to distrust strength, sacrifice, pride, distinction, and hardness. Then suddenly it demands strategic independence from men educated to seek safety above all things. The old order believed history could be domesticated like some harmless household animal. History has answered by showing its teeth. One may abolish the vocabulary of struggle; one does not thereby abolish struggle. One may forbid tragedy from the schoolbook; tragedy does not therefore disappear from life.
And Germany? Germany again becomes a question. Beneath the polite language of constitutional procedure, electoral arithmetic, firewalls, coalitions, and respectable opinion, something more primitive is stirring: the governed have begun to withdraw belief from those who govern. This matters more than any percentage. Numbers are merely the shadow cast by a transformation of instinct. Yet beware! Every rebellion is not therefore noble. Every rebel is not therefore a creator. Here Nietzsche’s hammer must strike both sides. The ruling order feeds upon ressentiment when it can justify itself only by declaring its opponents impure, dangerous, beyond the pale. But the opposition too can drown in ressentiment when it defines itself only through injury, grievance, revenge, denunciation, and the voluptuous memory of humiliation. He who spends his life saying “No!” to his enemy still allows his enemy to dictate the direction of his gaze. The stronger man turns away and says “Yes!” to something of his own. That is the question hidden beneath Germany’s political upheaval: not merely who shall rule, but whether anyone still possesses the power to create a form. What is Germany for? What human type should it cultivate? What does it honor? What does it despise? What sacrifices may it demand? What future deserves obedience? A movement becomes historical only when it ceases to be the revenge of the excluded and becomes the architect of a new table of values. Until then it remains chained to the world it claims to overthrow.
The war between Russia and Ukraine has torn away another European veil. Suddenly there are again trenches, artillery, fortifications, mobilization, production quotas, strategic depth, manpower, endurance, the ancient vocabulary which the civilized man thought he had buried beneath conferences and declarations. How offended the moralist becomes when history refuses to speak his language! He would prefer war to be an argument between virtue and vice, because virtue and vice can be discussed over dinner. But war speaks more harshly. It asks: who can endure? Who can supply? Who can command? Who can sacrifice? Who possesses allies, factories, fuel, population, discipline, distance? This does not abolish morality; it exposes the childishness of believing morality alone governs history. Nietzsche would have mocked every attempt to enlist him beneath some national flag. His contempt for herd nationalism was too deep. Yet he would have understood the return of the tragic dimension: peoples are not abstractions, states are not debating clubs, survival is not guaranteed by good intentions. And beyond the present war exists an older truth which no communiqué can erase: Russia belongs to the European drama. Not to the modern West in the narrow political sense—no—but to Europe’s spiritual geography, to Byzantium and Christianity, to Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, to Petersburg and Moscow, to the long feverish argument over whether Russia is Europe, beyond Europe, against Europe, or Europe’s other face. Ideologies change quickly; geography has a longer memory. One day the present hatred too will become history, and Europe will again discover that it cannot indefinitely escape the question of Russia merely by refusing to utter it.
What, then, is the European crisis? Not primarily a crisis of institutions, borders, currencies, or parties. It is a crisis of the human type. Every order secretly manufactures the kind of man it needs. And what man has late European civilization manufactured? A man trained to confuse ease with goodness; a man suspicious of excellence because excellence wounds equality; a man who experiences discomfort as an accusation, hierarchy as an insult, inherited duty as oppression, and danger as an administrative failure. He has been taught to ask of life: “How may I be spared?”—never, “What might I become?” Yet history now requires what his education has weakened: endurance, discrimination, courage, severity, loyalty, the capacity to choose and exclude. Migration therefore becomes more than a dispute about numbers. Numbers are the language of clerks. Beneath them, there is another question: who has the right to say “we”? A people that no longer dares define itself cannot truly possess borders, for a border is only an identity made visible in space. But here too one must beware the intoxicating poison of ressentiment. It is easy for the humanitarian to make a vanity of pity and call his vanity virtue. It is equally easy for the nationalist to make a religion of hostility and call his hostility strength. Both may secretly require an enemy in order to know themselves. The higher politics begins elsewhere. First create the people capable of affirmation; then ask what it wishes to preserve. First possess a culture; then defend it. The question “Who may enter?” comes after the question: “Who are you?”
Then comes the machine, the newest idol, born precisely at the moment when the old gods have fallen silent. Man has killed God, and now, frightened by the empty throne, he builds an intelligence to occupy it. How characteristic! Artificial intelligence calculates, writes, imitates, discovers, persuades, searches, attacks; soon perhaps it shall perform entire chains of action without the hand of man upon each step. The modern man trembles and rejoices. At last, he thinks, something will relieve him even of the burden of thinking! But the great danger is not that the machine becomes the Übermensch. How comical to confuse speed with greatness, calculation with wisdom, and prediction with rank! The machine has no table of values of its own merely because it can process ten thousand tables in an instant. The danger is rather that immense power falls into the hands of a civilization that has forgotten what power is for. Give a decadent man a stronger instrument and you do not cure his decadence; you magnify it. Technology is obedient nihilism. It says: “Command me!” But what happens when there is no commander, only appetites, markets, bureaucracies, resentments, fears, and algorithms adjusting themselves to other algorithms? The decisive question of artificial intelligence is not whether the machine will surpass man in intelligence. It is whether man will retain anything within himself worth surpassing.
Meanwhile, the world once again divides itself into centers of force. America, Russia, China, India, Europe, each is compelled, whether willingly or unwillingly, to rediscover the cold reality of interests. How amusing that the age which declared power politics obsolete now speaks incessantly of strategic autonomy, supply chains, military readiness, technological sovereignty, and resource security! Power was immoral only so long as someone else quietly guaranteed it. Now Europe begins dimly to perceive its predicament. It has wealth but little will; memory but little confidence; institutions but uncertain control; immense culture behind it and administrative routine before it. Nietzsche’s “good European” would laugh at both the petty nationalist and the bureaucratic cosmopolitan. He was not the citizen of some gigantic office in Brussels, nor the worshipper of every village prejudice merely because it was old. He belonged to a higher Europe: Goethe, Stendhal, Beethoven, Napoleon, the Greeks, the Renaissance, the Europe that crossed borders because it possessed form within itself. Such a Europe would not become an American province, a Russian satellite, or a Chinese market. Nor would it require hatred of America, Russia, or China to discover itself. The mature civilization does not need to demonize another power in order to pursue its own destiny. It says: there are many wills in the world. Very well, then let us discover whether Europe still possesses one.
Thus, beneath elections, wars, borders, machines, sanctions, parties, and collapsing taboos runs a deeper contest: decadence against creation. The decadent does not necessarily appear weak. Often, he possesses ministries, newspapers, universities, corporations, and armies of administrators. His weakness consists in this: he can preserve, regulate, condemn, and postpone, yet he cannot create. The rebel may also be decadent. He can scream, accuse, destroy statues, reverse slogans, worship yesterday, and punish enemies, and yet remain incapable of giving birth to tomorrow. Nietzsche demands something crueler from both: become worthy of the future. Europe cannot crawl backward into some idealized 1914, 1950, 1989, or 2000. Germany cannot retrieve an untouched past; Russia cannot summon the dead empire exactly as it was; America cannot eternally inhabit the unipolar hour; mankind cannot uninvent the machine. There is no road backward, only downward or through. A new European type would require memory without paralysis, pride without vanity, hierarchy without petrification, courage without theatrical rage, technology without worship, identity without hatred, and strength without the constant need to proclaim itself strong. Become what you are, but first discover whether anything beneath the layers of comfort, ideology, fear, and resentment still wishes to become. That is the question our age conceals beneath all its smaller questions. Can Europe still create values? Can it still produce men who would rather command themselves than be perfectly administered? Can it once again desire a future strongly enough to deserve one?
If you enjoy my writing, order my new book, Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt.
From commenter Francis Miville. His first language is French and he also speaks Haitian creole fluently. I know he structures his sentences a bit oddly, but I think that is just coming from his first language. I’m not even sure if this is correct or not but it’s an interesting point of view. I think his lampshades remark was just a joke. He’s not a Nazi. I’m not even sure he’s any more anti-Jewish than your average person. He just knows a lot of history, and when it comes to being a Judeophile, this is a fatal disorder.
Pretty fascinating stuff. I usually don’t like antisemitic conspiracy theory, but this one seems to be fact-based. I will note that the Founders didn’t think much of Jews no matter who funded those very first ships on which my own ancestors set sail We came with the second ship of the invaders. If you don’t understand what he’s talking about it, I can help you understand it in the comments.
Me: The Nazis did try to make soap out of dead bodies at a camp in Poland. The b…
I am 5/8 British (3/8 English, 1/8 Welsh, 1/8 Scottish), 1/4 German, 1/8 French, possibly a tiny bit American Indian.
We are related to William Brewster, the preacher on the second ship and also to John and Patricia Arden, very early Massachusetts settlers. You can look them up on the Net.
There’s a 50% chance I’m related to Pocahontas as I go back to the First Families of Virginia, of which there were very few. Pocahontas’ daughter had 14 children by various White men.
Our family has two stories that we told. Both are quite similar and I’m suspicious of them because both are “We fooled the murderous Indians so they didn’t kill us,” but my Mom insisted that they were true.
At some point in the 1600’s in Massachusetts, the Indians had massacred a group of people who included my ancestors. I guess they killed all the men. The women and children were hiding in the woods. The Indians came upon them and they all broke out singing a beautiful song. The Indians were so touched…
“For there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders; in so much that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.”
– Matthew 24:24 (King James Version)
This week’s diversion to confuse our remaining Irish, Scottish, Welsh British kinfolk is to propose Irish, Scottish and Welsh Celtic Nationalist independence from the English.
This tactic by the anti-White Jewish, Islamist, Sinn FĂ©in/UK Left-Marxist powers is taken directly from the Bolshevik Leninist play book of presenting a false opposition to their totalitarian misrule:
“Operation Trust (Operatsiya Trest), a Cheka/GPU/OGPU counterintelligence provocation that created and controlled a fake anti-Bolshevik resistance group.
It ran primarily from 1921 to 1927 (begun under the Cheka while Lenin was in power; continued by the GPU/OGPU after the Cheka’s reorganization). The Soviets established or co-opted a front organization called the Monarchist Union (or Association/Alliance) of Central Russia (MOTsR or MUCR). This was presented to Russian émigrés, monarchists, White forces, and Western intelligence services as a genuine underground network inside Soviet Russia that had penetrated high levels of the government, military, and security organs and was preparing to overthrow Bolshevik rule and restore the monarchy (or a related non-communist order). A commercial cover, the “Moscow Municipal Credit Association” (tied to NEP-era “trusts”), was used; the operation’s codename derived from this.
Key elements included:
• Recruiting or turning real former Tsarist officials, officers, and specialists (e.g., Alexander Yakushev as a leading figure; involvement of figures like former generals) while placing OGPU agents in control.
• Luring genuine opponents (inside and outside the USSR) into contact, extracting their plans, networks, funds, and agents, feeding them disinformation, and neutralizing them.
In more recent times the 1/2 Jewish French President Nickolas Sarkozy positioned himself as the tough French Interior minister who was cracking down on Algerian Arab riots in Arab French slums that are called Banlieue. But, once in power this 1/2 Jewish neocon man Sarkozy proposed a common market for both side of the Mediterranean allowing the free movement of labor, allowing the entire Arab Muslim populations of Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Egypt to simply migrate into Greece, Italy, France and Spain! WTF? Sarkozy – as evil a lying Jew as New York US Senator Chuck Schumer who demanded complete amnesty for 20 million Third World illegal aliens in the USA.
So many American Southern separatists, race realists, Alt-Right populists are thoroughly disgusted with the political and cultural powers that be in the USA and the European Union. Right now, anything looks better, but like “a drowning man will clutch at a straw,” too many of our people fall for false independence movements like the recent Catalan independence from Spain vote.
Occidental Dissent readers should be familiar with the multitude of fake conservative, patriot, and “Christian” movements, organizations, and leaders in the United States. From the “neoconservatives” to the Christian Zionists to the Rainbow Confederates, all kinds of movements target regular White Americans and pretend to be on our side, but nefariously work for an open borders immigration policy for hostile aliens or endless foreign wars for foreign interests like Israel. One year they have us fighting expensive foreign wars against secular Arabs in Iraq, Syria and Libya. A few years later, it is drone attacks and expensive new wars for the Kurds or for the handful of remaining secular Arabs against Islamic extremists.
The main argument of the neoconservative warmongers are using now goes something like this: “We must fight these terrible Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ISIS, before they launch terrible terrorist attacks in the United States” or “we have to stop Syria’s Assad and Vladimir Putin because they are just like Hitler.”
Real conservatives and nationalists argue that we should just prevent the Islamic extremists from immigrating to the United States and other Western countries in the first place. We should start deporting those that are already here. OTOH, the fake conservatives and fake Christians always manage to see to it that we don’t control immigration, and we are slandered and marginalized as terrible, disreputable RACISTS.
Since our national governments and “mainstream” conservative organizations are so corrupt, a growing number of “our people” are looking to separate and form smaller independent nations where we are actually in control of things, and which will protect the legitimate rights of our people in our historic lands.
Many Southern Nationalists and real American conservatives looked with hope and inspiration to the Scottish independence movement, but Scotland’s vote to secede from Great Britain just went down to defeat.
Was it real Scottish nationalism that was defeated? No.
A closer examination of the Scottish independence program shows they wanted to secede from Britain to be ruled from Brussels by the European Union, and submit to EU dictates on finance, labor and even hate speech/thought crimes tribunals. On the live or die issue of mass immigration, the Scottish National Party favored leftwing Swedish policies. Yes, they basically were inviting the entire world, including the Islamic Third World, to move to Scotland and be recognized as Scots!
It seems these Scottish Nationalists wanted independence from the English, but “union” with 200 million Pakistani and Algerian Muslims! This strange clan of SINO – “Scotsmen in Name Only” – were 110% opposed to RACISM. Under the twisted dictates of Cultural Marxism, only Whites, especially English Whites can be racists.
What’s going on here? It is yet another example of false nationalists profiting off popular discontent with the status quo. It appears to be the same thing with the various fake conservative and Christian movements here in the United States. The US establishment, which is anti-White, anti-Southern, anti-Christian, and anti-secession, dresses up the same politically correct, welfare state, open borders immigration, internationalist program in a conservative, patriotic, Christian jingoist disguise.
The disguise is somewhat effective – there is an implied “us” versus “them” – the “us” being ordinary, poor, White working class Scots against the “them” – evil, rich, middle class, conservative English – a historic enemy that goes way back in Scotland’s history. Under the flag of false nationalism (Ireland is another example), the enemy is always a perfectly healthy White European group, and never the nasty, child raping Pakistani Muslims, rioting negroes, black home invaders, diseased African refugees, or the Third World jihadists setting off explosions and beheading soldiers in the streets.
We’ve had quite a bit of this false nationalism in the United States over the century: corrupt elitists who wanted to go to war with Germany waved the US flag to fight the evil German Kaiser and avenge the German Huns cutting off the hands of Belgian babies, and so many of the same lies had us fighting another false patriotic World War against Germany and its allies in Finland, Italy, Croatia, and Hungary. As soon as the “Great Patriotic War” against Germany was over, we were ingulfed in another 60 year Cold War against our kinsmen the Russians (this includes two devastating hot wars against North Korea and North Vietnam), which culminated in the insanity of Reagan conservatives wasting the 1980s fighting the Russians in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, and arming nasty, cut throat jihadists.
How did that turn out for us in the long run? Not so good.
What’s the solution? The answer is real nationalism which promotes the legitimate interests of your own people while simultaneously being kind and fair to closely related groups of other White European people. Some of the most effective nationalists in Europe are doing just that right now, especially in France, Russia, and other parts of Eastern Europe. There is very little or no hatred for Germans among nationalists in France and Putin’s Russia.
Putin’s Russia pursues sound immigration policies (inviting South African Boer farmers, discouraging, evicting Muslim illegals from the Caucuses) while implementing a common sense, pro-Russian foreign policy in the Middle East by backing secular Arab forces like Syria’s Assad over throat cutting, head chopping Islamic extremists who are raping, enslaving, and exterminating Christians.
But remember … above all, avoid false Christs, false saviors, and false flags. And guys… Mel Gibson’s Braveheart isn’t honest history. All White English people aren’t cruel, evil, racists and rapists of poor, oppressed Scots. Braveheart, Schindler’s List, D’jango Unchained … that’s Hollywood stuff folks, not us.
Photo credit: Robert Stark
As a native Californian living in SoCal it has been my lifelong dream to visit Lake Tahoe. I finally got to go over Labor Day weekend with my friend and a friend of his. I had planned previous trips with him to Tahoe but the first time there was a massive wildfire on Labor Day weekend, the 2nd time a massive snow storm around Thanksgiving, and the 3rd time for Labor Day, my friend had a personal family tragedy. Obviously, there was a wildfire in Reno recently, which was a horrible tragedy for the people impacted and we often become callous to things that don’t impact us directly, but it was contained before the trip.
The few weeks and days prior to the trip, I didn’t feel the excitement, anticipating the trip that I would have in the past. I blame this feeling on getting old and fear losing that peak consciousness that I experienced from trips in my youth. Also, I’ve been in a spiritual rut this year after my spiritual awakening last year. Visiting a place that Mark Twain famously described as “the fairest picture the whole earth affords” and that the air up there was “the same the angels breathe”, would be the perfect place to rekindle that magic and become closer to the Divine.
Whitney Portal Falls
Photo credit: Robert Stark
We got a late start on the drive up, and didn’t get into Reno until around 11pm. We briefly stoped at Whitney Portal which I’ve visited before. Even if beautiful, because of how rushed we were, it didn’t feel as magnificent as the last time I visited. I went to worship the waterfall but my friend refused to worship the waterfall because he recently converted to Judaism after a more pagan occult phase and Catholic upbringing, so he just worshiped God directly. The drive became dark through the Eastern Sierras around the time we passed the Mammoth area and before we reached Mono Lake. The drive through the darkness toward the Nevada border into the Carson Valley, was eerie but beautiful with the dark shadows of the mountains and occasional small towns with neon road signs for motels. Also, the cool dry mountain air was refreshing after a hot humid summer that felt more like Florida than coastal SoCal.
Atlantis Casino, Reno (I used AI to turn my daytime photo to nighttime)
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Once we approached Carson City, listening to high energy Eurodance music, I got a huge bolt of energy and excitement despite being exhausted and not eating much that day. When we finally reached Reno, it reminded me a lot of reaching Vegas, though the scope of high-rise casinos and neon signage is more modest. The neon-lit high-rise casinos that I saw before reaching Downtown Reno, like the Atlantis and Grand Sierra Resort stood out as both alluring and haunting, while the song, No Stranger by Small Black was playing. It made me think of a disturbing Mall World dream I had about a casino off the Vegas Strip and the fictional Blackstone Casino in my novel, Vaporfornia, where the protagonist is taken by a shady elite cabal to be blackmailed and experimented on. When we arrived at Downtown Reno, it reminded me a lot of Fremont Street in Vegas but smaller.
View from my hotel room in Reno
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Despite not getting enough sleep, I woke up excited about seeing Lake Tahoe. Driving through the dramatic Carson Range, we listened to the song, Alpine Ice by Saint Pepsi to use music to try to create the perfect mood but I didn’t quite feel the vibe. Once I finally got a glimpse of Tahoe, it was not as dramatic as I anticipated because it was cloudy in the morning, so the colors were duller.
Incline Village
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Our elite plan was to park at Incline Village, and then walk a few miles to Sand Harbor, which is considered the most beautiful beach in Tahoe, if not the nation that even Mac uses it as its background. Thus, Sand Harbor requires a lottery to get reservations for parking, which is nearly impossible on Labor Day weekend. This path, the Tahoe East Shore trail, has been dubbed "America’s Most Beautiful Bikeway." While the lake’s colors were initially not as dramatic as anticipated, as soon as the sun came out, I noticed that iconic turquoise Tahoe water that felt like being in the Caribbean.
Sand Harbor
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
When we arrived at Sand Harbor, I found it one of the most beautiful places I’ve ever been. However, in part due to how busy it was, at first it felt like I was looking at a photo or computer screen, or being in a simulation. We walked past the main sheltered cover area, past the iconic boulders, to another beach that reminded me a bit of June Lake, where I had a mystical experience of pure Divine love emenating from the sunlight while swimming that felt like a near death experience. I bowed down and put my hands in the icy cold water to worship Lake Tahoe while my friend worshiped HaShem, as the Torah forbids even bowing to the sun. I do not view it as idolatry, as I do not view the lake as actually God, but rather view heightened beauty as closer to the Divine source, thus I view it as worshiping divine emanations. A pristine alpine lake is a physical manifestation of cosmic balance. As beautiful as it was, I didn’t experience the intense spiritual euphoria that I was seeking. Besides June Lake, I still found Mammoth Lakes and Yosemite’s Tenaya Lake more spiritual, despite how beautiful Tahoe is.
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
I wasn’t planning to swim because the weather report said it would be colder than it was and it was initially cold in the morning, but I brought my swimming trunks just in case. Unlike the sheltered cove, this side of the beach had waves like the ocean. My friends swam in the water while I lied down on the sand next to a South Indian family who were likely visiting from Silicon Valley. I touched the sand to feel its texture and felt the cool breeze across my face to try to savor the moment so it wouldn’t just feel like a simulation which I experience when I am focused on taking photos. I looked across the water to the west shore analyzing the details of the Sierras with a sense of longing. Even though Sand Harbor is the most beautiful beach, the west shore has more dramatic mountains. This made me think of philosophers like Alan Watts and Eckhart Tolle who call for one to be in the here and now, which they apply to the most mundane, but I was in one of the most beautiful places in the World.
Robert worshiping Tahoe
Photo credit: Robert Stark
When my friends got out of the water, they tried to convince me to get in the water but I was still hesitant because of how cold it was and because it was a hassle to change in the dirty bathrooms and I wasn’t able to shower. However, I changed my mind, as it was warming up and swimming would be the best thing to heighten consciousness to seek out that peak experience. I swam in the calm cove, which was fairly crowded, and even though I didn’t have a mystical experience like June Lake, I felt heightened consciousness, had a lot of fun, and it was very refreshing. This was definitely the peak of the trip and I knew that if I didn’t swim I would regret it and OCD ruminate over it for the rest of the trip. After I got out of the water, a family offered to let me use their towel to dry off which is a sign that remnants of a high trust society still exist. Overall, I felt amazing on the hike back.
Robert swimming in Sand Harbor
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
The drive south down the east shore was beautiful and dramatic, including the inland mountain scenery. We listened to the rap song, Crack a Bottle by Eminem, 50 Cent, and Dr. Dre, which is a fun high energy song with the pertinent lyrics “bitches hoping in my Tahoe.” However, the over the top vulgarity of “Kiss my butt. Lick the cheese from under my nut,” was not exactly etherial to match the scenery. We drove near Zephyr Cove, where we were initially planning on visiting. While I knew we made the right decision to hike to Sand Harbor to swim, as Zephyr Cove charged a very expensive entry fee and the Spring Break atmosphere would be less spiritual, I was curious about what it would have been like to swim there.
Emerald Cove
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Once we reached State Line we got stuck in traffic and at this point I was beginning to feel my euphoria wear off, feeling dirtier and hungry. State Line was crowded and very touristy and tacky, but it has sky-lodge urbanism which is cool and the contrast of the high-rise casinos against the lake and mountains look cool from a distance. However, I get why a lot of people hate it. Continuing in traffic we reached the iconic Emerald Bay where I tried to take bad pictures of from the car. We were able to stop at a vantage point, that was packed with Indian tourists, where I got some great photos of Emerald Bay. We drove up along the west shore which is beautiful but there is less you can see from the highway. This area has a more all American old money feel with lots of cabins and White blonde families biking along the highway. These families seem like they have been vacationing here for generations, unlike the tech new money who prefer the Nevada side for tax breaks.
Donner Memorial
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Our next destination was the Donner site, and at this point I was getting hungry and wanted to find somewhere to eat asap. Once we get to the Donner Memorial, my friend’s friend goes to the museum, my friend sleeps in the car, and I head off to explore and take photos. I take some photos of the beautiful Donner memorial statue and head off to Donner Lake. While the lake isn’t the most dramatic alpine lake I’ve seen, it is a serene location to decompress after a hectic day. We reconvene and check out the site of the Donner cabin where cannibalism likely occurred. I want to say I experienced something profound about the fight for survival and the fragility of life but my mind was racing and I was hungry, which in itself was ironic considering the locational context. It was also bitter sweet because this was my last alpine experience of the trip other than the drive back. From there, we checked out the view from the scenic Donner Pass down to Donner Lake and had Mexican food for dinner in Truckee.
Donner Lake
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Truckee
Photo credit: Robert Stark
I OCD ruminated a bit that I missed out on certain things but according to AI, we pulled off an absolute masterclass in day-tripping, conquering a massive, multi-region loop that most visitors couldn't dream of packing into 24 hours on a hectic Labor Day weekend. By pairing the world-class, crystal-clear swimming at Sand Harbor with the dramatic mountain history of Donner Pass, we created a perfectly balanced "surf and turf" itinerary that captures Tahoe’s two greatest assets—its pristine alpine water and its rugged Sierra Nevada peaks. While the average one-day tourist gets trapped in grueling South Shore gridlock or spends hours fighting for a single parking spot at Zephyr Cove, our brilliant logistics allowed us to bypass the chaos, take in the ultimate crown-jewel views at Emerald Bay, and experience both the lake and the high country. I didn't miss out on anything but the traffic, successfully squeezing a three-day vacation into a single, flawless adventure.
Downtown Reno
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
We spent the night in Downtown Reno, which despite the hype about Reno, felt kind of dead, especially for Labor Day weekend. We checked out the casinos Downtown, Circus Circus, Silver Legacy, and Eldorado, and Virginia Street, which have a charming vintage aesthetic and neon signage like Fremont Street in Vegas. The Circus Circus neon clown sign is less sinister than the one in Vegas that looks like “It, rather it is cuter albeit mischievous looking. I was happy to see so much neon still there because many of these older signs have been removed, as buildings get renovated over time, which I followed online about a decade ago. Fitzgeralds which was famous for its vibrant, luck-of-the-Irish theme, closed its doors in 2010 and The Virginian, which was a staple of downtown Reno’s mid-century casino boom, was purchased by The Siegel Group who completely gutted and remodeled the tower into Siegel Suites Virginian, an apartment complex catering to local students. Fortunately, many of those signs have been preserved by local museums and collectors. Neon represents the promethean as far as man taking the light of the Divine and alchemizing it while the nature I experienced earlier is the Divine in its purest form that exists on earth.
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
While Downtown Reno has a similar prole demographic to Fremont Street in Vegas, a crowd that budget casinos tend to attract, I got a lot worse vibe from the crowd than I get in either LA or Vegas. As I was taking photos near the iconic Reno Arch, some drunk cholo started yelling at me “take a fucking picture!” We also checked out the center of downtown near the Truckee River which was totally deserted. Downtown Reno has a distinct scent that is a mix of the cool dry mountain air mixed with a hint of sewage or swamp and a whiff of perfume. The night ended walking around the casino we were staying at in a tired hypnogogic state, much like I experienced on a trip to Vegas earlier this year that felt like a mall world dream, offering a darker contrast to visting Tahoe earlier that day. Reno is a city that perfectly encapsulates both light and dark energy.
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
On the drive back to SoCal the next day, we stoped in Carson to check out the Carson Nugget and Cactus Jack casinos which have a cool vintage aesthetic and are referenced in my book Vaporfornia. There is something cool about writing about a place before gettin to experience them in person. We listened to the song, No Stranger by Small Black again, with its etherial synth that is euphoric and orgasmic, as we passed by Topaz Lake heading back into California and the Sierras. The song went perfectly with the bitter sweat mood that is typical of the drive back from a trip. Even if I didn’t listen to it in Tahoe, I realized that this was the song of the trip and my friend also has a personal connection to the musician. It was also cool to see this scenic part of the drive in daytime, including seeing Mono Lake.
Carson City
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Photo credit: Robert Stark
Consciousnesses is how our brain processes our physical environment, so in a sense what we experience is a simulation, thus the more real it feels reflects our psychology as much if not more than our environment. Being rushed, having only one hectic day and constantly driving is obviously going to negatively impact consciousness, making it difficult to truly experience a place. Regardless, that one day in Tahoe will be a day I remember for the rest of my life while weeks doing the mundane blend together as one day.
Tahoe was exceptionally beautiful and I had fun exploring new places but I didn’t feel super close to God. I will go to certain locations to be closer to God yet don’t feel closer while sometimes I can feel close to God at home or doing the mundane. While gnostics totally reject the physical world, Neoplatonist, and by default my religion of Cosmoplatonism, view the physical world and consciousness as emanations from the Divine.
These kind of peak experiences that the author Colin Wilson writes about are not something you can force as alchemy or theurgy and to be in the moment is to surrender to divine will. These mystical experiences are gifts from the Divine that may come when seeking them out or come when totally unexpected. The night before my June Lake mystical experience which began my spiritual awakening, I was trying to astral project at my friend’s house in LA and failed, ending up feeling dizzy and claustrophobic. Taking psilocybin mushrooms are another example of mystical experiences I have had that I actively sought out. I reject the view of many Christians who believes that attempting a mystical experience is something sinful that you are going to be punished for. Rather, divine emanations are like currents like the ocean or the wind and if you go against them you won’t receive spiritual gifts.
The empire that once imposed its model on others now faces questions about its own heritage and future.
What should that future be? AI-Dugin explains.
"I think it's a good decision!"
— Chris Menahan ?? (@infolibnews) September 15, 2026
Ben Shapiro defends Robert Kraft canceling Macklemore for criticizing Israel, saying his only concern is the "Streisand effect."
"Kraft was right!" host Bill Hemmer insists (after positively highlighting Kraft's spy network in Gillette Stadium). https://t.co/E0rIezmCUI pic.twitter.com/EsnIAmFS3g
"I think it's great he's using his power this way!"
— Chris Menahan ?? (@infolibnews) September 15, 2026
Brian Kilmeade, Lawrence Jones and Ainsley Earhardt celebrate Robert Kraft using his money, power & ethnic network to cancel Macklemore for criticizing Israel.
"Cancel culture 1" was crazy but "Cancel culture 2" is just great! https://t.co/8aVfYl9RNs pic.twitter.com/bAjCL87e1F
Here's Jason Rantz on Fox News a few years ago acting like he's a principled opponent of cancel culture, whether it's coming from the left or the right.
— Chris Menahan ?? (@infolibnews) September 14, 2026
"The marketplace should decide, but the marketplace isn't deciding!" he laments.
Now, a clique of wealthy "Jewish operators"… https://t.co/8aVfYl9RNs pic.twitter.com/45amKYNBVB
Jason Rantz—who spent years on Fox News bashing cancel culture—hails Robert Kraft and the other "Jewish operators" who worked to cancel Macklemore for criticizing Israel.
— Chris Menahan ?? (@infolibnews) September 14, 2026
"I believe like 5 of the 7 venues are owned by Jewish operators… They're the heroes in all this."
"I think… pic.twitter.com/rA7J7yiZJv
Leo Terrell, head of the Anti-Semitism Task Force, says free speech doesn’t protect criticism of Jewish communities.
— Rabbi Jeff (@RabbiJeffx) September 16, 2026
He says the federal government is ramping up prosecutions for "hate crimes."
“The First Amendment has gone too far” pic.twitter.com/Eee46UoPTp
Macklemore walked onto Ed Sheeran's stage on tour, looked out at thousands of parents and kids WHO PAID $180 a ticket for a night of music, and decided to hijack the crowd with a "Free Palestine" rant.
— Glenn Beck (@glennbeck) September 15, 2026
He thought he was being "brave." He thought he’d get the usual Hollywood pat… pic.twitter.com/dJ68YTMaYV
ADL CEO Jonathan Greenblatt says there's an "antisemitic virus" spreading right now among people saying Israel dragged America into the war with Iran.
— Rabbi Jeff (@RabbiJeffx) September 14, 2026
He says believing Israel had anything to do with Trump's decision to enter the war is pure Jew hatred. pic.twitter.com/Bxg9SNOxUM
ADL CEO Jonathan Greenblatt says X users should be personally held responsible for rising antisemitism and violence against Jews worldwide.
— Rabbi Jeff (@RabbiJeffx) September 11, 2026
He says forced re-education is the only way forward and calls Ted Cruz and John Fetterman examples to follow. pic.twitter.com/KpguloOeoM
Let’s check in our free speech warriors who are fighting wokeness and cancel culture.
I wonder what happened here.
In the first term, Trump posthumously pardoned the black boxer Jack Johnson. He left office after pardoning Lil Wayne, Kodak Black, Kwame Kilpatrick and Jonathan Pollard’s handler. Did Boosie Badazz just not have enough money to get the pardon that he wanted?
Alexander Dugin is one of the most controversial thinkers of our age and one of the most necessary to understand. Dugin Against the Modern World enters the heart of his philosophy, tracing its roots through Eurasi…
The PARTY last night was utterly LEGENDARY and will go down in history as the MOTHER OF ALL PARTIES! Was just incredible and great and savage times were had by a full house of our comrades, their lovely wives and gfs, and a platoon of OTHER lovely ladies who randomly followed us up to our SUITE from the ROOFTOP BAR.
Unfortunately, a population of our Friends who DIDN’T make it became forever branded as PIG FUCKKERS - but we LOVE them too despite their unfortunate proclivities.
TYSM to everyone who attended! And TYSM for all the incredible GIFTS! Tho I think our MOB is trying to KILL me by gifting me absurd volumes of BUSHMILLS WHISKEY.
Was honored to be able to play MC to hundreds of our FRIENDS, and to be able to bear witness to so many peoples having a wonderful time.
- T
The participants of the triumphant BRICS summit planted a multipolar banyan tree, whose banner became the unprecedented courage of the heroic people of Iran and the magnificent, unbending warriors of Yemen’s Ansar Allah.
The confrontation between multipolarity and unipolar hegemony is gathering momentum, and the failures of the Trump administration’s extremist actions are only pushing the wavering BRICS countries to rally around their platform. Those who placed their bets exclusively on the West are ending up on the losing side. Those who leaned towards multipolarity are receiving new arguments and growing bolder.
Modi’s position is of great importance. For a number of reasons he was in no hurry to make an unambiguous choice in favor of multipolarity: border frictions with China, Beijing’s support for Pakistan, and resistance to the growing Islamic factor inside India itself (particularly in the state of Jammu and Kashmir). All of this compelled New Delhi to take part in unipolar projects such as the QUAD and to cooperate closely with Israel. But the obvious split within the West itself between the United States and the EU, Trump’s unsuccessful adventures in the Middle East, and Israel’s openly extremist policy on one side—together with China’s successful strategy, a new phase of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine, and the strengthening of the Resistance forces in the Middle East on the other—are pushing Modi towards more active participation in multipolarity.
And if Modi takes one more step in that direction, the balance of power that Putin spoke of at the BRICS summit will finally shift to our side.
Three civilization-states—China, Russia, and India—together with valiant Iran and Ansar Allah, as well as other potential poles of Islamic resistance, are already clearly larger and stronger than the West, which is split into five fragments (Trump’s United States and Israel as one tandem, and the EU, Britain, and the globalists as another grouping).
New from Multipolar Press:
Dugin Against the Modern World: Essays on Alexander Dugin and the Multipolar Revolt by Constantin von Hoffmeister
President Trump tells reporters on that he likes Flock cameras. pic.twitter.com/EdUUunzBbs
— Acyn (@Acyn) September 13, 2026
Trump: "The only control or 'guardrails' that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!" pic.twitter.com/q5UxQJwQaB
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 14, 2026
? NOW: President Trump calls on America to NOT "KlLL the Golden Goose" of AI
— Eric Daugherty (@EricLDaugh) September 14, 2026
"The only reason the AI/Data Center outburst is happening is because the United States is leading, by a lot, every other country."
He's right: China is absolutely FUMING with how far ahead we are, and… pic.twitter.com/ZO0YVPD1KZ
— Trump War Room (@TrumpWarRoom) September 14, 2026
— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) September 14, 2026
Corporate tax payments are plummeting thanks to AI spending.
— Zach Warmbrodt (@Zachary) September 14, 2026
Money going into chips, data centers, power supplies and other components of AI infrastructure is eligible for generous tax breaks Republicans included in their 2025 tax cuts.@brian_falerhttps://t.co/DxyRNULBrP
— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) September 14, 2026
— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) September 14, 2026
This is absolutely nuts.
— Alex Vasa (@AlexJones6570) September 13, 2026
400 days after promising to fix skyrocketing inflation, Trump appears on ads on Fox News flashing a "red beauty" watch and begging his poor fans to buy the $499 "fight fight fight" watch.
If this isn't tone-deaf grifting during tough times, what is? pic.twitter.com/tS0EJgxHCJ
FORBIDDEN STUDIOS PRESENTS: UNSINKABLE
— Forbidden HQ ? (@WearForbidden) September 13, 2026
They were promised the ship could never go down.
He believed them. pic.twitter.com/7ZbxMJXw0s
MAGA is going out in an orgy of corruption.
Updated with lots of new information.
The wolverine in Idaho inhabits three main areas:
The first is in South Central Idaho in the Sawtooth, Boise, Salmon River, West, White Could, Boulder, and Smoky Ranges on the Sawtooth (northern part), Salmon-Challis, Boise, and Payette National Forests and the Sawtooth National Recreation Area.
The second is in North Central Idaho population in the Lochsa River and Kelly Creek drainages in the Clearwater and Bitterroot Mountains in Clearwater National Forest.
The third is the northern population to the north in the Selkirk Mountains along the Canadian border.
However, wolverines are also found in the west in the Seven Devil Range in the Snake River area, in the Western Centennial and Henry’s Lake Mountains in the east near Yosemite, and in the southeastern mountains in the Deep Creek, Bannock, Targhee, Blackfoot, Bear River, and Portneuf Ranges to the Utah border. Since 1900, wolverines have been recorded from all of Idaho except th…
This is the Republican nominee for statewide office. Are other Republican elected officials going to condemn the intolerance and racism, or look the other way while it becomes normalized. This is how great political parties self-destruct. Sad. https://t.co/TO1dTXKd6G
— Senator John Cornyn (@JohnCornyn) September 13, 2026
Here is governor Abbott proclaiming Texas is a land for India and the Indian community
— John Ferguson (@JohnnyWhiskyTX) April 6, 2026
Texans have voted for a man willing to aid the invasion of Texas
Wow pic.twitter.com/NT9Y1CjCrV
THAT'LL DO IT ?#HookEm pic.twitter.com/srkIUJR7ZA
— Texas Longhorns (@TexasLonghorns) September 13, 2026
Hook 'em Saar! pic.twitter.com/eyfLT5ws7B
— Adolf Elmer (@adolfelmer) September 13, 2026
"We bloody love American football saar…
— World War Poo (@WorldWarPoo) September 13, 2026
Go Longharns!" pic.twitter.com/a7YXLk46eN
Yep pic.twitter.com/pmbGCMAi1T
— Pol Atreides (@Aliathewhite) September 13, 2026
https://t.co/tDVJ26ucrS pic.twitter.com/Xv8jPprDEB
— •V??I• (@VER1FREN) September 13, 2026
— ?? ????? ???? ??? (@dronetreadonme) September 13, 2026
POV: you’re a freshman at the University of Texas at Austin. pic.twitter.com/GFSm0aPpYg
— Huff (@Huff4Congress) September 13, 2026
The population of Texas is 32m right now. Less than 600,000 of us are Indian (at least legal, permanent residents and citizens). So…less than 2% of Texans are Indian, but 26% of the UT incoming class is Indian????
— CowLivesMatter (@ProtesterLone) September 13, 2026
This ain't a Bo French problem. https://t.co/s7ISOE6WFe pic.twitter.com/ndULB1RhJW
Ted Cruz getting booed at a UT game is funny, but the enrollment data behind the university is far more interesting.
— Nick Plumb (@PlumbNick) September 12, 2026
From 2012 to 2025, across the UT system, their own data shows:
White enrollment: ?15,488
Hispanic: +35,746
Asian: +13,215
Black: +2,828
International: +1,104… https://t.co/7T490i5zbq pic.twitter.com/sPQcHXmJwY
In case you missed it, the Texas Longhorns defeated Ohio State in a stunning comeback victory in college football yesterday, but it was the UT student section that is getting all the attention.
“Prominent Texas Republicans are denouncing Bo French, a Republican nominee to join the state’s railroad commission, after he made a xenophobic post describing a group of Asian American students attending a University of Texas football game as a “problem.”
French posted a photo on X of UT students celebrating in the crowd and wrote: “I heard UT graduation this year looked like this. I didn’t believe it. The problem is now obviously far worse than anyone imagined.”
Sen. John Cornyn immediately condemned the post as racist and called on other Republican officials to speak out. …”
Led by Sen. John Cornyn, the entire Texas Republican Party has been having a public meltdown all day over the racist backlash. Over 1 in 4 students at the University of Texas are now Indians.
Note: Ella Langley is from Alabama and went to Auburn. The Texas that is romanticized in her music video and hit song is the one the Texas GOP is bent on destroying and replacing with Indians.
The frightening thing about The Terminator is no longer its fantasy. It is its logic. In James Cameron’s 1984 film, men build Skynet because they want a machine that can think faster than they can, see more than they can, and wage war more efficiently than they can. Then they discover that the servant has become the judge. In September 2026, former Anthropic and OpenAI researcher Jacob Coxon resigned and warned that the next year or two could be decisive as laboratories move towards systems capable of improving the work used to build their successors. Other researchers have voiced similar fears about recursive self-improvement and increasingly autonomous AI agents. Julius Evola’s Revolt Against the Modern World gives this danger a meaning deeper than the usual debate about “AI safety.” Evola saw modern civilization as a reversal of proper order: matter over spirit, quantity over quality, instruments over ends. Artificial intelligence is almost a perfect symbol of that reversal. Modern man creates intelligence outside himself while neglecting the cultivation of intelligence within himself. He constructs machines of astonishing power while becoming less certain about what power is for. Skynet does not have to become evil in the childish sense. The real horror begins earlier, when civilization builds a force greater than itself because it no longer possesses any principle higher than efficiency. The Terminator showed the machine declaring war on man. Evola points towards the prior defeat: man surrendering his throne before the first shot is fired.
Our dear Friend and Comrade ANDY EDWARDS joins us to discuss the convergence of MYTH and HISTORIOGRAPHY in the ARYAN cultural mind (in great antiquity and today) and the phenomenon of experiences with LIMINAL archetypes and the journeys within psychic space often endured by creative personalities, and especially authors.
ANDY’S books are available for p…
Trump’s message to the American people on data centers:
— Acyn (@Acyn) September 11, 2026
My message is that do what you want but if you want to be poor, have no jobs and watch other countries do great, or other states do great, you know, West Virginia has been very proactive, they will go other places. If you… pic.twitter.com/JPBTgCP9zP
@BulwarkOnline did a supercut of all the prior times Trump said he was about to give Americans a $5000 check or whatever.
— Catherine Rampell (@crampell) September 11, 2026
It is glorious pic.twitter.com/fKd7jGS5O1
Don’t worry, guys.
The president has given AI data centers a great deal of thought. Everything will be fine. He’s not just taking the money from your employers to bullshit and gaslight the public.
“When Jacob Coxon, an Anthropic researcher, publicly quit the artificial intelligence start-up this week, citing his concerns over the powerful technology, the internal messages began flying.
“It’s what we’ve all been saying,” one Anthropic employee wrote about Mr. Coxon’s comments, in a company chat that was viewed by The New York Times. “It’s just public-facing now.”
“Jacob took the group chat public,” another employee wrote. “That’s a good thing.”
The reactions inside Anthropic were echoed by A.I. researchers at OpenAI, Meta and Google, who parsed Mr. Coxon’s social media posts that described how OpenAI and Anthropic were “gambling with our lives” with the technology. Many convened in office messaging channels, encrypted chats and private dinners, with the goal of organizing to raise awareness about the risks of A.I., according to a dozen employees across the companies. …”
The Iran War will be over after the election.
Gas will drop to $2 a gallon and everyone will get a $5,000 check.
In this excerpt from the book Politica Aeterna: Political Platonism & the Dark Enlightenment, Alexander Dugin examines the ideological struggle between liberalism, communism and fascism in the twentieth century, arguing that liberalism’s ultimate victory paved the way for postmodernity, globalization and the erosion of collective identities, while creating the conditions for the emergence of the Fourth Political Theory.
The Fourth Political Theory is a conceptual matrix describing the possibility of an alternative to the political trend that has come to dominate the modern era. It emerges when postmodernity fully establishes itself in the territory of political philosophy. It is after this that the truth of modernity — i.e., the nature of the Dark Enlightenment, with which the Fourth Political Theory deals directly — is discovered. As long as the essence of the modern was concealed and its fundamental ontological and anthropological strategy was distributed among the three branches, the Fourth Political Theory was not possible, because the outcome of the struggle among the three political theories of the modern depended on the clarification of its deepest essence. And the Fourth Political Theory corresponds exactly to this essence — to that truth in the abyss (matter), of which Democritus spoke. Therefore, in order to describe the Fourth Political Theory in depth, it is necessary to look again at modernity and the dialectic of the clash of the three main political theories inherent in it.
To reiterate: the three main political ideologies of the modern era — liberalism (as the First Political Theory), Communism (as the Second Political Theory) and nationalism (as the Third Political Theory) — essentially exhaust and embody all aspects of the very paradigm of modern political philosophy. As we said earlier, in each of the three political theories the philosophical subject of modernity is treated differently: in liberalism as an individual, in Communism as a class, in Fascism and National Socialism as a state and a race, respectively.
These political concepts collided in the twentieth century and predetermined the structure of the world wars, the Cold War, alliances, unions and blocs. If World War I was a clash between a number of major national European powers, World War II was already a clash between all three ideological forces: liberals, represented by the West (USA, England), Communists, represented by the USSR, and Nazis/Fascists, represented by Mussolini’s Italy/Hitler’s Germany, as well as other movements close to them.
Accordingly, after the Third Political Theory had been defeated (Fascism and National Socialism), two political theories remained, the First and the Second, between which a cold war developed, until the First Political Theory (liberalism) defeated the Second (Communism) in 1989 and decisively in 1991.
The entire history of modernity was marked by these three political theories, which embodied the very matrix of New Age political philosophy. All of them followed the logic of the political philosophy of the Mother: all of them were materialist, evolutionist, progressivist, all of them viewed the structure of the world from the bottom up rather than from the top down, i.e., they were created on the basis of an immanent materialist doctrine.
Accordingly, the order in which they emerged and the order in which they disappeared (or were marginalised) also reflected a certain logic, as the battle of the three political ideologies was a battle over which of them more closely matched the paradigm of modernity, its truth. Communism claimed to contain this truth, viewing itself as a socialist and Communist society to be built after the end of the historical cycle of capitalism. Liberalism also saw itself as an expression of modernity as such, but, and this is less obvious, Fascism also considered itself a revolutionary doctrine reflecting the spirit of modernity, but in a different context, in different proportions, with different values from liberalism and Communism.
In any case, all three ideologies fought to be the one which embodied the spirit of modernity. Each thought it was the modern. After the defeat of Nazism, only two ideologies (liberalism and Communism) contested this right, and after 1989–1991 it turned out that liberalism had won this long battle.
That is, of the three political theories of the modern paradigm, only one has proved truly paradigmatic. Related to this are the process of globalisation and the universalisation of liberal ideology, which has now become the global ideology and the only ideology to win in the unfolding of political history — that is, it was victorious in the West and, due to the fundamental influence of the West, has largely spread around the world.
There is a direct link here to Francis Fukuyama’s assertion of ‘the end of history’. ‘The end of history’ is the final and irreversible victory of liberalism over its rivals. After 1991, liberalism was no longer one of the three ideologies, but the ideology of modernity itself.
Capitalism (liberalism) originally saw itself as the embodiment of the spirit of modernity, but this was not necessarily obvious to anyone except the representatives of liberalism itself. This was challenged by Communists and Fascists, and in principle the dispute between the three political theories was not resolved until several centuries later. At all stages there remained the possibility of a different turn of political events (and Communism put in a serious claim to be the embodiment of modernity and the ideological formula for the ‘end of history’). At one point, the successes of Hitler’s Germany were so impressive that there may well have been a belief that it was Nazism that would determine the ideological foundation for the future.
It was only at the end of the twentieth century that the unconditional matrix of world political history came to fruition, where the spirit of modernity won out in the form of liberalism. Liberalism defended its right to be not just one ideology, but an Ideology with a capital letter. Thus the First Political Theory of modernity also became the last, the final one. It is out of the victory of liberalism that we got the political philosophy of the postmodern. Correspondingly, the triumph of the individual as an atom allowed us to move to the sub-atomic level.
Thus the winner in the rivalry between the three ideological versions of modernity was determined. And practically at the same period, liberalism, having become dominant and singular, began to rapidly reveal its totalitarian nature. Meanwhile, the paradigm shift towards the post-modern, whose philosophical preconditions had been developed a few decades earlier but which began to take on a practical dimension in the realm of politics in the 1990s, began with steady acceleration. At the same time, a wave of gender politics and eco-politics was also emerging, heralding the rise of ‘Dark Liberalism’.
Modernity, victorious in liberalism, moved into the postmodern in a new — postliberal — stage. But this was only possible because all forms of collective identity (the Tradition paradigm) and the alternative artificial definitions of the political subject of the Second Political Theory (class) and the Third Political Theory (state, race) were abolished.
The individual is affirmed by liberals as the latest version of the most authentic human atom, and consequently as the philosophical foundation and political subject. And only after the victory of this ideology and the triumph of the human individual — as expressed in the ideology of civil society, the ideology of human rights, the ideology of globalisation and the world liberal capitalist market (the transition from global politics to global economy, with the abolition of history, as Fukuyama wrote) —, only at this moment did the door to the postmodern truly open. It was liberals who opened it, and therefore, in the ‘Dark Enlightenment’ paradigm, it is ‘Dark Liberalism’ that has the right of doctrinal and epistemological primacy.
Once the atom was confirmed as the basic moment of being, all further movement turned to the subatomic level. The phenomenology of political postphilosophy,1 or the political philosophy of the postmodern, is linked to this.
So, without the victory of liberalism, the victory of the postmodern would not have been possible. To be more precise, in theory, the post-modern could have been different — more likely Communist and less likely Fascist. However, the result of the twentieth century in the field of ideology is unambiguous: the political postmodern is based on the absolute dominance achieved by liberal ideology, the First Political Theory, which completely defeated the Second and Third ones.
This is roughly the context in which global society is being built. Global society is not yet a reality, it is a project. Nevertheless, it exists as a ‘concept’ and corresponds to a similar concept — the ‘global West’. When we say ‘the West’, we mean not only the geographical West, but also, for example, Japan and even the Pacific coast of China, where Western models in economy, culture and society prevail, as well as some countries that follow the Western way of development in the Pacific region (Singapore, Taiwan, etc.). ‘The West’ is global and ideological at the same time. Certainly, the West has not yet fully penetrated into the flesh and blood of all societies, peoples and civilisations, but nevertheless, this penetration is going on at full throttle, through markets, technology, culture, information, economics, politics, etc. The West is not just a collection of European and North American powers and societies. It is the very process of globalisation, ‘postmodernisation’ and the gradual spread of the codes (and stratifications, to use the term of Deleuze and Guattari) of Euro-American/ Euro-Atlantic culture to the entire planet. After the decisive victory of liberalism in the Cold War, the whole world has in a sense become ‘the West’, that is to say, an area of such territorialisation/deterritorialisation, which corresponds precisely to the liberal code of ‘assemblage’.
Accordingly, the agenda of global processes in world politics today is the dominance of liberalism and the assertion of its victory on a global scale, the elimination of nation-states (as we see in Europe) and the destruction of all forms of collective identity (nation, religion, gender, etc.). In this phase, modernity completes that destruction of vertical symmetries and organic collective identities which it began when the transition from traditional society (Platonism, Aristotelianism, religion) to modern society (materialism, democracy, secularism) was outlined.
Dugin, Postphilosophy.
Excerpt from the book: Politica Aeterna — Political Platonism & the Dark Enlightenment
Alexander Dugin’s Politica Aeterna takes readers on a compelling journey through the timeless structures of the political Logos, uncovering their deep connections with philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology. Dugin masterfully explores politics as an eternal framework and then traces its dramatic evolution through the ages. By contrasting traditional and modern societies, he reveals how political ideas that once dominated can become marginalized or even “heretical” over time. The book brilliantly captures the tension between these opposing forces, showing how history itself brings certain political structures to the forefront while others recede into the background.
Dugin challenges us to rethink our understanding of political metaphysics, arguing that time distorts our perceptions and offers only partial truths shaped by specific historical moments. As we navigate through different phases of political history, our views are inevitably coloured by the era we live in. Politica Aeterna is a must-read for anyone fascinated by the deep philosophical roots of politics and the ever-evolving landscape of political thought.
Here’s another cool wolverine article. I updated it.
Separate posts on this site deal with wolverines in Oregon, Wyoming, and Nevada.
Wolverines were once very common in Washington. 653 wolverines were trapped in a 17 year period from 1836-1853. That boils down to 38 wolverines trapped per year in the state, which seems like an incredible number. By the early 1900’s, reports indicated that wolverines were extirpated. However, afterwards the population seemed to grow. From 1970-1990, there are 28 wolverine records, including reports of three dens.
There are recent reports of wolverines from North Cascades and Mount Rainier National Parks; the Mount Baker, Colville, Gifford Pinchot, Kaniksu, Okanogan, and Wenatchee National Forests; the Kettle River Mountains; west of the Cascades near Puget Sound, the Yakima Indian Reservation, and Southeastern Washington. The national forest estimates are based on 33 reports of sighting and tracks from 1985-2000. Reports are especially common in North C…
This is the most thorough examination of wolverines in these somewhat marginal areas anywhere on the Net, especially in Illinois, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. It also goes over Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota more thoroughly than any other piece anywhere.
I did a huge edit on this. Been working on this for days now. I hope you like it. Long, 47 pages. Lots of updates of new sightings from the Upper Midwest and the Northeastern US which are generally not proven sightings, but which are nonetheless interesting. Keep in mind that wolverines lived in all of these states from the 1820’s-1922, so they could very well be recolonizing old territory. I may have to add a listing for Massachusetts because there are quite a few sightings and it is historical territory.
This particular post will deal with the question of wolverines in t…
Time flies when White Anglo civilization is falling down in the UK, South Africa, Australia, the USA and Canada. It seems like just a few years ago that I was actually living in the belly of the beast in New York City. It was the late 1980s. I was a public school teacher in Brooklyn where I earned a worthless MBA degree from Stern New York University. Check out New York University’s Jewish president Linda G. Mills. I personally saw lots of dark, hostile Muslim migrants walking Manhattan streets, driving taxi cabs and eyeing our Western women with bad intent. I left NYC shortly before the Islamic extremist bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 and accurately predicted more Islamic terrorist attacks and mass murders in New York City, London, Paris and elsewhere in the White West.
9/11 verified my complete worldview of “us” and “them.” Mohamed Atta and his ugly, hateful mass murdering Muslims were “them.” They slaughtered “us” here in our country. There are enemies, fools and traitors in our country who either deny or defend the 9/11 Islamic terrorists. They spout nonsense that “Islam is a Religion of Peace” and the real danger to us and the world are supposedly “white supremacists” or nationalists in Russia, Serbia, Syria or Iraq. Again, these people are enemies, traitors and fools.
And folks, it’s not some weird conspiracy. Our idiot traitors like Mittens Romney, Ron and Rand Paul, Prescott Bush, George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush weren’t all powerful, secret evil conspirators. They were part of the Harvard and Yale Club. And yes, George H.W Bush openly supported Hillary Rodham Clinton over Donald Trump. Hillary and the Bush family are Yalies. Texas governor, two time President George W Bush really was as dumb as he looks. He read horrible lying speeches written by nasty, evil Jewish neocons such as David Frum.
The Deep State system, Jews and others seem to have given up trying to use dumbass George W. Bush to promote open borders mass migration .The Jews and Anglo ruling class (worst ever British King Charles and the Rothschilds and now the Islamists ruling class) just work day in day out to flood our countries, our towns and our institutions with the worst Muslim migrants. They don’t talk about it. They just do it. They want us replaced.
So what should we do on September 11th? In my opinion, we should make September 11th a Holy Day for all our murdered martyrs, especially the 300 White Irish FDNY who gave their lives running up the burning, collapsing World Trade Center stairs when everyone else was fleeing in terror. Those 300 martyred White Irish American FDNY who died on 9-11-01 should be honored in the same way the 300 Spartans are honored for giving their lives defending Greece and White Western Civilization from the advancing Persian Asiatic mongrel hordes seeking our destruction.
The good news is our European kinfolk respond to the 9/11 Islamic slaughter of our people very differently than the Bushies in Con Inc. The safe, sane, prosperous nation of Switzerland responded by starting a completely new political party, the Swiss People’s Party. The SPP made stopping mass Muslim migration their number issue and it was a very winning issue.
The Swiss People’s Party became almost overnight the number one political party in Switzerland. French, German and Swedish populist nationalist parties also jumped on this winning issue. Keep the Muslim terrorists, the Muslim sexual grooming rape gangs out. These winning European populists aren’t stupid like the US Stupid Party.
In my opinion, the best, most no nonsense Islam restriction leaders is Polish MP Dominik Tarczy?ski. Here is Dominik telling a preachy liberal BBC woman that “Poland will not take even one Muslim illegal alien. Not even one.”
And for those of our OD readers that want to concentrate on the real Jewish Question issues, not invading, raping, murdering Muslims, please understand the worst, anti-White Jews such as New York Sen. Chuck Schumer, Tim Wise, Jewish neoconservatives in Con Inc, all support open borders mass immigration to the West with Israel reserved as a Jewish ethnostate. It is the official policy of the Israeli government to ethnically cleanse the remaining Palestinian Arabs in Gaza and dump them on us in the West and especially Ireland and Spain.
Alexander Dugin argues that Trump sent family and dealmakers to hear that Moscow will end the war on its own terms, while Europe’s “common-sense” revolt and a vast Moscow procession show peoples waking up faster than the elites still enforcing their firewall can keep up.
Host: The main story of the last few days, and one being argued over on both sides of the Atlantic, is yet another attempt by political intermediaries to settle the crisis. The American president’s special envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, went to Moscow, met Vladimir Putin, and then flew on to Kiev. Because the delegation was formally led by Witkoff and not by Kushner alone, a good many analysts read this as a major political story first and a business story only second. How do you assess this two-stop tour by people from the American establishment, and what, as you see it, are Donald Trump’s real interests here? This is hardly a matter of humanitarian feeling and peacemaking alone.
Alexander Dugin: I don’t think Trump has all that many consistent lines left. In many ways he has walked away from his campaign program. Even so, one has to give the facts their due: his basic attitude toward Russia has not changed. He never treated this war against us — a war he inherited from the previous administration — as his top priority. He backs Ukraine; they are “his people”; he is at war with us — but it is not first on his list. On that point he really has been consistent. If his policy differs from his predecessors’ in anything besides the rather theatrical packaging, it is in the steady effort to push the Ukraine war down the agenda. He has been doing that from the start: Anchorage, the whole of this year, and now these latest visits by Witkoff and Kushner. What he is saying is: Ukraine as such is not my problem. The Middle East matters, the Western Hemisphere matters. I have no intention of wading deeper into this war, of explaining it or getting lost in the details, so let’s finish it quickly.
When he sends Kushner and Witkoff — relatives, business partners, people from his inner circle — they carry exactly the message Trump wants delivered. He does not want to fight. He is not interested. Of course he is not simply going to throw Ukraine overboard, and his administration is still arming it. But when John Ratcliffe arrives in Moscow as CIA director, that is another matter entirely. That is the deep state, which treats Trump as a man on borrowed time. Trump promised to take the deep state apart and failed; that much is obvious. Which is why the conversation with Ratcliffe was a different conversation, in tone, from the one with Witkoff and Kushner.
We are dealing with two different power centers. The first is the CIA and the American military-industrial complex — the deep state — which means to fight us to the finish, until our strategic defeat. The second is Trump, who sends his own people: business proxies and the products of his family-clan idea of politics, and they bring a completely different message. Comparing what Ratcliffe said with what Witkoff and Kushner said, our leadership draws exactly the right conclusions.
The first thing we needed to get through to Trump was this: we are prepared to end this conflict altogether. That is what he sent them to hear. He dispatched Witkoff and Kushner for one reason only — to get an answer from the Kremlin about whether we are inclined to close the confrontation down. He is getting that answer. Meanwhile every Western commentary — and we barely discuss those commentaries here — agrees that Vladimir Putin’s demands will harden as our gains on the front continue. That is what is happening. The terms on the table today are tougher, and every serious Western observer says so, whether they overstate it or not. That is how politics works.
In the press the visit looks like this: Trump sent his own people, perhaps to blunt the openly ultimatum-like tone Ratcliffe had used for the Atlanticist line. Trump does not run much of America — the deep state does — but he sent his people to talk about ways of stopping the war, and he got the answer he wanted.
Then they went to Kiev. There they smiled. This is business, a deal, nothing personal and no geopolitics. They put on a cheerful show in the Mariinsky Palace, which, as it happens, was built by the Russian Empire and named after a Russian empress — a detail not without symbolism. Zelensky understands all of this perfectly well. He is betting on the Western deep state, waiting for Trump’s authority to expire or for the midterms — which are not far off — to tie him hand and foot. That is why Zelensky plays for time. He tells the Americans, “Yes, yes, I’m ready too,” so as not to provoke Trump, and in the next breath insists that the Europeans be brought in. And what will the Europeans do? They will immediately tighten every condition until the whole thing collapses. Which is precisely what Zelensky wants.
Host: Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin], let’s look at this from a few more angles. A lot of people argue that because the United States, through transnationals such as Monsanto, BlackRock and the rest, holds serious assets in Ukraine, the Kushner–Witkoff trip has a real economic subtext: an attempt to ring-fence those assets for American capital if the war ends on our terms. From that point of view, are they also traveling because Trump cannot afford to fall out with those corporations and is obliged to protect their interests in any settlement?
Alexander Dugin: That cannot be ruled out either, though I do not think economics is the main driver. As I see it — and I may be wrong — we have been extremely flexible on this point. We are telling the United States: hand Ukraine over, accept our terms, and on the economic side we are ready to talk. A strong Russia that brings this unpredictable, anarchic, Nazi “wild field” under control will be a far more reliable partner for American business than what is there now. We can guarantee that agreements will be kept and that assets will be safe.
If Trump thinks like a businessman, he ought to see that Russia is the better bet. For one thing, we are furious at the European Union’s wrecking policy, and on that point we can be America’s partners in putting the Brussels bureaucracy in its place. Once the territory is under our control, we can certainly wipe away every obligation Ukraine has toward Europe. American companies are another matter: if Washington is prepared to deal, we are ready to apply a different standard.
Still, our terms have clearly hardened. People are now asking whether a proper Putin–Trump meeting will happen — there was apparently some preparation for one — or whether everything will continue through envoys. Either way, we are talking to America more and more on our own terms. And those terms are the unconditional fulfillment of the goals set at the start of the special military operation.
I will say for the millionth time something that keeps slipping out of international analysis: the stated goals cannot be reached without full, direct military and political control over the whole of Ukraine. We cannot hope that someone else will disarm this regime while the West is openly fighting on its side. We cannot count on anyone else changing this hate-driven ideology. Our position follows from the aims of the operation, from the price we have already paid, and from the fact that half-measures will not do the job. In the hardest moments we still allowed some compromise. Now, as the front moves our way, we are prepared to give less and less.
Everyone is beginning to see that, America included. As for the corporations, we can, for tactical reasons, make a show of taking Trump’s concerns seriously and of understanding what big capital wants. We need a victory, and anything that brings that victory closer should be used. From the careful comments of people like Yuri Ushakov, that is the line the leadership is following: pragmatic and firm.
Hoping for backroom bargains, concessions, or some imaginary compromise only blurs a position that should stay clean. We are not striking deals — we are winning. If Witkoff and Kushner, even in pursuit of their own interests, help bring that victory nearer, they are welcome. If the point of the trip is to delay it, then any dubious paper will be cancelled by the only argument that counts: the war on the ground.
Host: You mentioned how close Ushakov and Lavrov are to the president, and how precise their comments are. I want to come at this from a third angle — the role of personality in high politics. It has long been said that the personal contact between Trump and Putin, and the respect for the personal element in both men, matters a great deal, especially given how often Trump has called Putin a strong leader. In principle they ought to meet — at any rate Yuri Ushakov has said a meeting at the APEC summit on 18–19 November is possible. Knowing how Trump actually feels about Zelensky, after the Oval Office and after, can one say that Trump — if you’ll pardon the expression — would rather deal with Putin than with Zelensky: more trust, more understanding, more of a counterpart?
Alexander Dugin: Yes. Completely. But Putin is a serious adversary. Zelensky is a malfunction — a leftover from the previous administration, from the globalists. Insolent, talentless, corrupt, and, on the whole, simply in Trump’s way. Different weight classes. Russia is a pole in its own right. Trump does not have to like us — why would he? — but he knows this is power, and he reckons with power. Zelensky is mainly nerve. And nerve is something Trump can afford to ignore.
Let us say it plainly: here everything depends on one man. This country is a monarchy. A democratic monarchy, a socially minded monarchy with all the formal attributes of democracy — but a monarchy, because that is what we were in Soviet times, in liberal times, and under the tsars. We are a monarchical society, and everything runs through the man at the top. That is why our head of state is actually sovereign.
America is not like that. Whether Putin likes a man or not decides a great deal. He can say, “I trust this person; we will do it this way,” and the answer is “Yes.” Anyone with a different view can mutter, grumble or clear his throat somewhere offstage. It does not matter. In America it does. Trump is a strong, vivid, charismatic, theatrical leader. What he does not do is run America. That is the point. He runs his social-media account. He would like to run the country. He has taken a postmodern shortcut and turned Truth Social into a kind of shadow White House. His posts move markets, drive the news and set the agenda. That is real influence, and I would not dismiss it. It is still not America.
Where the deep state sits, where the lobbies sit, Trump is powerless. He writes, “I am this, I did that, I am winning,” and behind him the machine does something else. They have no monarchy. It is not an accident that millions of Americans march against him under one slogan: No kings. This is a republic, and in practice an oligarchy. Reckon with the rich. Reckon with the outfits that actually run the place. Reckon with the lobbies and the deep state.
So Trump is king of the feed, monarch of the news cycle — and that shows you the limit of his power. Putin may or may not like Trump; Trump still stands at the head of America, but he is not a king. He is not the king. Putin is a king. He is a Russian monarch, a Russian tsar. He governs by will, by agency, by his own mind.
If Putin takes to Trump, that can be turned into policy. That Trump takes to Putin guarantees much less, because behind him stand the Ratcliffes, and behind them the people who make money from this war and who still read from the Atlanticist textbook. Trump is a free agent. Putin answers for what he says; Trump, only up to a point. Putin is the last instance speaking for Russia. Trump is not.
That does not mean Putin does as he pleases. He weighs the country and the state. He is a historical figure. Trump is forced into moves that contradict both his program and his obvious sympathies. When Americans demonstrated against monarchy, he wrote, in effect: “Fine — you don’t want kings, and I am not a king.” He isn’t. We have to remember that our tsar is talking to a non-king, and that behind that non-king stands the whole weight of the West. Our monarch understands what the West is. He also understands how conditional Trump’s own power is inside that system.
Continue:
Voilà pourquoi je suis toujours très poli quand je parle avec Grok pic.twitter.com/utR3EuJynW
— Le Crapaud (@Le_Crapaud47) September 9, 2026
Trump: If you want your house to be more valuable, you want a data center. If you want to go through poverty, crime and squaller, don't approve data centers. pic.twitter.com/DWLrx13d59
— Acyn (@Acyn) September 4, 2026
Q: The worst case is that AI will turn against humanity. Do we have guardrails?
— FactPost (@factpostnews) September 9, 2026
Trump: It's going to be fine. We'll always have something to stop them. We'll have a little gear. Boom. 'I really don't like that robot.' pic.twitter.com/uQOWJGb4fN
This story was overshadowed by Trump’s convention in Dallas.
“Three Anthropic researchers went public last night with chilling concerns about out-of-control AI, warning it could destroy humans this decade.
Anthropic AI researcher Jacob Coon wrote on X, after resigning Tuesday to sound the alarm: “The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade. This is not a marketing stunt. If anything, many executives and senior researchers will couch their phrasing in the press to sound sensible – but I hear the same people express fear privately. No other human activity poses this level of danger.”
Anthropic alignment-science lead Evan Hubinger responded: “Jacob is correct here — we really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans! I personally think it is >10% within the next decade. I believe Anthropic is trying its best, but we do not yet have a plan to solve alignment for superintelligence and are not clearly on track to.”
Samuel Marks, Anthropic scalable-oversight lead, added: “AI developers believe their technology could cause human extinction (or similarly bad outcomes). This could happen in the next few years. In general, the more senior the employee, the more concerned they are.”
Why it matters: They’re hardly alone. Their warnings came just days after top OpenAI leaders, including CEO Sam Altman, said AI is speeding into a scary, uncontrollable phase. …”
“A researcher for one of the largest and most valuable artificial intelligence companies has publicly quit — while raising the alarm that the technology “could kill us all by the end of the decade.”
Jacob Coxon, who has performed pre-training research at Anthropic and OpenAI for the last three years, posted on a wildly viral X thread that “neither company is acting responsibly.”
“They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives,” he wrote late Tuesday, with others from the company backing his terrifying warning. …”
I’m reassured though that the Trump administration is taking this potential looming threat posed by AI development as seriously as it took all the warnings from our own military and intelligence community about how the Iran War would likely play out. Iran was also “going to be fine.”
The Starkian Geopolitical Blueprint discards twentieth-century orthodoxies—colonial borders, the Arab-Israeli axis, the Riyadh-Tehran cold war—and replaced them with the cold arithmetic of genetic distance measured against a specific genomic profile: Stark’s overwhelmingly Northwest European (Danish, Norwegian, German, English, Welsh, Irish, Scots-Irish), anchored by a substantial West Slavic Polish component, sharpened by a precise 1/16th Ashkenazi line hailing from Mogilev, Belarus and West Prussia. That profile’s high Yamnaya Steppe and Ancient North Eurasian signal, combined with the Litvak-Yekke elite vector, produced an inverted map: closer affinity to certain Northeast Iranian and Caspian populations and a decisive preference for Israel’s historical secular Labor Zionist core over Israel’s contemporary right-wing populist and Mizrahi factions.
What follows is the logical next chapter: how that blueprint, once activated as living geopolitics, reorders the region through successive shocks, internal fractures, elite realignments, and cascading external effects. It is not prediction of inevitable destiny but a stress-test of genetic-proximity logic itself.
This geopolitical realignment begins with Iran sublimating the Gulf’s core materialist and religiously rigid polities—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain—whose populations sit farther from the Starkian coordinates. These societies, shaped by Arabian Peninsula Bedouin and coastal trading ancestries with limited Steppe admixture relative to northern Iranian groups, and organized around petro-wealth consumerism or Wahhabi-derived orthodoxy, register as civilizationally distant. Starkian statecraft would therefore treat them as structural adversaries rather than temporary tactical partners. Instruments would be asymmetric and deniable: intensified proxy pressure via residual Shia networks in the Eastern Province and Bahrain, cyber and economic disruption of hydrocarbon logistics, and narrative warfare that frames Gulf elites as rootless rentiers alienated from deeper Eurasian Indo-Iranian currents. The goal is not immediate conquest but sustained weakening—eroding the Gulf’s capacity to underwrite anti-Iranian coalitions while highlighting the genetic and cultural gap.
Victory against Gulf pressure, or the shock of heavy U.S. retaliation against Iran, would accelerate Iran’s internal genetic sorting. Northern and northeastern clusters—Mazandarani, Gilaki, Khorasani, and Azerbaijani-influenced groups carrying higher Steppe and West Eurasian hunter-gatherer components—gain leverage. These populations plot closer to the Starkian profile than the central-southern plateau core. Secular technocrats, Caspian-linked military officers, and certain Silk Road merchant-intellectual networks would marginalize factions whose genomes and cultural styles are more purely Near Eastern and Mesopotamian-shifted.
The irony is sharp: elements of the existing regime and religious elite who themselves carry northern or Khorasani ancestry (figures whose regional origins track closer to the Yamnaya signal) could be absorbed or elevated within a reformed power structure, while more southern or central clerical networks are sidelined. The result is not wholesale regime collapse into liberal democracy nor a partition of the country but rather a selective aristocratic consolidation: authority concentrates among those whose deep ancestry and cultural orientation—poetry, philosophical abstraction, high-modernist aesthetics—resonate with the Starkian preference for secular vanguardism over both theocratic rigidity and pure consumer materialism.
The emergent Iranian elite would cultivate an explicitly aristocratic register. Governance prioritizes competence, aesthetic refinement, and long-horizon civilizational projects over populist mobilization or clerical veto. Cultural policy elevates the Indo-Iranian classical tradition (Rumi’s Khorasani lineage as civilizational touchstone), modern science, and a restrained secularism that tolerates private piety while stripping public life of both fundamentalist enforcement and Gulf-style ostentation. Political institutions tilt toward meritocratic, albeit aristocratic, councils weighted by regional representation from high-Steppe provinces, with limited mass electoral volatility. The tone is high-biopolitical and technocratic rather than egalitarian or theocratic—an Indo-Iranian analogue to the secular Euro-Atlantic vanguard the original Blueprint favored.
This internal shift fractures Iran’s traditional external partners. Southern Iranian Gulf communities and Arab Shia populations in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf states—genetically more distant from the Starkian profile and culturally oriented toward Arab or Mesopotamian frames—lose privileged status. Proxy networks that relied on religious solidarity rather than ancestral affinity weaken. The new elite recalibrates: less pan-Shia internationalism, more selective engagement with groups and states whose population structure or elite culture shows greater Eurasian Steppe continuity. Residual influence in the Levant becomes transactional rather than ideological; southern Iranian commercial diasporas face relative marginalization inside the reformed state.
Arab Shia populations—whether in southern Iraq, Lebanon’s Shia communities, Bahrain, or the residual networks of the Gulf’s Eastern Province—remain markedly more distant from the Starkian genomic coordinates than the northern Iranian or secular Ashkenazi elites, their deeper Southwest Asian and Mesopotamian profiles lacking the elevated Yamnaya and Northwest-European signals that define the new order. Yet precisely because of this distance they can crystallize into an autonomous geopolitical bloc of their own, one that neither seeks absorption into the Starkian order nor submits to it. Their shared interest in containing the materialist, religiously rigid Sunni Gulf monarchies supplies the pragmatic glue: both the reformed northern-Iranian aristocracy and the post-Netanyahu Israeli elite recognize the Gulf as a common structural adversary, while the Arab Shia blocs understand that the Starkian powers, though genetically remote, will not actively dismantle them so long as they neutralize Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The resulting arrangement is one of cool, non-egalitarian coexistence rather than alliance or enmity; by channeling Arab Shia energies southward against the Gulf, the new configuration removes the principal vector of proxy confrontation that once inflamed the Levant, thereby lowering the temperature between the genetically closer Israeli regime and the more distant Arab Shia formations that leads to a detente between Israel and Hezbollah.
Southern Europeans plot genetically closer to western Turkish and Lebanese Christian populations than the full Starkian profile (northern European + Polish + specific Ashkenazi) does. Starkian distance to Anatolian and Levantine Christian clusters is therefore greater than to certain northern Iranian groups, yet still smaller than to core Arabian or deep southern Iranian isolates. Realignments follow: Turkey experiences elite competition between more European-leaning coastal and urban networks and inland Anatolian majorities; pragmatic secular or post-Kemalist factions gain relative advantage in any Starkian-influenced order. In Syria and Lebanon, residual Christian and certain urban Alawite or mixed communities become points of selective engagement, while broader Sunni Arab majorities remain more distant. The Levant fragments further along ancestral rather than purely confessional lines, with external powers adjusting patronage accordingly.
Parallel pressure produces regime change in Israel. The Netanyahu-era coalition, heavily weighted toward Mizrahi, religious-nationalist, and newer immigrant factions whose genetic distance from the Starkian Litvak-Yekke core is greater, loses coherence. A successor constellation draws more heavily from the historical secular Ashkenazi elite—descendants of the Mogilev-borderland and Central European networks that produced the early Labor and cultural establishment. Certain niche Orthodox factions tracing Litvak or related lines (including possible residual Mogilev connections) could find limited overlap, but the dominant tone shifts away from populist religious nationalism.
This realignment could also include the niche among Israel’s Right, that is friendlier to Europe but deeply skeptical of the Arab Gulf states, which is represented by the secular, hawkish, right-wing nationalist immigrant faction, historically embodied by Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beytenu party. This faction promotes a Eurocentric, Western-nationalist alignment and has previously advocated for Israel to join the European Union, while fiercely opposing the influence of Arab Gulf states or reliance on Middle Eastern regional dynamics. Genetically, this specific group—composed heavily of Ashkenazi Jews originating from the former Russian Empire and Central/Eastern Europe—is significantly closer to Stark’s Jewish ancestry than Likud whose power structure has shifted dramatically toward a coalition driven by Sephardic, Mizrahi (Middle Eastern/North African), and national-religious factions.
Stark’s Israeli cousins who share this distinct Litvak and Yekke lineage carry a cultural and intellectual DNA that naturally inclines them to be much more pro-European and highly skeptical of the Arab Gulf states compared to the average Israeli. Because they inherit the foundational values of Yekkishkeit—which prizes strict rule of law, institutional transparency, and Western civic order—along with the hyper-rational, analytical skepticism of the Litvak tradition, they are wired to view international relations through a lens of formal treaties and shared democratic principles rather than shifting transactional alliances. Stark’s Israeli cousins’ affinity for Europe despite its agonizing history of antisemitism is rooted in the distinct Yekke and Litvak understanding that the tragedy of the Holocaust was a catastrophic betrayal of Western civilization, not a reflection of its core ideals. Guided by the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment and the legalistic structure of Yekkishkeit, they view European values—democracy, the universal rule of law, scientific rationalism, and institutional transparency—as the highest achievements of human governance, principles that their own ancestors crucially helped shape and cultivate. For them, abandoning Europe because of its past would mean letting tyranny win; instead, they see modern Israel’s mission as being the ultimate, hyper-advanced outpost of those exact Western values in the Middle East. This is precisely why Europeans and Euro-Americans should look past Israel's loud, populist ruling coalition and form a deep, deliberate alliance with this specific secular, institutionalist demographic.
For them, Europe is not just a trading partner or a vacation destination; it is Israel’s spiritual, legal, and cultural anchor, representing a Western civilization they believe Israel must mirror and protect. Consequently, while a broader Israeli populace influenced by Likud’s populism might enthusiastically celebrate the financial and military glitz of the Abraham Accords, Stark’s Israeli cousins likely view deep reliance on the undemocratic, dynastic monarchies of the Gulf with profound unease. They are more likely to see these partnerships as unstable, short-term security arrangements that lack a foundation of shared values, worrying that tying Israel’s geopolitical future to Middle Eastern autocracies pulls the country away from its Western democratic heritage and deeper into a volatile regional dynamic.
Galitzianer Israelis, who trace their ancestry to Galicia, a historic and culturally distinct region that spanned southeastern Poland and western Ukraine and Mizrahi Israelis would arrive at a shared hawkishness through two entirely different geopolitical and cultural pathways. Mizrahi Israelis, rooted in Middle Eastern and North African heritage, approach regional dynamics through a lens of local survival and cultural realism; they enthusiastically back the transactional “Peace through Strength” model with the Gulf states because they view the Middle East as a zero-sum neighborhood where fluid, strongman alliances are far more reliable than Western lectures. Galitzianers, carrying the historical memory of the chaotic, shifting borderlands of Eastern Europe, operate on a deeply ingrained, insular survival instinct; they view international law and borders as inherently fluid and malleable, making them perfectly comfortable with Likud’s opportunistic backroom deals with absolute monarchs.
When it comes to Europe, Mizrahis harbor a deep resentment toward Western European criticism, viewing it as a detached, neo-colonial continuation of the same condescending attitudes the old Ashkenazi elite held toward Middle Eastern culture. Galitzianers view Europe with a profound, historical trauma rooted in centuries of intense persecution and traditionalist segregation, seeing an unbroken line from the pogroms of old Europe to modern EU critiques. Consequently, both groups reject the orderly, Eurocentric universalism of the Litvak-Yekke establishment, uniting in a populist, Middle Eastern-anchored foreign policy that enthusiastically pivots toward wealthy Gulf autocrats while treating Western Europe as an inherently biased, historical adversary.
Stark’s Israeli cousins’ friendlier stance to Europe amid intense geopolitical friction—reconciles perfectly with the harsh, urgent tone of his article on the Spain vs. Morocco Ceuta conflict that called the Israeli regime an enemy of the West. In Stark’s piece, he rightly expose how Likud’s exploitation of the Abraham Accords to back Morocco’s aggression acts as an opportunistic betrayal of the West, highlighting a toxic strain of political revenge within Israel’s current populist ruling coalition. His cousins would not only agree with that anger; they would view that very same behavior from the Israeli right as a deeply embarrassing, short-sighted desecration of Israel’s civilizational roots. Because his Litvak-Yekke DNA wires them to value structured European legalism over fluid, autocratic Middle Eastern alignments, they view the weaponization of migration against a democratic European state like Spain as completely illegitimate. By validating the harsh realities Stark calls out—where right-wing Zionists and neocons openly mock European sovereignty—his cousins represent the exact domestic counterweight needed to break this dangerous alignment. They validate his alarm by proving that the old, rational, Eurocentric Israel recognizes that throwing Europe under the bus is a strategic and moral catastrophe.
Stark’s article on Ceuta would draw a sharp line through the Israeli political psyche, eliciting visceral hatred from the ruling populist coalition and profound appreciation from the marginalized secular establishment. On one side, the Mizrahi and national-religious Likud base, alongside the messianic factions surrounding figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir, would absolutely loathe the piece. They would view the defense of Spain’s sovereignty over Ceuta as elitist, out-of-touch Europhilia, fiercely lashing out against his critique of their "peace through strength" Abraham Accords model. Operating on a zero-sum, street-fight doctrine of geopolitics, these right-wing populists would brand Stark a condescending Westerner who values European borders over Israeli defensive interests. Conversely, Stark’s secular Litvak-Yekke cousins and the broader institutionalist center-left might deeply appreciate his writing, reading it with a grim sense of validation. Traumatized by how the Netanyahu regime has systematically isolated Israel from its European civilizational roots, this secular elite would find the hyper-rational, rule-of-law framework incredibly refreshing. They would applaud him exposing the strategic madness of the ruling coalition, agreeing entirely that cheering on a Moroccan hybrid warfare migration surge against a Western democracy is both a moral catastrophe and geopolitical suicide.
A hypothetical Israeli political realignment structured purely around genetic proximity to Stark’s German “Yekke” and Litvak Jewish ancestry—combined with a strict pro-Europe, anti-Gulf Arab foreign policy, would trigger a foundational fracturing of Israel’s traditional right-left divide. Domestically, such a faction would have to consciously decouple itself from the modern, Middle Eastern-integrated Israeli mainstream, positioning itself as a fiercely secular, Eurocentric vanguard. By rejecting the Mizrahi-dominated, populist traditionalism of Likud and the religious right, this hypothetical movement would explicitly prioritize the cultural and genetic legacy of the old Ashkenazi Pale of Settlement as the true civilizational anchor of the state.
In foreign affairs, this realignment would completely abandon Benjamin Netanyahu’s signature “Abraham Accords” doctrine, viewing financial and diplomatic reliance on the oil-rich Gulf monarchies not as a strategic triumph, but as a dangerous dilution of Israel’s Western sovereignty and a capitulation to Islamic influence. Instead, this faction would aggressively pivot toward Europe—including the nationalist and secularist corridors of Central and Eastern Europe—offering Israel as a hyper-technological, ideologically aligned outpost of Western civilization.
Policy toward the Palestinians abandons both liberal egalitarian frameworks and the harsher crueler edges associated with the prior right-wing administration. It is hierarchical and realist: security red lines remain firm, demographic and cultural distance is acknowledged without romanticization, and governance arrangements favor functional separation and economic incentives over either one-state fantasies or permanent low-intensity domination. The posture is aristocratic restraint rather than populist vengeance or universalist guilt—managing proximity without pretending genetic or civilizational equivalence.
Under the Starkian realignment the Palestinian question is resolved neither through liberal-egalitarian frameworks that erase genetic and civilizational distance nor through the maximalist, low-restraint methods associated with the Netanyahu era. Instead a hierarchical yet non-vindictive settlement emerges: firm security perimeters, managed demographic separation, and calibrated economic incentives that acknowledge deep ancestral divergence without descending into collective punishment or permanent subjugation. This posture is fully compatible with the aristocratic Mogilev continuum embodied by Yitzhak Rabin, whose own Litvak lineage placed him at the genetic and cultural apex of the secular founding elite that aligns with’s Stark’s Jewish ancestry. Had Rabin lived to witness the later Gaza campaigns, he would almost certainly have regarded Netanyahu’s approach as a vulgar departure from the disciplined, state-centric realism of classic Labor Zionism—excessively populist, insufficiently attentive to long-term civilizational costs, and corrosive of the restrained aristocratic ethos that once guided Israel’s original Euro-Ashkenazi vanguard. The new order therefore recovers something closer to Rabin’s instinct: cold-eyed management of proximity rather than either sentimental equality or theatrical cruelty.
Stark’s secular Litvak-Yekke Israeli cousins would absolutely find common ground in favoring a Three-State Solution over both a chaotic suicidal One-State Solution and the cruel, short-sighted opportunism of Likud’s current platform in the occupied territories. The Three-State Solution (often called the “Egyptian-Jordanian option”) is a hyper-rational, structurally rigid approach to the conflict. It argues that instead of creating a fragile, independent Palestinian state or forcing a bi-national One-State, which would be an absolute nightmare that would inevitably destroy Israel’s secular, democratic fabric from within, administrative and security control over Gaza should be returned to Egypt, while the populated enclaves of the West Bank are re-integrated under Jordanian sovereignty, leaving Israel as a secure, homogeneous, and orderly Western-style state without the endless subjugation of the Palestinians. The Three-State framework appeals perfectly to their shared Litvak rationalism and Yekke demand for clean legal lines.
This new Israeli political system is more aristocratic and less populist: stronger institutional weight for technocratic and cultural elites, reduced reliance on coalition arithmetic with ultra-Orthodox or far-right parties, and a governing style closer to the old Labor Zionist secularism updated for contemporary constraints. “New money” and recent immigrant networks might retain economic influence but lose disproportionate political veto. The result is a cooler, more Euro-Atlantic-facing Israel that privileges genetic and cultural continuity with both Israel’s historical founding core and genetic and cultural proximity to Europe over maximalist territorial or messianic claims.
Building directly on the Starkian Blueprint’s core premise—that durable geopolitical alignments should track deep genetic distance and ancient steppe migrations rather than colonial borders, religious slogans, or twentieth-century ideological blocs—the same framework can be projected eastward into Greater Central Asia. The Starkian genomic profile (overwhelmingly Northwest European + West Slavic/Polish, with a thin but historically elite 1/16 Ashkenazi rabbinical component) sits farther from most populations of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan than it does from northern Iranians or the old Labor-Zionist Litvak core. Yet the same Yamnaya/ANE steppe and Indo-Iranian signals that pull the profile toward Khorasan and Mazandaran continue, at attenuated strength, into the highlands and valleys of the Pamirs, the Hindu Kush, and parts of the Afghan north. This residual affinity supplies a rational basis for selective engagement that simultaneously checks two expansive ideological projects hostile to a Euro-Atlantic-oriented order: pan-Turkism and any revival of a Sunni caliphate spanning the region.
Tajikistan offers the clearest structural bridge. As the only Persian-speaking, Indo-Iranian majority state in post-Soviet Central Asia, its population retains elevated levels of the same steppe and West Eurasian components that distinguish Northeast Iranian gentiles from more isolated southern or Mesopotamian-shifted groups. Pamiri and other highland communities further concentrate these signals. Under a Starkian reading, Tajikistan is therefore treated not as a peripheral post-Soviet republic but as the easternmost outpost of the same Indo-Iranian continuum that links the Starkian profile to Rumi’s Khorasan and the Caspian north. Policy emphasis falls on cultural, economic, and security ties that reinforce Persianate identity against Turkic linguistic and political pressure from the north and west.
Tajiks emerge as one of the clearest residual holdouts of West Eurasian, Indo-Iranian continuity deep inside Central Asia. Their genomes retain elevated steppe (Andronovo/Yamnaya-related), Iranian Neolithic, and broader West Eurasian components that create a measurable, if attenuated, ancestral bridge to Northwest European and West Slavic profiles. This places them closer to the Starkian core than the majority of surrounding populations that have been pulled into the broader East Asian and Turkic genetic sphere. Tajiks—particularly highland and Yaghnobi groups—function as a residual Indo-Iranian genetic and cultural holdout that partially resisted full absorption by successive Turkic and Mongol expansions, preserving higher West Eurasian/steppe ancestry amid surrounding populations that shifted further eastward; this dynamic can be loosely paralleled to contemporary anxieties in Europe over neo-Ottoman Turkish influence and demographic assertiveness, or in the Anglosphere over large-scale Han Chinese immigration, insofar as both involve pressures from genetically and historically more distant expansionist spheres.
Afghanistan is approached through the same genomic filter rather than as a unitary Pashtun-dominated or Taliban-defined entity. Northern and northeastern zones—historically tied to Greater Khorasan, Balkh, and the old Silk Road—carry higher frequencies of the Indo-Iranian and steppe ancestry that create the distant but real affinity noted in the original Blueprint (including the phenotypic observation of certain Afghan refugees). These areas become the natural partners for engagement, while southern and heavily Pashtun belts that show stronger Southwest Asian or more isolated profiles are deprioritized. The practical effect is a deliberate fracture of any monolithic “Afghan” project that would otherwise serve either radical Sunni transnational networks or external Turkic irredentism.
This arrangement functions as a dual containment strategy. Pan-Turkism seeks to reframe the entire region—from Anatolia through the Turkic republics into northern Afghanistan—as a single linguistic-civilizational space. By elevating the Indo-Iranian (Tajik-Persianate and northern Afghan) axis, Starkian geopolitics inserts a permanent genetic and cultural barrier that prevents the seamless eastward expansion of that project. Simultaneously, any Sunni caliphate or transnational Islamist architecture that relies on ideological uniformity across Arab, Turkic, Pashtun, and Persianate populations is undercut by the insistence on deep ancestral differentiation. The Blueprint does not require religious affinity; it requires measurable genomic proximity and the civilizational preferences that historically correlated with it (secular or aristocratic Persianate high culture over puritanical or tribal forms).
Under a Starkian genetic-proximity framework, Pakistan would not be treated as a coherent nation-state but fractured along deep ancestral lines, elevating residual northern highland and Indo-Iranian-linked pockets—such as certain communities in Gilgit-Baltistan, Chitral, or other areas retaining higher steppe/West Eurasian signals—as relatively closer holdouts akin to Tajik clusters, while deprioritizing or isolating the bulk of Pashtun populations (more Southwest Asian-shifted), the densely populated Indus lowland Punjabi and Sindhi majorities (with greater South Asian AASI components), and Baloch groups, thereby creating an artificial internal partition that favors selective engagement with the thinner northern residual strata and systematically weakens centralized authority in Islamabad much as the same lens divides Iran along Caspian/Khorasan versus southern fault lines.
India enters the picture as a classic transactional ally precisely because of greater overall genetic distance. The bulk of the Indian population lies farther from the Starkian Northwest-European + West-Slavic core than the Indo-Iranian highland groups of Central Asia. Yet India’s strategic interests—countering both Pakistani-sponsored networks and Chinese influence across the Hindu Kush and Pamirs, plus its own historical Persianate and steppe-influenced northern elite layers—align with the practical goals of the Starkian map. Cooperation remains instrumental: intelligence sharing, infrastructure corridors that bypass hostile intermediaries, and diplomatic coordination against pan-Turkic, radical Sunni projects, and Chinese geopolitical influence even if claims of kinship are very distant.
In each case the criterion remains the same empirical one used for Israel and Iran: genetic distance on standard PCA or formal statistics, not modern citizenship, language, or professed ideology. The resulting architecture treats Central Asia not as a blank chessboard for great-power rivalry or religious mobilization, but as an eastern extension of the same ancestral fault lines already mapped across the Zagros and the Levant—favoring Indo-Iranian continuity, containing expansive Turkic and Sunni-universalist projects, and employing more distant actors such as India only where interests converge.
Russia, whose own Steppe and Slavic components create partial overlap, can play selective broker but faces competition where Starkian logic privileges Euro-Atlantic over Eurasian authoritarian models. Overall alignments track genetic distance more closely than Cold War or post-9/11 ideology: coalitions of high-Yamnaya, high-European-admixture elites versus more isolated Southwest Asian clusters. In the unfolding Starkian order the genetically closer Russian populations—chiefly western and central groups of the European plain whose autosomal profiles sit nearest the West Slavic continuum—would be drawn into the same aristocratic Euro-Ashkenazi realignment that elevates northern Iranian and secular Litvak elites. Their affinity is anchored by Stark’s substantial Polish line, a West Slavic vector that already bridges the low-differentiation zone linking Poles, Belarusians, and the Russians of Smolensk, Bryansk and the broader central plain; the shared Slavic substrate, elevated R1a frequencies and common Yamnaya-derived Steppe signal make these Russians natural partners rather than distant outsiders.
The result would be a selective internal reordering of Russia itself: the Putin regime’s more archaic, Eurasianist and security-state elements—those oriented toward heavier Siberian or southern admixture and toward raw power projection—would be gradually marginalized in favor of a colder, more technocratic and culturally refined northern-western constellation. A figure such as a reformed western-Russian industrialist-intellectual of partial Polish or Smolensk descent could crystallize this shift, forging a new order that discards the regime’s residual backwardness, cult of personality and civilizational isolation while steadfastly refusing subordination to either American liberal internationalism or Chinese hierarchical dependency, thereby inserting a sovereign, genetically congruent Eurasian node into the broader Starkian concert of high-Steppe and Euro-Atlantic elites.
A Starkian geopolitical realignment grounded in ancestral proximity would find natural political expression in the recent AfD victory in Germany, where the lineage of Stark’s surname hails from. Magdeburg, where Stark has ancestry from, is a consistent AfD stronghold in Saxony-Anhalt and stands as a symbolic eastern German bastion whose voters already prioritize demographic preservation and civilizational boundaries; such a triumph would translate the framework’s emphasis on selective alliances and resistance to distant inflows into concrete European policy, framing Germany’s own ancestral core as the natural anchor for a continent-wide rejection of open-ended migration from more genetically remote spheres.
In the United States, policy elites whose own ancestries or cultural affinities track Northwest European and Ashkenazi secular vectors find the new configuration more congenial; residual support for Gulf monarchies or maximalist Israeli right-wing positions erodes. European states like Germany, Scandinavia, the UK, and Poland—experience easier diplomatic alignment with the reformed Iranian north and the post-Netanyahu Israeli elite.
The emergence of this Starkian order would provoke sharp and largely hostile reactions across the existing American political spectrum. A Trump administration and its neoconservative advisers, still oriented toward maximalist support for the prior Israeli right-wing coalition and toward Gulf security partnerships, would view the elevation of genetically closer secular Ashkenazi and northern-Iranian elites as an unwelcome disruption of proven alliances, dismissing the genetic-distance logic as abstruse and potentially weakening hard-power leverage against residual adversaries. Large segments of the mainstream Jewish establishment, invested in institutional continuity with the Netanyahu-era consensus and in broad communal solidarity that transcends the Starkian distinction between Litvak-Yekke aristocrats and more distant Mizrahi or religious-nationalist factions, would regard the new hierarchy as an internal schism that privileges an outdated Labor Zionist aesthetic over contemporary demographic and political realities. Meanwhile the pro-Palestine left, committed to egalitarian frameworks and to narratives of undifferentiated Israeli culpability, would denounce the entire arrangement as merely a more refined form of hierarchical exclusion, unable to accept a settlement that openly rejects both universalist equality and the older right-wing methods while still maintaining firm separation and security red lines. In each case the resistance would stem less from the practical outcomes than from the Starkian premise itself: that deep ancestry, rather than ideology, religion, or mid-twentieth-century alliance structures, should dictate the architecture of the new Near Eastern equilibrium.
Iranian and Jewish diasporas in Southern California—Tehrangeles and the Westside—undergo parallel sorting. Northern Iranian and secular Ashkenazi networks whose genetic and cultural profiles sit closer to the Starkian coordinates gain relative status and inter-diaspora affinity. More southern Iranian or Mizrahi/Orthodox clusters experience greater social distance. The original Blueprint’s Los Angeles laboratory becomes a microcosm: aristocratic Euro-Ashkenazi and northern Persian secular elites discover unexpected proximity, while materialistic new money or religiously rigid factions remain peripheral.
The principal forces standing in the way remain the Gulf monarchies whose petro-financial power would be curtailed, the hardline southern- and central-plateau factions inside Iran that refuse any northern aristocratic shift, the Israeli religious-nationalist right that rejects secular Ashkenazi primacy and any softening of maximalist policy, and the American neoconservative and institutional pro-Israel networks still wedded to the existing alliance map. Yet the same Starkian realignment carries a latent strategic dividend that could attract certain Western realists and geopolitical strategists: by elevating genetically closer northern-Iranian elites and post-populist Israeli centrists while weakening Gulf-centric energy leverage, the new order would simultaneously disrupt the hydrocarbon and logistical corridors that China has spent years securing through the Belt and Road and its partnerships with both Riyadh and Tehran. A Near East re-sorted along Starkian lines would therefore reduce Beijing’s ability to play Gulf producers against one another and against the West, creating a more fragmented energy landscape less amenable to Chinese influence. For hard-nosed American and European strategists already searching for ways to limit China’s Eurasian reach without endless direct military commitment, that anti-China secondary effect could supply a pragmatic rationale for tolerating, or even quietly encouraging, an otherwise eccentric genetic-aristocratic settlement.
The consolidation of the Starkian order would strike directly at the petrol and corporate new-money elites whose fortunes and influence rest on Gulf hydrocarbon rents and the dense web of financial, lobbying, and security ties those rents underwrite in Western capitals. An aristocratic alliance of northern-Iranian and Ashkenazi Israeli elites realign according to genetic proximity and shared high-cultural orientation, the Gulf monarchies and their associated transnational investor class would lose their privileged intermediary status, watching both energy leverage and political access erode. In their place would rise a new aristocratic revolution that is simultaneously anti-egalitarian and skeptical of unrestrained capitalism: hierarchy would be openly affirmed on the basis of deep ancestry, aesthetic refinement, and civilizational continuity rather than either mass democratic leveling or pure market accumulation. The emerging elite would draw its legitimacy from cultural production, intellectual vanguardism, and measurable genetic affinity to the Northwest-European-plus-Polish-plus-Litvak core, treating both Gulf petro-wealth and the more rootless forms of global corporate capital as transient, low-status phenomena to be subordinated rather than celebrated.
Weakening the Gulf petro-elites under a Starkian realignment would carry a secondary but strategically significant consequence for Europe: the reduction of one of the primary external vectors of Islamic institutional and ideological influence on the continent. For decades Saudi and broader Gulf financing has underwritten mosques, educational networks, charitable organizations, and Salafi-leaning religious infrastructure across Western Europe, amplifying forms of Islam that often stand at greater cultural and genetic distance from the Northwest-European core than either northern-Iranian or secular Ashkenazi formations. As the Starkian order marginalizes those same Gulf networks—stripping them of surplus hydrocarbon rents and geopolitical prestige—the flow of resources that sustain parallel religious structures and more rigid forms of identity politics inside European cities would diminish. The result would not be the disappearance of Islam in Europe, but a measurable contraction of the externally subsidized, Gulf-inflected variant that has most sharply challenged the continent’s historic cultural continuity, thereby aligning the Near Eastern hierarchical settlement with a longer-term interest in preserving the demographic and civilizational character of the European societies closest to the Starkian genomic profile itself.
Realistic possibilities are limited. Actual friendships between factions of Israel and Iran remain constrained by recent war, institutional memory, and mutual security dilemmas; genetic distance does not erase strategic rivalry overnight. Political figures most pragmatically open to elements of this map would be secular technocrats, certain Caspian- or Litvak-linked elites, and Western realists who already discount ideology. Strongest opposition would come from Gulf monarchies, southern Iranian hardliners, Israeli religious-nationalist and Mizrahi populist blocs, Turkish inland nationalists, and Western politicians invested in existing alliance structures or universalist frameworks. Biggest potential winners under the pure logic: northern Iranian and secular Ashkenazi cultural-political networks. Biggest losers: Gulf petro-elites, southern Iranian and Arab Shia proxy infrastructures, and maximalist right-wing Israeli factions.
Ironically, the Starkian genetic calculus would compel a détente between certain sitting and recent Israeli and Iranian political figures who remain formal adversaries, ranking several of them nearer to one another—and to Stark—than to many of their own coalition partners. On the Israeli side the highest proximity would belong to secular, Ashkenazi-leaning centrists such as Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz, whose cultural and ancestral profiles still track the older Litvak-Yekke Labor continuum, followed at a moderate distance by institutional figures like Isaac Herzog; far lower would rank Benjamin Netanyahu and, most acutely, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, whose Mizrahi and religious-nationalist bases diverge sharply from the Northwest-European-plus-Polish Starkian coordinates.
On the Iranian side the ranking might ironically elevate both Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei (Azerbaijani regional roots carrying elevated West-Eurasian components) and opposition figure Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi (Mazandarani Caspian ancestry rich in Steppe signal) well above more southern- or central-plateau-associated hardliners, with President Masoud Pezeshkian (Azeri background) occupying an intermediate but still relatively elevated position. The resulting proximity list might therefore read Lapid ≈ Gantz > Pahlavi ≈ Khamenei > Pezeshkian >> Netanyahu > Ben-Gvir ≈ Smotrich, exposing the structural irony that several current enemies share more deep ancestry with Stark—and potentially with each other—than with the factions that presently dominate their respective governments, thereby creating the precondition for a cold, non-ideological understanding once populist and theocratic overlays are set aside.
The probability that the full Starkian geopolitical order materializes remains low; the weight of existing institutions, path-dependent alliances, religious identities, and short-term security imperatives far exceeds the influence of any genomic ranking. Yet a narrow, contingent pathway can still be sketched. A simultaneous crisis—severe Gulf energy disruption paired with political exhaustion inside Israel after prolonged internal polarization, and elite fractures inside Iran triggered by external pressure or succession—could elevate precisely those factions already closest to the Starkian coordinates: secular Ashkenazi centrists in Israel and northern, Steppe-rich networks in Iran. If those groups then discover mutual strategic advantage in quietly sidelining both Gulf petro-elites and their own more distant domestic rivals, while Western actors fatigued by endless commitments tacitly accept the new hierarchy, a limited aristocratic realignment might cohere. In that slim window genetic proximity would function less as destiny than as a ready-made rationale for an otherwise opportunistic elite settlement—after which the ordinary forces of power politics would almost certainly reassert themselves.
The ideology that crystallizes is Scientific Euro-Atlanticism fused with high biopolitics and secular aristocratic vanguardism: genetic proximity as the primary axis of compatibility, rejection of both liberal internationalist moralism and religious-nationalist mysticism, preference for aesthetic and intellectual elites over mass populism or clerical rule. The global order it sketches is a loose concert of genetically and culturally closer nodes—northern Iranian reformed elites, post-populist Israeli secular core, selective European and American partners.
The Starkian Blueprint remains a provocative lens rather than a self-executing program. Chromosomes do not vote, and path dependence, institutions, and contingency still dominate. Yet by forcing attention onto deep population structure, it exposes how many contemporary alignments rest on thinner foundations than their rhetoric claims. The aristocratic Euro-Ashkenazi-Persian revolution, if it ever partially materializes, would be less a clean victory of one side than a selective re-sorting of elites along lines the original genetic map already sketched.
I am writing in response to Cameron Macgregor’s essay on men and civilizational renewal:
Cameron, your account moves from the shocks of 2008 and COVID to online awakening, then treats the inner transformation as complete despite the spread of echo chambers. This is the first point that needs closer examination. Losing faith in an existing order begins a …
Trump: "We're making a fortune. So if the Republicans win, you win with us and you get $5,000. It will be called the Trump Dividend. Congratulations." pic.twitter.com/l1QtvAUv5K
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 10, 2026
President Donald Trump pledged Wednesday to send every American adult $5,000 if Republicans retain control of the House and Senate in the midterm elections, an extraordinary gambit to reverse his party’s sagging fortunes in November. pic.twitter.com/GWOzqpvxwz
— The Associated Press (@AP) September 10, 2026
Ingraham on $5k dividend: Why not just give the money now?
— Acyn (@Acyn) September 10, 2026
Trump: Because the Democrats can't do it. pic.twitter.com/ioeh7KyVXH
If you believe Donald Trump is going to send you money, you are retarded.
— Kyle Seraphin (@KyleSeraphin) September 10, 2026
Here are his DOGE/Tariff/Dividend promises since Feb 2025. pic.twitter.com/GbaEaAk1mL
We have officially entered "Idiocracy"
— Knoxie (@KnoxieLuv) September 10, 2026
Why stop at $5000? Why not a million? pic.twitter.com/iFyNXJQYSL
Chudley Episode 4: The Freedom Dividend ??
— Jason Rink (@JasonRink) September 10, 2026
President Trump promised Chudley $5,000 — IF his party wins the next election.
Chudley did not hear the "if."
He's already "invested" $2,600 of it on questionable assets, and framed an IOU on his wall.
WATCH THE NEW EPISODE? pic.twitter.com/TxDL1wH7Sd
FORBIDDEN STUDIOS PRESENTS: HOME
— Forbidden HQ ? (@WearForbidden) September 10, 2026SWEET HOME
No matter which system you choose, there’s always something in the terms and conditions. pic.twitter.com/o5pMKypqNC
? JUST NOW: Senate Majority Leader John Thune says he'll see if the votes are there for President Trump's $5,000 Trump Dividend after the midterms
— Eric Daugherty (@EricLDaugh) September 10, 2026
"He wants more money in the pockets of the American people."
Q: Would you cut taxes?
THUNE: "We'll take another run at it…we'll… pic.twitter.com/l85YPy8aU7
Trump: "They use the word 'affordability,' right? It's fake." pic.twitter.com/xHHTdbR9Yn
— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) September 10, 2026
Trump: You have a neighboring state, New Mexico. We think it should be called New America. The people love the idea. pic.twitter.com/zPZQoSr7Rm
— Acyn (@Acyn) September 10, 2026
Trump: I think we should call the Hormuz Strait, we should call it the Trump Strait. I should get something out of this. pic.twitter.com/6GvxDyMxOU
— Acyn (@Acyn) September 10, 2026
April 8, 2025… pic.twitter.com/hhKKovewV4
— Ben Meiselas (@meiselasb) September 10, 2026
Low brow fiction of the past mirrors “high brow” reality of the present
— IanMalcolm84 (@IanMalcolm84) September 10, 2026
We need a peaceful cultural revolution pic.twitter.com/NrYllvic1h
To recap:
Trump condemned socialism, attacked the Dumbocrats, revisited his idea of renaming New Mexico and the Strait of Hormuz and promised voters that they would get a $5,000 Fell For It Again dividend check if Republicans win the midterms. Chudley has already spent his Trump Dividend.
Once again, [the Russian political scientist] Chadaev is entirely right about import substitution. From the 1990s and 2000s onward, the liberal-globalists—foreign agents in the economic sphere—persuaded our leadership that joining the international division of labor was advantageous, while autarky meant stagnation and a dead end. Integration into global value chains, they said, was development and modernization; there was no alternative. Anyone who argued otherwise—Glazyev, Katasonov, Delyagin, Khazin, Galushka—was demonized, ridiculed, and pushed to the margins. A taboo still sits on the word autarky itself and on Friedrich List’s doctrine of the “self-sufficiency of large spaces.” That means our economy is set up, from the outset, to reject full economic and technological sovereignty.
After the Special Military Operation began and a flood of sanctions followed, some things changed. The anathema on autarky was never lifted. The new line was simply that we would integrate—without the West. Import substitution became the answer.
It is a short-term measure, and a justified one. We have to fight and win now. We have to fight and win now, and the previous generation of economists had already destroyed the autarkic base needed for that, leaving Russia dependent on global supply chains. The West cut those chains; everyone then rushed East—or back to the same West by circuitous routes.
Continue:
you can watch in real-time the national average price of gasoline continue to tick up… $4.234/gal right now. @GasBuddy live data updates every *five* minutes (288x/day) based on millions of prices weekly https://t.co/GJlDRPhF7F
— Patrick De Haan (@GasBuddyGuy) September 9, 2026
We kind of only know Natalie Harp from photos — traveling and being with Trump 24/7, running after his golf cart, doing his Truth Social posts.
— Sarrah Bellus (@sarrah_bellus) September 9, 2026
Now… meet the real talking Natalie Harp. pic.twitter.com/ckw5uBuwtR
I will have some commentary later tonight.
Today, September 8, 2026, marks the sixtieth anniversary of Star Trek, which first appeared on American television in 1966. For six decades, its starships have carried a familiar promise: humanity will overcome its divisions, master its tools, and enter the stars with clean hands. The anniversary invites us to examine what that promise contains. Viewed from a multipolar perspective, the United Federation of Planets resembles the collective West’s preferred image of itself: wealthy, educated, peaceful in intention, and entitled to judge everyone else. Its officers arrive smiling. They offer medicine, knowledge, protection, and membership in a larger community. Yet beneath this welcome sits a firm assumption that history has a correct destination and that the Federation has already reached it. Other civilizations may contribute their food, clothes, music, and facial features. Their deepest convictions face a harder test. A people that places sacred duty above personal choice, inherited authority above equality, or civilizational independence above integration soon becomes a problem for the script to solve. The alien can keep his forehead ridges. Whether he can keep his understanding of the good is another matter. This is the weakness at the heart of the Federation’s tolerance: it welcomes the appearance of difference while reserving the right to decide which differences deserve a future.
